Chinese Air-Launched Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (Report Preview)

Note: The following text is part of a forthcoming SPAS Consulting Report examining the strengths and limitations of China's long-range conventional strike capabilities.

While the PLAAF has always operated the vast majority of the PLA’s crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft, the PLANAF has long operated a parallel fleet of land-based fixed-wing combat aircraft of its own. Before 2024, PLANAF fixed-wing combat aircraft, which were largely identical to those operated by the PLAAF, were used to provide air defence coverage to the PLAN surface fleet, which had very limited shipborne air defence capabilities until the 2010s, and undertake aerial attacks on surface ships, whether naval or merchant. Until the 2010s, the PLANAF – not the PLAAF – was trained and equipped to regularly operate over open water and undertake aerial attacks on surface ships. Over the 2010s and in tandem with the modernization of its combat aircraft fleet, however, the PLAAF pursued an expanded set of missions, including operations over open water in general and maritime strike in particular.

In 2023, the competition between the PLAAF and PLANAF over roles and resources, as well as the PLANAF’s reorientation to an aircraft carrier-centric force, culminated in the transfer of the bulk of the PLANAF’s land-based fixed-wing crewed combat aircraft to the PLAAF. Although the PLAAF is now the lead PLA service branch undertaking aerial maritime strike missions, it bears emphasis that it is not clear if all or just part of the PLAAF force structure is trained and equipped to undertake aerial attacks on surface ships. It is possible, even likely, that only a subset of PLAAF brigades are trained and equipped to undertake maritime strike missions even if the specific combat aircraft design(s) that a given PLAAF brigade operates is capable of launching anti-ship cruise missiles.

This section of the report examines the air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles associated with the crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft operated by the PLAAF and the PLANAF. The widespread characterization of China’s military as one focused on so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities notwithstanding, publicly available information suggests that the PLAAF and PLANAF have, to date, been strikingly unenthusiastic about air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles. As of this writing in March 2025, publicly available information indicates that the PLAAF and PLANAF together operate no more than three distinct air-launched anti-ship cruise missile designs, one of which is exclusively operated by the PLAAF bomber fleet and another of being of uncertain operational status. Although even a single operational air-launched anti-ship cruise missile design may be sufficient for the PLAAF and PLANAF, the majority of the combined fleet of ~2200 non-bomber fixed-wing crewed combat aircraft reportedly operated by the PLAAF and PLANAF in early 2025 – including former PLANAF land-based combat aircraft transferred to the PLAAF in 2023 – appear to be incapable of launching anti-ship cruise missiles of any type. Although this apparent situation may change in the future, the PLAAF of early 2025 does not appear to be an air force that places a strong emphasis on maritime strike capabilities, and this further attests to the PLAAF’s enduring focus on air-to-air combat missions.

YJ-83K Subsonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

When it came to anti-ship cruise missiles, the PLAN primarily relied on Soviet-built specimens, Chinese-built versions, and later Chinese derivatives of the very large and heavy surface-launched liquid-fuelled rocket-powered Soviet P-15 subsonic anti-ship cruise missile design throughout the Cold War. The original Soviet P-15 design and its progressively improved Chinese versions and derivatives had many limitations, and the PLAN made concerted efforts to emulate international developments in anti-ship cruise missile technology. These efforts were accelerated in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s following the apparent injection of foreign technology into China’s military industry. After the introduction of the comparatively much more sophisticated Chinese solid-fuelled rocket-powered subsonic YJ-8 anti-ship cruise missile in the late 1980s, the PLAN introduced the more competitive turbojet-powered subsonic YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missile by the late 1990s. The YJ-83 quickly became the standard anti-ship cruise missile of the PLAN surface fleet and was further developed into an air-launched variant, the YJ-83K, for use by first PLANAF and later PLAAF combat aircraft. As of March 2025, the decidedly conventional YJ-83/YJ-83K anti-ship cruise missile appears to be the most widely deployed anti-ship cruise missile in both the PLAN surface fleet and the PLAAF’s combat aircraft fleet. It is important to note that the YJ-83K is closely related to the KD-88 air-launched cruise missile design family, which was examined in a prior section of this SPAS Consulting report.

The Chinese YJ-83 family of anti-ship cruise missiles have a decidedly conventional subsonic design that draws heavily from the earlier French Exocet and American Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile design families, among other comparable designs. The YJ-83K reportedly weighs around 700 kg and has a reported nominal maximum range of around 220 km. The maximum practical range of the YJ-83K, which is a fire-and-forget air-launched missile, is affected by its flight profile. All else being equal, range can be maximized with a higher-altitude flight profile that minimizes the time-distance spent at lower altitudes. As with any air-launched munition, the maximum practical range of the YJ-83K is affected by the speed and altitude of the host aircraft at the time the munition separates from the host aircraft.

As with the baseline surface-launched YJ-83 that is widely deployed across the PLAN surface fleet, the baseline YJ-83K is equipped with an active radar homing seeker. While the active radar homing seekers employed on many anti-ship cruise missile designs are generally unsuitable for use against terrestrial targets, it is possible that the YJ-83 has a limited capability against certain types of terrestrial targets located near a coastline. The YJ-83K is reportedly equipped with a 165 kg semi-armour-piercing high explosive-fragmentation warhead that features multiple explosively formed penetrators distributed around the warhead. Specialized warheads of this type are optimized for attacks on dense targets of complex internal construction, such as warships, and are not optimized for use against most types of terrestrial targets. While a version equipped with a general purpose high explosive-fragmentation warhead cannot be ruled out, the combination of an active radar homing seeker and the aforementioned specialized warhead indicate that the baseline YJ-83K is employed as an air-launched anti-ship cruise missile rather than a multi-purpose air-launched cruise missile that is optimized for use against surface ships.

Although the aforementioned baseline version appears to be the most widely deployed version of the YJ-83K, this Chinese design has evolved into a family of air-launched cruise missiles that may offer progressively enhanced land-attack capabilities. Publicly available imagery indicates the existence of three distinct versions of the YJ-83K airframe that are equipped with an apparent imaging infrared seeker. While active radar homing is a tried and tested and, therefore, widely employed approach to anti-ship missile guidance, it has limitations and is increasingly susceptible to countermeasures. As with any active sensor, active radar homing seekers emit electromagnetic radiation that can be detected at a greater distance by potential targets than the seeker can itself detect potential targets. This can provide early warning to adversary warships and increases the likelihood that an anti-ship cruise missile is detected and successfully intercepted in flight. Active radar homing seekers are also susceptible to electronic warfare, chaff, and deployable floating radar reflector decoys. Imaging infrared seekers, in contrast, utilize a passive sensor and are, therefore, immune to the effects of the aforementioned countermeasures. Missiles equipped with imaging infrared seekers are, however, susceptible to a different set of countermeasures and can be intercepted in flight as with any other munition. A major advantage of imaging infrared seekers is that these facilitate enhanced target classification. As a result, an anti-ship cruise missile equipped with an imaging infrared seeker is more likely to home in on a specific type of warship as opposed to any surface contact, including a decoy, that has a sufficiently large radar signature. All else being equal and in a world of unlimited resources, multi-mode guidance is preferable in an anti-ship cruise missile design.

Imagery shared on Chinese social media in recent years has revealed the existence of two versions of the YJ-83K that augment the active radar homing seeker with an imaging infrared seeker. The first version, which may have the designation YJ-83KA, incorporates what is likely to be a small imaging infrared seeker that is conspicuously attached to the fuselage under the nose section.

The second version, which may have the designation YJ-83KB, has a revised nose section that contains two apertures that appear to support both an active radar homing seeker and a likely imaging infrared seeker, with the latter being much larger than the small aperture installed under the nose section of the YJ-83KA.

Publicly available imagery also indicates the existence of a third version, reportedly designated the YJ-83KH, that appears to be exclusively equipped with an imaging infrared seeker. The YJ-83KH, which is likely to have a fire-and-forget mode if it is not an exclusively fire-and-forget anti-ship cruise missile design, can be distinguished from the related imaging infrared seeker-equipped human-in-the-loop KD-88A air-launched cruise missile by the absence of distinctive data link antennas, which are installed on the tips of the main cruciform wings of the KD-88A.

The production and deployment status of these more recent members of the YJ-83K design family are unclear. It is possible that at least one of these versions amounts to an upgrade of existing YJ-83K missiles. The version reportedly designated the YJ-83KA, which incorporates what is likely to be a small imaging infrared seeker installed underneath the nose section, is likely to amount to a low-cost upgrade of existing YJ-83K missiles. The version reportedly designated the YJ-83KB, which has a revised nose section that contains two sensor apertures, is more likely to be a factory-built design. The third version, reportedly designated the YJ-83KH, reflects a different approach to the employment of anti-ship cruise missiles, given that it appears to be exclusively equipped with an imaging infrared seeker.

The existence of the YJ-83KH raises the possibility that PLAAF combat aircraft will launch salvos of anti-ship cruise missiles with a mixed load of missiles equipped with active radar homing and/or passive imaging infrared seekers. The apparent existence of three members of the YJ-83K design family may be reflective of the pursuit of such a capability over time. That said, it is possible that one or more of the aforementioned three YJ-83K versions are prototypes and/or versions that are not widely deployed or available in large numbers. There is very limited publicly available information on these anti-ship cruise missiles, including the timeframe in which these were developed and/or deployed. It also bears emphasis that the transfer of most PLANAF land-based combat aircraft to the PLAAF in 2023 may have led to revised procurement and modernization priorities for the PLAAF’s expanded and highly heterogeneous fleet of crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft and its accompanying arsenal of air-launched munitions.

Uncertainties notwithstanding, the evolution of the YJ-83K design family is of particular relevance to an assessment of the PLAAF’s strike capabilities. The use of imaging infrared seekers is likely to significantly enhance the land-attack capabilities of what was previously a very conventional active radar homing subsonic anti-ship cruise missile design. This is, of course, an analytical inference made solely on the basis of discernible changes to hardware, and it is possible that PLAAF doctrine continues to view the versions of the YJ-83K missile equipped with imaging infrared seekers as anti-ship cruise missiles rather than multipurpose air-launched cruise missiles. There is, moreover, no indication that existing and/or new build YJ-83K family missiles are equipped with a multipurpose warhead. It is, however, possible that the third version, reportedly designated YJ-83KH, amounts to a multipurpose fire-and-forget air-launched cruise missile design that complements the PLAAF’s closely related KD-88A human-in-the-loop air-launched cruise missile. China’s military industry offers export customers the CM-802AKG, which is solely equipped with an imaging infrared seeker. The CM-802AKG, which is an export designation, has a reported nominal maximum range of 230 km while equipped with a 285 kg warhead and is explicitly characterized in recent marketing material as a multipurpose air-launched cruise missile suitable for use against both surface ships and terrestrial targets.

Although the production status of the YJ-83K family of air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles cannot be confirmed with publicly available information, the widespread deployment of the air-launched YJ-83K and the surface-launched YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missiles as of early 2025 suggests that this long-standing Chinese missile design remains in production. All things considered, the YJ-83K is a fairly conventional subsonic anti-ship cruise missile design comparable to the American AGM-84 Harpoon, French Exocet, and Russian Kh-35, among others. The YJ-83K and similar designs have reached something of an evolutionary dead end. While China has adopted imaging infrared guidance for use in its air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, there is limited scope for increasing the range of the YJ-83K to facilitate standoff launches at a greater – and safer – distance.

While a major redesign of the YJ-83K is, of course, a possibility, the PLA is likely to be better off with a clean sheet design or an adaptation of a more sophisticated low-signature existing design, such as the KF-98 air-launched cruise missile. Chinese designers can also trade payload for range in a further evolution of the YJ-83K design family but this will have the effect of reducing destructive effects against surface ships, whether naval or merchant, and the PLA as a whole appears to be more interested in sinking the ships rather than merely damaging the ships that it targets. It bears emphasis that the versions of the YJ-83K equipped with imaging infrared sensors may have been deployed long before these were unofficially unveiled. That is, the YJ-83K versions equipped with imaging infrared sensors may well amount to lagging indicators of the air-launched maritime strike capabilities of PLAAF and PLANAF.

The YJ-83K air-launched anti-ship cruise missile can be employed by 39.64% of the combined fleet of ~2200 non-bomber crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft reportedly deployed by the PLAAF and PLANAF in early 2025. The integration of the YJ-83K been confirmed with the JH-7A strike aircraft (x4), J-10C multirole fighter (x2), J-15 STOBAR carrier-borne multirole fighter (x2), J-15T CATOBAR carrier-borne multirole fighter (x4), J-16 multirole fighter (x4), H-6G/H-6L (x4) bomber, and H-6J bomber (x6).

YJ-91A (Kh-31A) Supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

Soviet missile designers were particularly enthusiastic about developing munitions with multiple guidance options. The Kh-31 design family is one manifestation of this dynamic, having been developed in the form of the Kh-31A supersonic anti-ship cruise missile and the Kh-31P supersonic anti-radiation missile. The Chinese YJ-91 anti-radiation missile examined in the previous section of this report is a Chinese-built Kh-31P. Public sources indicate that China imported some number of Kh-31A supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles for use with the PLANAF’s small fleet of Russian-built Su-30MK2 multirole fighters, which were built in a somewhat different configuration than the larger number of Su-30MKK multirole fighters ordered by the PLAAF. As with the bulk of the PLANAF’s fleet of land-based fixed-wing combat aircraft, the small Su-30MK2 fleet was transferred to the PLAAF in 2023. It is unclear if the PLAAF operates the Russian-built Kh-31A supersonic anti-ship cruise missile outside the small ex-PLANAF Su-30MK2 fleet or if the Chinese YJ-91A anti-ship cruise missile has been built and deployed in large numbers.

Whereas the YJ-91/Kh-31P anti-radiation is equipped with a passive radiation homing seeker, the YJ-91A/Kh-31A anti-ship cruise missile is equipped with an active radar homing seeker. While the active radar homing seekers employed on many anti-ship cruise missile designs are generally unsuitable for use against terrestrial targets, it is possible that the YJ-91A has a limited capability against certain types of terrestrial targets located near a coastline. As with the YJ-91/Kh-31P anti-radiation missile, the YJ-91A is powered by an air-breathing ramjet engine that employs liquid fuel and draws oxidizer from the atmosphere. The ramjet engine powers the YJ-91A to a maximum speed of around Mach 3 over a reported nominal maximum range of around 70 km while equipped with a reported 94 kg warhead. Ramjet engines do not function at a subsonic airspeed, and the YJ-91A, therefore, relies on an integral solid-fuelled rocket booster to accelerate the YJ-91A to a speed suitable for ignition of the ramjet engine.

When compared with a subsonic anti-ship cruise missile like the air-launched YJ-83K, the YJ-91A/Kh-31A reflects a trade of payload and range for speed. While it is equipped with a much smaller – reportedly 94 kg – warhead than the YJ-83K, which is reportedly equipped with a 165 kg warhead, the kinetic effects of a YJ-91A/Kh-31A impact alone – as in the event of a defective warhead that fails to detonate – is considerable, and a successful detonation in the interior of a warship of dense construction will likely result in significant damage even with a comparatively small warhead. Kinetic effects are not, however, the reason for the existence of the YJ-91A/Kh-31A and other supersonic anti-ship cruise missile designs.

The primary purpose of sustained supersonic speed in an anti-ship cruise missile is to reduce the time-to-target and attain a higher probability of penetrating naval air defences through speed alone. In terms of a short time-to-target, most large warships are unlikely to achieve a top speed much greater than 60 km/h, and no warship can outrun a high subsonic anti-ship cruise missile – such as one flying at Mach 0.85 – unless said missile is launched toward an extremely distant target ship. In terms of penetrating naval air defences, subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles are slow enough and have a sufficiently long time-to-target to be, all else being equal, highly vulnerable to radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery and naval surface-to-air missiles.

A sea-skimming subsonic anti-ship cruise missile crossing the radar horizon will require some two minutes and seventeen seconds to reach a target ship. Medium-caliber radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery, including the well-known American Phalanx Close In Weapons System (CIWS), has a maximum engagement range no greater than 2-4 km and will, as such, have around 6-21 seconds to engage a subsonic anti-ship cruise missile flying at a speed of around Mach 0.85. The target ship’s surface-to-air missile systems, various countermeasures, electronic warfare systems, and, not least, the target ship’s crew, have around two minutes and seventeen seconds to respond to the incoming subsonic anti-ship cruise missile. While supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles can also be intercepted by radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles and are similarly susceptible to various countermeasures and electronic warfare systems, a high speed of Mach 2 to Mach 3 translates to a time-to-target of approximately 40-60 seconds once the missile crosses the target ship’s radar horizon. Radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery will, as such, have just 2-6 seconds to engage a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile flying at a speed of Mach 2 to Mach 3. By operating at such a high speed, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles take advantage of slow human reaction times. Warships are, therefore, forced to operate air defence systems and countermeasures in a semi-automated if not fully automated state when in a high-threat environment.

Although supersonic anti-ship cruise missile designs receive a lot of attention, there are sound reasons as to why militaries – including both the PLAAF and PLAN – have primarily directed their finite resources toward subsonic anti-ship cruise missile designs. Among other things, the high speed of supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles is accompanied by a significant infrared signature and does not lend itself to the employment of passive imaging infrared seekers. As a result, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles with active radar homing seekers can be more readily detected through various means. Subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles can, in contrast, benefit from major reductions in radar and infrared signature and can also be readily equipped with passive imaging infrared seekers. Supersonic speed is not, therefore, without cost or trade-off when it comes to anti-ship cruise missile technology.

For an air force like the PLAAF, there are also other considerations related to the effects that carrying a given munition has on the launch aircraft. The YJ-91A/Kh-31A is a very large missile that weighs around 600 kg, and this affects the number of Y-91A supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles that can be carried by a given aircraft. While a 600 kg missile is not a particularly heavy payload for contemporary combat aircraft, the YJ-91/Kh-31A has a reported nominal maximum range of just 70 km. The maximum practical range of the YJ-91 is, of course, affected by its flight profile. All else being equal, range can be maximized with a higher altitude flight profile that minimizes the time-distance spent at lower altitudes. As with any air-launched munition, the maximum practical range of the YJ-91 is also affected by the speed and altitude of the host aircraft at the time the munition separates from the host aircraft. A nominal maximum range of 70 km – or even 100 km – for an anti-ship cruise missile, even one flying at a supersonic speed, is not impressive when compared with the 220 km reported nominal maximum range of the subsonic YJ-83K. A nominal maximum range of 70 km is, moreover, insufficient for the launch aircraft to remain beyond the expanding reach of the naval surface-to-air missile systems that protect warships from aerial attack.

As noted earlier, the primary purpose of sustained supersonic speed in an anti-ship cruise missile is to reduce the time-to-target and attain a higher probability of penetrating naval air defences through speed alone. Most warships are unlikely to achieve a top speed much greater than 60 km/h, and a warship under attack by a YJ-91A/Kh-31A is unlikely to displace more than 1-2 km from the time that a supersonic YJ-91A is released from the host aircraft. In terms of a higher probability of penetrating naval air defences through speed alone, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles can be extremely effective against a notional adversary surface fleet characterized by weak – as viewed from the perspective of an observer in 2025 – long-range naval air defence capabilities. The issue, of course, is that a notional strong contemporary surface fleet lacking in terms of long-range naval air defences amounts to a contradiction in terms in 2025.

For the PLAAF and PLANAF, the primary targets of Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles, whether subsonic or supersonic, are the American and Japanese surface fleets. Taiwan’s surface fleet is, of course, of non-zero importance, but it is unlikely to be a major concern for Chinese military planners focused on the American and Japanese surface fleets. The American and Japanese surface fleets are exceptionally well-equipped and, in wartime, are likely to constitute the naval squadrons best protected against aerial attack. American Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, for example, are equipped with RIM-66 and RIM-174 long-range surface-to-air missiles as well as RIM-162 medium-range surface-to-air missiles. With 74 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in active service as of March 2025, and with each of these American destroyers being equipped with 90-96 Mark 41 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, PLAAF and PLANAF combat aircraft will face a formidable challenge when undertaking maritime strike sorties. American warships and accompanying Japanese warships are, moreover, regularly extended air cover by American carrier-borne fighter aircraft and AEW&C aircraft and, to a much lesser degree, the vertical take-off and landing fixed-wing fighter aircraft carried on American flat-deck amphibious warfare ships. Viewed in these terms – and notwithstanding the fact that not every warship targeted by the PLAAF and PLANAF in wartime will have the air defence capabilities of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer or similar – an air-launched supersonic anti-ship cruise missile is impractical for the PLAAF and PLANAF unless it offers a substantial standoff range of at least 200-300 kilometers when launched from medium to high altitude.

While the YJ-91A has major limitations as an anti-ship cruise missile at the disposal of the PLAAF and the PLANAF in early 2025, it is important to note that the Soviet designers of this supersonic anti-ship cruise missile were not obtuse. At the time it was developed in the 1980s, naval surface-to-air missiles were primarily medium-range, not long-range systems, and even the most heavily armed warships did not have the air defence capabilities of an American Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the first of which was only commissioned by the U.S. Navy in 1991 (the first vertical launch system-equipped version of the preceding Ticonderoga-class cruiser was only commissioned in 1986). Naval combat dynamics were, as such, very different in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Kh-31A supersonic anti-ship cruise missile amounted to a formidable capability in the hands of Soviet Naval Aviation at the time. This was particularly the case in functionally near-enclosed bodies of water like the Baltic Sea and the Sea of Japan, both of which were, not unimportantly, home to dense concentrations of Soviet combat aircraft, air defences, and surface ships. While the PLAAF can productively employ the YJ-91A against adversary ships in the Taiwan Strait and the Yellow Sea as well as along China’s coastline, the PLAAF, PLAN, and PLARF are increasingly focused on maritime strikes against distant surface ships operating several hundred or more kilometers from the Chinese coastline in the Philippine Sea, East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Should the version potentially deployed by the PLA have a nominal maximum range of just 70 km – or even 100 or so km, the supersonic YJ-91A anti-ship cruise missile is not a practical design for use against American and Japanese warships in 2025.

It bears emphasis that the above dynamics do not exclusively apply to China. Other countries interested in supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles encounter the very same challenges. Japan, for example, developed the ASM-3 supersonic ramjet-powered anti-ship cruise missile. As it was being developed, the ASM-3 held the potential of giving the Japanese military the upper hand against the larger Chinese surface fleet in the East China Sea. By the time that the development of ASM-3 concluded, however, the PLAN was the better part of a decade into a large-scale surface fleet modernization and expansion program in which the PLAN had commissioned and was building dozens of destroyers equipped with long-range HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles against which the reported 200 km nominal maximum range of the original ASM-3 was inadequate. In the world of 2025 let alone the near- and medium-term future, air-launched supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles must have sufficient standoff range so that the launch aircraft does not have to operate at a medium- to high-altitude – with the aim of maximizing the practical range of the supersonic anti-ship cruise missile – while within range of adversary long-range naval surface-to-air missiles.

Notwithstanding the uncertainty about the operational and production status of the Soviet-designed YJ-91A/Kh-31A supersonic anti-ship cruise missile in PLA service, it is important to note that there is scope for improving the performance of the YJ-91A. The Russian manufacturer’s latest version of the design, the Kh-31AD, has a claimed nominal maximum range of 160 km while equipped with a 110 kg warhead. Although this amounts to a substantial improvement over the original late Cold War Kh-31A, which has a reported nominal maximum range of 70 km while equipped with a 94 kg warhead, it likely remains inadequate for use against American and Japanese warships in 2025 and beyond. As with the related YJ-91/Kh-31P supersonic anti-radiation missile examined in the previous section of this SPAS Consulting report, the YJ-91/Kh-31 airframe’s large size and weight inhibit current and future PLAAF operations as well as those of carrier-borne PLANAF aircraft. These negative effects will only increase as PLAAF and PLANAF operations increasingly focus on the J-20 (PLAAF), J-35 (PLAAF and PLANAF), and other crewed and uncrewed combat aircraft designs in which munitions are primarily, if not exclusively, carried in internal weapons bays of finite volume. There is, moreover, no indication that China has developed a version of the YJ-91A that approaches the latest Russian Kh-31AD in terms of maximum range.

Publicly available information is inadequate to confirm the operational status of the YJ-91A/Kh-31A supersonic air-launched anti-ship cruise missile outside the small fleet of ex-PLANAF Su-30MK2 aircraft. Assuming that the YJ-91A/Kh-31A can be launched from any aircraft that is capable of launching the YJ-91/Kh-31P anti-radiation missile – which is not a very sound assumption, the YJ-91A/Kh-31A anti-ship cruise missile can be employed by 44.78% of combined fleet of ~2200 non-bomber crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft reportedly deployed by the PLAAF and PLANAF in early 2025. The integration of the YJ-91/Kh-31P anti-radiation missile – not the YJ-91A/Kh-31A anti-ship cruise missile – been confirmed with the JH-7A strike aircraft (x4), J-10C multirole fighter (x2), J-15 STOBAR multirole fighter (x2), J-15T CATOBAR multirole fighter (x4), and J-16 multirole fighter (x4). It bears emphasis, however, that the launch aircraft will likely require a compatible radar with a maritime search mode to make full use of the YJ-91A/Kh-31A anti-ship cruise missile.

Placing China’s Pursuit of Long-Range Supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in an International Context

For all of the emphasis given to China’s maritime strike capabilities in discussions of the country’s so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, it is notable that the PLA’s non-bomber fixed-wing combat aircraft appear to be limited to launching YJ-83K subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles with a reported nominal maximum range of around 200 km. Even if the YJ-91A supersonic anti-ship cruise missile is operational in the PLAAF and/or PLANAF, the original Soviet-Russian Kh-31A has a reported nominal maximum range of less than 100 km, and even the latest Russian Kh-31AD has a claimed nominal maximum range of 160 km. As a result, the ~2220 non-bomber fixed-wing combat aircraft that the PLAAF and PLANAF are collectively reported to deploy in early 2025 appear to lack an air-launched anti-ship cruise missile, whether subsonic or supersonic, that can be launched beyond the reach of American and Japanese long-range naval surface-to-air missiles. This requires a maximum range of at least 200-300 km. Public sources indicate that China operates one such air-launched anti-ship cruise missile design, the supersonic YJ-12. Given the size and weight associated with any missile design using current technology that is capable of delivering a sizeable warhead over a long distance at supersonic speed, the YJ-12 is unsurprisingly a very large missile that, as of this writing, can only be carried by PLAAF bomber aircraft, including ex-PLANAF airframes. The YJ-12 is not, as such, a substitute for the YJ-83K and the YJ-91A in PLAAF (and PLANAF) service, but a niche system that expands the PLAAF’s maritime strike capabilities and in so doing bolsters the aggregate of China’s maritime strike capabilities that are divided among the PLAAF, PLAN, PLARF, and to a much lesser degree the PLAGF.

Before examining the Chinese YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, it is productive to situate it in the context of the development of long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles worldwide. Aside from ballistic missiles, most supersonic missiles that have been developed and deployed to date are surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. Aside from ballistic missiles, the development and deployment of supersonic surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles, including those powered by ramjet engines, amounted to an almost exclusively Soviet undertaking, if not obsession, throughout the Cold War. The Soviet Union developed and deployed a wide range of surface-, subsurface-, and air-launched supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles – most of which were primarily equipped with nuclear warheads – for use against the aircraft carrier-centric U.S. Navy.

While the post-1945 expansion of the Soviet surface and submarine fleets are likely to be familiar developments to many contemporary observers of the PLA, the Soviet Navy also operated a large fleet of land-based bomber aircraft tasked with maritime strike missions in parallel to the Soviet Air Force’s much larger and better-known Long Range Aviation bomber force, which did not focus on maritime strike missions. It is important to note that in the decades up through 2023, the PLANAF not only operated a large number of land-based fixed-wing combat aircraft in parallel to the PLAAF in the same manner that Soviet Naval Aviation operated land-based combat aircraft in parallel to the Soviet Air Force (as well as the separate and independent Soviet Air Defence Force), but the PLANAF also operated a modest fleet of older H-6G/H-6L and newer H-6J maritime strike bombers in parallel to the much larger PLAAF fleet of H-6M/H-6W, H-6K, and nuclear-armed H-6N bomber aircraft. The Xi’an H-6 bomber family refers to Chinese derivatives of the 1950s origin turbojet-powered Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 bomber design, with the latest turbofan-powered H-6K, H-6J, and H-6N versions amounting to a major upgrade over the turbojet-powered Tu-16 variants that the Soviet Union deployed by the end of the Cold War. The Soviet experience with air-launched supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles is, as such, relevant to the contemporary PLA in multiple respects.

By the end of the Cold War, Soviet Naval Aviation operated a near-evenly split combined fleet of around 250 supersonic Tu-22M and subsonic Tu-16 bomber aircraft. Soviet Naval Aviation bombers were primarily tasked with operations in the North Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean – the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and Baltic Fleet were assigned smaller and shorter-range (land-based) aircraft like the Su-17 and Su-24 for maritime strike roles. The Soviet maritime strike bomber fleet was supported by, among other things, large numbers of ISR and maritime patrol/anti-submarine warfare aircraft, many of which were versions of the Tu-16 and Tu-95 bomber aircraft designs. The Soviet Naval Aviation fleet of bomber aircraft, therefore, amounted to a long-range maritime strike capability intended to target American aircraft carriers and other warships at a distance of 500 or more kilometers from the Soviet Union’s northern and eastern maritime frontiers.

Given the wide gap that existed between the naval capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early Cold War, the Soviet Union eagerly developed a wide range of anti-ship cruise missiles. This includes the liquid-fuelled rocket-powered P-15, the technology of which was transferred to China prior to the Sino-Soviet Split, and the design from which the currently operational Chinese turbojet-powered KD-63 air-launched land-attack cruise missile and the retired liquid-fuelled rocket-powered YJ-6 air-launched anti-ship cruise missile – both of which are/were launched from H-6 bomber aircraft – are derived. The Soviet Union never developed an air-launched version of the cumbersome P-15 for its bomber aircraft or a turbojet-powered version of this 1950s origin Soviet missile.

By the late Cold War, the primary reason for the existence of Soviet Naval Aviation’s large fleet of Tu-22M supersonic bombers was to launch up to three supersonic Kh-22 anti-ship cruise missiles per aircraft. The Kh-22 is an extremely large and heavy – nearly 6000 kg – liquid-fuelled rocket-powered anti-ship cruise missile design that first entered service in the 1960s. The Kh-22 was far too large and heavy to be carried by Soviet Naval Aviation’s subsonic Tu-16 bombers. Soviet Naval Aviation Tu-16K-10 bombers were instead used to launch a single turbojet-powered supersonic K-10S anti-ship cruise missile from a semi-recessed station under the fuselage. The Soviet Union, therefore, developed the solid-fuelled rocket-powered supersonic KSR-5 anti-ship cruise missile as a comparatively smaller and lighter analogue to the Kh-22 for carriage on the two wing stations available on other versions of the Tu-16. The rocket-powered Kh-22, the turbojet-powered K-10S, and the rocket-powered KSR-5 were primarily deployed in nuclear-armed versions, although the Soviet Union also built and deployed these supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles in versions equipped with very large 1000 kg high explosive warheads.

By the end of the Cold War, the supersonic Kh-22 and KSR-5 anti-ship cruise missiles had been in Soviet service for over two decades and were in need of replacement. Most Soviet supersonic anti-ship cruise missile designs were launched from surface ships and submarines, which can readily carry a larger and heavier payload than even the largest bomber aircraft designs. While most of the supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles developed and deployed by the Soviet military were liquid-fuelled rocket-powered, solid-fuelled rocket-powered, or turbojet-powered designs, the Soviet Union pivoted to ramjet propulsion in the late Cold War. Although two ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile designs were developed for use by Soviet surface ships and submarines, the Soviet Union did not deploy an air-launched ramjet-powered long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missile for its bomber aircraft by the end of the Cold War. It did, however, deploy the shorter-range supersonic Kh-31A anti-ship cruise missile for use with its non-bomber combat aircraft – the Kh-31A supersonic anti-ship cruise missile was examined earlier in this section.

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union deployed the P-270 Moskit, a surface-launched ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile developed by MKB Raduga. The Soviet Union also undertook the development of the P-800 Oniks. Separately designed by NPO Mashinostroyeniya, the development of the P-800 was only completed in post-Soviet Russia. The P-270 and P-800 amount to very different ramjet-powered designs that are most readily distinguished by the starkly different air intake configurations and nose sections. These separately designed ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles amounted to a major upgrade over prior Soviet supersonic anti-ship cruise missile designs. An air-launched version or derivative of the P-270 and/or P-800 would have amounted to a major improvement over the rocket-powered supersonic Kh-22 and KSR-5 anti-ship cruise missiles carried by Soviet Naval Aviation bomber aircraft up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was followed by one of the most significant leakages of previously highly restricted military technology. While the scope of licit and/or illicit technology transfers to China following the dissolution of the Soviet Union is not public knowledge, the PLAN (licitly) ordered two Project 956A and two Project 956EM Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia, each of which is equipped with eight P-270 Moskit ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. These Russian-built destroyers were commissioned by the PLAN in 1999-2000 and 2005-2006, respectively. In other words, China not only received the much-smaller ramjet-powered Soviet-Russian supersonic Kh-31 air-launched anti-radiation/anti-ship cruise missile design – respectively designated YJ-91 and Y-91A in PLA service – but also the much larger and longer-range P-270 Moskit surface-launched ramjet-powered anti-ship cruise missile. It is important to note that the Kh-31 was not designed by the developers of the P-270 Moskit or the P-800 Oniks.

Public sources offer no indication that China ordered the P-800 Oniks from Russia. The P-800 was not ready for deployment at the time the Soviet Union dissolved. In 1995, India and Russia established a joint venture to develop the BrahMos ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile on the basis of the existing P-800 design. In time, Russia completed development of the P-800 and deployed the P-800 as its supersonic ship- and ground-launched anti-ship cruise missile alongside the new subsonic Kh-35. Russia notably exported the K-300P Bastion-P coastal defence system, which is used to launch P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles, to Vietnam. India deploys large numbers of ground- and ship-launched versions of the BrahMos as both a land-attack and an anti-ship cruise missile. India has notably developed a lighter version, the Brahmos-A, for carriage by the Indian Air Force’s Soviet-Russian Su-30MKI multirole fighters on a centerline station. India has also exported ground-launched BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles to the Philippines.

Although the existence of the P-800 and BrahMos in the arsenals of several of China’s adversaries is likely to mean that the PLA is very familiar with this separate evolutionary branch of Soviet ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile technology, there are indications that China was also the recipient of extensive licit and/or illicit transfers of the technology of the P-800 Oniks. One of the highlights of the 2014 iteration of the Zhuhai Airshow was the unveiling of the CX-1, a ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile that is uncannily similar in terms of appearance to the Soviet-Russian P-800 Oniks and, as such, the Indo-Russian BrahMos.

While the biennial Zhuhai Airshow offers the PLA an opportunity to formally display advances in Chinese military technology and military capabilities, it is primarily used to showcase the products of China’s fragmented and primarily state-owned military industry. Many of the designs on display at the Zhuhai Airshow are either purposefully developed as export offerings or are the losing designs in an unpublicized domestic competition for a research and development and/or procurement contract funded by the PLA or another part of the state budget. Stated differently, the systems on display at the Zhuhai Airshow reflect an amalgam of systems deployed by the PLA which may or may not be offered to export customers, versions or derivatives of systems deployed by the PLA are available to export customers, functioning systems that are not in use with the PLA but which are available to export customers, and potentially non-functioning – not fully developed – systems that may have nothing to do with the PLA but which are available for export customers. With most of China’s fragmented military industry being state-owned and the PLA being the primary purchaser of China’s military-industrial output, China’s military industry does not develop systems in the manner of the “private(ly funded) ventures” regularly undertaken by privately owned and even some state-owned military industrial companies worldwide.

Given the overlap in claimed performance and missions of the CX-1 and the YJ-12, the fact that there is no indication that the PLA deploys the CX-1, and the fact that CX-1 is an industry export designation, the CX-1 is likely to amount to the losing design in a domestic Chinese design competition in which the PLA selected the YJ-12 as its ramjet-powered long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. It is worth nothing that the CX-1 was developed by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) while the YJ-12 was developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), two large rival state-owned conglomerates that compete for finite PLA research and development as well as procurement Yuan. It also bears emphasis that CASC is not known to have secured any export orders for the CX-1 and that marketing material on the CX-1, including mockups, no longer feature at military industrial exhibitions. It is, therefore, possible that the CX-1 did not reach a very advanced stage of development and that CASC was seeking an export customer to recoup research and development costs, subsidize the competition of development, and pay for the establishment of a production line in the absence of PLA orders.

Although supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles were almost exclusively developed and deployed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it is important to note that other countries have also undertaken extensive developmental efforts in ramjet-powered cruise missile technology both during and after the Cold War. Russia and, as such, the Soviet Union, are not, therefore, the only potential source of technology and/or inspiration for China’s development of the YJ-12. One of the first countries to deploy an air-launched ramjet-powered cruise missile was France with its nuclear-armed ASMP. China’s East Asian adversaries have also sustained a longstanding interest in supersonic ramjet-powered anti-ship cruise missiles for use against the PLAN. Japan has developed the ramjet-powered air-launched ASM-3 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. South Korea has developed two distinct ramjet-powered anti-ship cruise designs, of which at least one is launched by combat aircraft. Taiwan has developed and deployed the Hsiung Feng-III (HF-III), a surface-launched ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, and recently unveiled an air-launched derivative of the HF-III. India, of course, has developed the air-launched BrahMos-A and this design is a candidate for possible integration with Vietnam’s fleet of Su-30MK2(V) multirole fighter aircraft.

China’s primary adversary, the United States, has also undertaken research and development efforts in ramjet-powered cruise missile technology. Prior to the selection of the subsonic AGM-158C LRASM as the primary American long-range air-launched anti-ship cruise missile, the U.S. military pursued the development of the ramjet-powered LRASM-B as well as a design known as RATTLRS, among others. These American research and development projects appear to have been abandoned without any missiles being deployed. While the Chinese YJ-12 is by far the largest and longest-range publicly-known ramjet-powered air-launched supersonic anti-ship cruise missile design, this says more about the PLA’s prioritization of maritime strike capabilities and the fact that the United States, Russia, and China are the only countries operating bomber aircraft capable of carrying large external payloads than anything else.

YJ-12 Supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile

Although the YJ-12 is primarily associated with the PLAAF’s H-6K and (ex-PLANAF) H-6J bombers, which are much evolved Chinese-built derivatives of the Soviet Tu-16, the Chinese ramjet-powered YJ-12 is nothing like the liquid-fuelled rocket-powered Soviet Kh-22 and KSR-5 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles operated by Soviet Naval Aviation. Notwithstanding the fact that that China (licitly) purchased the smaller and shorter-range Soviet ramjet-powered air-launched supersonic Kh-31 anti-radiation missile/anti-ship cruise missile and the much larger and longer-range ramjet-powered surface-launched supersonic P-270 Moskit anti-ship cruise missile and therefore benefited from these licit technology transfers, the Chinese YJ-12 also appears to be very far from being a copy of these two Soviet designs. And while China appears to have licitly and/or illicitly accessed the technology of the Soviet-Russian P-800 Oniks and/or the related Indo-Russian BrahMos, the Chinese YJ-12 is clearly not a copy of this evolutionary branch of Soviet ramjet-powered cruise missile technology or, indeed, a copy of any other known ramjet-powered cruise missile design. The YJ-12 is, rather, best characterized as China’s take on what a large and long-range ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile looks like even if it is very likely to draw upon the fruits of licitly and illicitly accessed foreign research and development efforts and technology as is the case with essentially all military systems developed by any country – few military systems are developed from a truly blank slate.

The Chinese YJ-12 is a very large ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile that likely weighs around 3000 kg. Its air-breathing ramjet engine, which employs liquid fuel and draws oxygen from the atmosphere, powers the YJ-12 to a reported maximum speed of Mach 4 over a reported nominal maximum range of 400-500 km while carrying a reported 200-300 kg warhead. Ramjet engines do not function at subsonic airspeed. The YJ-12, therefore, relies on an integral solid rocket booster to accelerate the YJ-12 to a speed suitable for ignition of the ramjet engine. The YJ-12 is not a ballistic missile, and its maximum practical range is affected by its flight profile. All else being equal, range can be maximized through a higher-altitude flight profile that minimizes the time-distance at lower altitudes. As with any air-launched munition, the maximum practical range of the YJ-12 is affected by the speed and altitude of the host aircraft at the time that the munition is released. That is, the reported maximum range of the YJ-12 is likely to refer to a high–high–low flight profile (launch phase–cruise phase–terminal phase) in which the PLAAF H-6L/H-6K/H-6J bomber launching the YJ-12 is more likely to be detected and possibly intercepted by adversary combat aircraft equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles.

Much remains uncertain about the YJ-12 a decade after its official unveiling. The YJ-12 is likely to be equipped with a nose-mounted active radar homing seeker. Given the fairly large volume available in the nose section, it is possible that the YJ-12 is also equipped with a passive radiation homing seeker for use in the event that electronic warfare degrades the performance of the active radar homing seeker – in which case a home-on-jam mode can be very useful – and/or in a mode in which the YJ-12 lowers its radio frequency signature. Public sources estimate a 200-300 kg class warhead of an unspecified configuration. Assuming that the supersonic YJ-12 accurately hits its intended target, fusing is, in many respects, more important than the weight of the warhead. For maximum effectiveness against surface ships smaller than aircraft carriers in particular, the YJ-12 will likely require a void sensing fuse to detonate at the appropriate moment following penetration of a target ship’s hull. It is unclear if the YJ-12 is exclusively deployed as a fire-and-forget system or if it is equipped with a one-way or two-way beyond-line-of-sight satellite communications data link. The installation of a data link allows for the transfer of off-board target location data and can thereby facilitate the employment of the YJ-12 in a mode in which the likely active radar homing seeker in the nose can remain wholly inactive until the terminal phase of flight.

On paper, the YJ-12 is the most formidable air-launched anti-ship cruise missile known to exist in the PLA arsenal. The superlative, of course, means relatively little in a context in which PLAAF and PLANAF crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft appear to be otherwise limited to the subsonic YJ-83K and possibly the supersonic YJ-91A, both of which have a much shorter reported nominal maximum range than the YJ-12. Given what is likely to be a very high unit cost and the seemingly unavoidable use of a bomber aircraft as the launch platform, the YJ-12 is best characterized as a niche maritime strike munition that is likely to be available in limited numbers and is therefore likely to be prioritized for use against the most lucrative targets. The most lucrative maritime targets in the Western Pacific are, of course, American aircraft carriers, large amphibious warships, large replenishment ships, and high-end large surface warships such as the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, as well as the broadly comparable warships deployed by Japan. Should it be available in sufficiently large numbers, YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles may, of course, be launched against a more expansive target set of naval and merchant ships. Even if available in unlimited quantities, however, the YJ-12 is poorly suited to targeting smaller vessels, such as very distant mine countermeasures vessels and smaller landing craft that PLAAF combat cannot otherwise target with the shorter-range YJ-83K or YJ-91A.

Although the YJ-12 is unlikely to be very effective as a land-attack cruise missile, it may nevertheless be used to attack terrestrial targets of opportunity in certain operational contexts. As of this writing in March 2025, it is, however, unclear if the YJ-12 can be used to attack terrestrial targets. While the kinetic effects of a supersonic cruise missile of this size are likely to devastate many potential terrestrial targets, the YJ-12 is unlikely to be a very useful land-attack strike munition. The likely active radar homing seeker installed in the nose section is best used against surface ships. While the YJ-12 can rely on INS and GNSS guidance systems to attack a stationary terrestrial target, this would amount to a very inefficient use of a highly specialized and likely very expensive supersonic anti-ship cruise missile available in limited quantities. The destructive effects of the YJ-12 against many terrestrial targets are also likely to be limited unless it is equipped with a multipurpose warhead and a multi-mode fusing system. Assuming that it is equipped with a penetrating blast-fragmentation warhead and a void-sensing fuse, for example, the YJ-12 will be poorly optimized for attacking parked aircraft at an airbase or attacking a warehouse storing spare parts for military equipment. The YJ-12 is also poorly suited for adaptation into a submunitions dispenser, although an airburst fusing mode may make it more effective against distributed soft targets such as parked aircraft. Given all this, the PLAAF is likely to turn to air-launched ballistic missiles as a shorter time-to-target and higher probability of penetration long-range standoff munition against terrestrial targets. Indeed, the PLAAF has already deployed such an air-launched ballistic missile for use with its bombers, a design that will be examined in the following section of this SPAS Consulting report.

While the YJ-12 is an impressive anti-ship cruise missile that significantly bolsters China’s maritime strike capabilities, it has the same limitations as all supersonic cruise missiles. Militaries pay a very high premium to attain a sustained supersonic cruise speed that confers two primary benefits: a shorter time-to-target, which is primarily relevant against fast-moving and fleeting targets of which most large warships are not an example, and a higher probability of kinematically defeating air defences in a world in which there is an increasingly long menu of approaches through which to detect and defeat anti-ship cruise missiles of various types. Although the sustained supersonic speed of the YJ-12 is impressive, it is insufficient to automatically defeat existing naval surface-to-air missile systems, systems that evolved throughout the Cold War in response to advances in Soviet supersonic anti-ship cruise missile technology. The measure-countermeasure dynamics underway in response to China’s development and deployment of the YJ-12 are, therefore, very much a continuation of where the United States and Soviet Union left things at the end of the Cold War. The YJ-12 is too large, too heavy, and likely too expensive to be widely deployed by PLAAF or PLAN, including the PLANAF, and can, therefore, only serve in a niche role. This niche role only exists because China, like the Soviet Union before it, encounters the unique and imposing threat posed by multiple heavily armed and heavily protected American aircraft carrier groups in wartime. With the deployment of the YJ-12, the PLA has emulated one part of the Soviet approach to countering American naval dominance.

While the H-6K/H-6J bomber design will be separately examined later in this SPAS Consulting report, it is important to note that the air-launched YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missile should not be viewed independently of its primary if not only launch aircraft or broader operational dynamics. Although the YJ-12 design is likely to benefit from the decades of sustained advances in military technology that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a PLAAF H-6K/H-6J bomber carrying four supersonic YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles is in a very specific respect a less imposing threat to the U.S. Navy than Soviet Naval Aviation Tu-22M bombers carrying three of the far less sophisticated liquid-fuelled rocket-powered supersonic Kh-22 anti-ship cruise missile. For one, Soviet Naval Aviation possessed a large arsenal of nuclear-armed anti-ship cruise missiles, including the Kh-22. The use of nuclear warheads in anti-ship cruise missiles fundamentally reshapes naval warfare with or without the backdrop of the potential large-scale use of so-called strategic nuclear warheads. Publicly available information offers no indication whatsoever that the PLAAF, PLAN, or PLARF currently intend to employ nuclear-armed missiles of any type against adversary warships. The threat posed by Soviet Naval Aviation also differed in that the Tu-22M is a very large and long-range supersonic heavy bomber. The Chinese H-6K/H-6J bomber is, in contrast, a subsonic design best characterized as a medium bomber that cannot credibly operate independently throughout the Philippine Sea.

Over the Cold War, the U.S. Navy made concerted investments to counter the supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles carried by Soviet Naval Aviation bombers. This includes the operational concept of an “outer-air battle” in which long-range carrier-borne F-14 fighters supported by carrier-borne E-2 AEW&C aircraft would establish a defensive perimeter some 500-700 km from an aircraft carrier to launch very long-range – by the standards of the day – AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles, which were equipped with terminal active radar homing seekers, at Soviet Naval Aviation bombers before the bombers could launch nuclear- and/or - conventionally-armed long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. American naval air combat capabilities have evolved considerably since the 1980s, and the U.S. Navy is currently deploying the AIM-174B, an air-launched version of the RIM-174 long-range naval surface-to-air missile, with the aim of establishing an expansive defensive perimeter around American aircraft carriers and other warships operating in the Western Pacific. While the YJ-12 amounts to a very impressive long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missile design, it should not be viewed in isolation from its launch aircraft, the military-geographical context in which it is deployed, and, not least, the capabilities of the military that it is primarily intended for use against.

It is important to note that although China appears to have integrated the YJ-12 on a JH-7B prototype aircraft, the JH-7B development program appears to have been terminated without the latest version of the outdated Chinese strike aircraft design entering production. Public sources offer no indication that the operational JH-7A can carry one or more YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles.