Chinese Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles (Report Preview)

Note: The following text is part of a forthcoming SPAS Consulting Report examining the strengths and limitations of China's long-range conventional strike capabilities.

The PLAAF in general and the PLAAF bomber fleet in particular require long-range standoff munitions to practically undertake attacks against distant heavily defended targets. Very long-range standoff munitions can more generally extend the reach of the PLAAF and thereby allow the PLAAF to substantially bolster the long-range strike capabilities resident in the PLARF-operated arsenal of surface-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Until the early 2020s, the sole publicly known long-range armament of the PLAAF’s sizable operational bomber fleet was the KD-20 land-attack cruise missile. While the KD-20 greatly extends the reach of the PLAAF in terms of terrestrial strike capabilities, it is a fairly slow subsonic cruise missile with a flight time of two or more hours to its maximum range. More importantly, the KD-20 air-launched does not have a low signature design in the manner of, for example, the American AGM-158 JASSM. The KD-20 is, as such, likely to amount to a fairly long time-to-target and a fairly low penetration rate strike munition against distant, heavily defended targets. The YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile amounts to a much shorter time-to-target but otherwise a very niche and likely expensive strike munition and is more generally lacking in terms of range. While the PLAAF could develop a low signature long-range air-launched land-attack cruise missile – something amounting to a larger and longer-range analogue to the American AGM-158 JASSM – to substitute for the KD-20 and/or a longer-range counterpart to the YJ-12, it has instead turned to air-launched ballistic missiles as its seemingly preferred short time-to-target and higher probability of penetration long-range standoff munition. 

In turning to air-launched ballistic missile technology for its bomber aircraft, the PLAAF is leveraging China’s sustained development of a wide range of solid-fuelled ballistic missile designs, most of which are deployed by the SAC-turned-PLARF. The concept of an air-launched ballistic missile, which has been much discussed since the late 2010s following the unveiling of the Russian Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, is far from novel. It is, however, increasingly appealing to militaries, including the PLA, due to the intersection of supply-side dynamics – advances in military technology – and demand-side dynamics – the increasing appeal of long-range standoff munitions for use with high explosive and/or nuclear warheads. Before examining China’s known air-launched ballistic missile designs, it is productive to first summarize the history of air-launched ballistic missile technology. Doing so will highlight how different China’s motivations for the development of air-launched ballistic missiles appear to be relative to other countries that have previously and are currently developing this type of strike munition.

Placing China’s Pursuit of Air-Launched Ballistic Technology In An International Context

The first operational ballistic missile design, the cumbersome liquid-fuelled German V-2, weighed over 12,000 kg and was far too large and heavy to be carried by bomber aircraft at a time when even the American B-29, a large long-range bomber with a maximum take-off weight of around 60,000 kg, could carry less than 10,000 kg of ordnance and was more generally unsuitable for carrying an oversized payload with the dimensions of the V-2. As ballistic missile technology advanced in the Cold War and amid an intensifying measure-countermeasure competition between combat aircraft – including bombers – technology, on the one hand, and air defence technology, on the other, militaries considered the possibility of using a large bomber aircraft to launch one or more ballistic missiles. 

The first air-launched ballistic missile design to approach operational status was the solid-fuelled American GAM-87 Skybolt, which was intended to serve as a nuclear-armed air-launched ballistic missile for both American and British bomber aircraft. The GAM-87-equipped American and British bombers did necessarily have to make deep penetrations of Soviet airspace and could thereby avoid the threat posed by increasingly numerous and increasingly potent Soviet radar-directed interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. The development of the GAM-87 was cancelled in 1962, and the United States and United Kingdom thereafter directed their resources toward the fast-improving area of submarine-launched ballistic missile technology. By the early 1970s, however, the United States deployed the much smaller and lighter nuclear-armed solid-fuelled AGM-69 SRAM for use with its bomber aircraft. Although the AGM-69 SRAM was not an air-launched ballistic missile, it is an example of a type of rocket-powered standoff munition that was widely employed with nuclear-armed bomber aircraft in the Cold War.  

Although the Soviet Union did not develop a counterpart to the American GAM-87 Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile, it was also interested in a standoff munition for use with its bomber aircraft. Unlike the United States, which was primarily interested in attacking terrestrial targets with nuclear warheads, the Soviet Union was interested in employing such munitions against both terrestrial and maritime targets – against American aircraft carriers in particular – and with versions equipped with both nuclear and conventional warheads. In addition to a range of large and heavy turbojet-powered air-launched cruise missiles launched by Soviet bomber aircraft, the Soviet Union developed a range of rocket-powered cruise missiles – not to be confused with the very different turbofan- and turbojet-powered air-launched cruise missiles deployed from the 1980s onward – including the liquid-fuelled Kh-22 and KSR-5, two Soviet anti-ship missiles examined in a prior section of this SPAS Consulting report. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union deployed the Kh-15, a solid-fuelled short-range nuclear-armed ballistic missile, for use with its supersonic Tu-22M bomber fleet. The Kh-15 was the Soviet counterpart to the American AGM-69 SRAM.

The aforementioned air-launched rocket-powered standoff missiles were developed before the nuclear-armed American AGM-86 and Soviet Kh-55 demonstrated the viability of a long-range air-launched cruise missile in the 1980s. More importantly, the aforementioned air-launched rocket-powered standoff missiles were primarily developed to undertake a very specific role: to offer primarily subsonic long-range nuclear-armed bomber aircraft a supersonic standoff munition – one that was faster than the bomber itself – to target known adversary air defence facilities along the nuclear-armed bomber’s flight path. In the context of the Cold War nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, these flight paths would primarily cross through the Arctic Circle, but the United States had greater basing access outside of its own territory and, therefore, had more geographically expansive plans for the employment of its much larger fleet of nuclear-armed long-range bomber aircraft. It bears emphasis that the subsonic turbofan-powered air-launched cruise missiles that the United States and the Soviet Union deployed in the 1980s – the AGM-86 and the Kh-55 – were too slow to undertake this role. The late Cold War American and Soviet bomber forces were not interested in a standoff munition merely for range and a high rate of penetration but for speed – a short time-to-target.

Although the concept of an air-launched nuclear-armed ballistic missile was appealing, there were many practical challenges to the employment of such strike munitions throughout the Cold War. Ground- and submarine-launched nuclear-armed ballistic missiles offered several key advantages relative to air-launched nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. This includes accuracy – stationary ground-launched ballistic missiles were, all else being equal, more accurate than mobile ground- or submarine-launched ballistic missiles until sustained breakthroughs were made in inertial navigation technology. In time, American and Soviet bomber aircraft also received advanced astro-inertial navigation systems, but these were far too complex and expensive for use on most non-bomber combat aircraft, and the practical challenges to accuracy remained considerable. 

Air-launched ballistic missiles were also restricted in terms of size and weight by the design of the host aircraft. While air-launched ballistic missiles became more practical with the advent of solid-fuelled and storable liquid-fuelled ballistic missile designs, these developments also made mobile ground-launched and submarine-launched ballistic missiles more practical. Another challenge revolved around the issue of readiness. While an air-launched ballistic missile would be fast, the bombers it would be launched from would be primarily subsonic and would have a long flight time even if the bomber aircraft was capable of sustained supersonic flight. Although the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command operated at a very high readiness throughout the Cold War as a result of a very lavish allocation of resources and the existence of an extremely large fleet of bomber aircraft from which a subset would be held at a constant state of very high readiness, stationary ground-launched and, in time, mobile ground-launched and submarine-launched ballistic missiles amounted to a more practical approach to deploying a high-readiness nuclear force throughout the Cold War.

As the above paragraphs make clear, the development of air-launched ballistic missile technology almost exclusively focused on the employment of such strike munitions to deliver nuclear, not high explosive warheads, throughout the Cold War. The challenge of accuracy in particular cannot be overstated – a nuclear-armed air-launched ballistic missile design could at least compensate for inaccuracy with a large destructive radius in a manner that an air-launched ballistic missile equipped with a high explosive warhead could not. Although technological change made air-launched ballistic missile technology somewhat more practical by the end of the Cold War, the nuclear forces of the United States and Soviet Union were increasingly entangled in arms control frameworks that amounted to yet another barrier to the deployment of such nuclear-armed strike munitions.

Following the end of the Cold War, leading militaries gradually developed and deployed smaller, lighter, and more accurate ballistic missiles that were natural candidates for launch by combat aircraft – for use as a conventionally armed air-launched ballistic missile. There was, however, little demand for such munitions on the part of countries that had the resources available to undertake research and development and follow it with a procurement program for the post-Cold War era. The countries with the requisite financial resources, namely the United States and NATO countries and a few close allies thereof, doubled down on their longstanding investments in fixed-wing crewed combat aircraft technology. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden all procured long-range air-launched cruise missiles for use with their combat aircraft. Most of these countries also elected to deploy new low signature combat aircraft and, more generally, a range of new standoff munitions to stay ahead in the less intense post-Cold War measure-countermeasure competition between combat aircraft technology, on the one hand, and air defence technology, on the other. While multiple factors were at play, it is worth noting that most countries do not operate bomber aircraft (or a very large non-bomber aircraft like the Soviet MiG-31 interceptor). Any air-launched ballistic missile would, therefore, have to be launched from a fighter aircraft, which imposed major design restrictions in terms of dimensions and weight, or from a military transport aircraft, a mode of operation that most air forces have long been apprehensive about for both technological and non-technological reasons.

While most of the dominant players in post-Cold War military research and development focused on building upon their existing strengths, a different set of countries invested resources in areas that many of the previously dominant players expressed little interest in. By the 2010s, supply-side dynamics, namely advances in INS technology, the increasing practicality of GNSS, and the wider availability of terminal guidance systems, facilitated a re-evaluation of air-launched ballistic missile technology. Three countries – Israel, Russia, and China – independently pursued air-launched ballistic missile technology for very different reasons and in pursuit of very different requirements than that which informed research and development in most other countries. 

Israel’s Pursuit of Air-Launched Ballistic Missile Technology

The first conventionally-armed air-launched ballistic missile design to break cover was a fairly modest Israeli design that, in time, amounted to the tip of a large iceberg. While the Israeli Air Force operated a very large fleet of F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft and would come to deploy its first F-35A fighter aircraft in 2017, the Israeli Air Force has a unique and fundamentally offensive posture and prizes freedom of action above all else. As a result, Syria’s procurement of a small number of Russian S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile systems, the deliveries of which were delayed due to the Syrian Civil War, and Iran’s procurement of a small number of S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile systems, the deliveries of which were delayed by international sanctions, was held to be intolerable and this spurred the development of a long-range short time-to-target standoff attack capability for Israeli Air Force fighter aircraft.

While Israel could have pursued a long-range supersonic anti-radiation missile to target the deployment of the S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile system by Syria and Iran, Israel’s military industry instead developed what amounted to a small air-launched ballistic missile that could be used against emitting radars, non-emitting radars, and any number of other stationary target types. In 2012, Israel Military Industries (IMI) disclosed research and development efforts aimed at adapting its 306 mm diameter EXTRA guided heavy artillery rocket – a INS and GNSS guided small ballistic missile by another name – into the MARS (Multipurpose Air-Launched Rocket System) for use as an air-launched ballistic missile with a variety of fighter aircraft operated by the Israeli and other militaries.

In 2017, another Israeli company, Israel Aerospace Industry (IAI) briefly released marketing material for the Sky Sniper, a reportedly 250 km range air-launched version of an Israeli guided heavy artillery rocket – a small ballistic missile by another name – for use with not just the F-15 and F-16 fighters operated by Israeli Air Force but also the Soviet-Russian MiG-29 and Su-30 fighters operated by some of the Israeli military industry’s top export clients such as India and Azerbaijan. The briefly released marketing material included an elaborate video depicting the use of Sky Sniper air-launched ballistic missiles to target an S-300 surface-to-air missile system while the launch aircraft remained safely beyond the reach of the S-300. The marketing material, including the video uploaded on Youtube, was swiftly deleted by IAI for unknown reasons. In 2018, IAI and the Israeli company Elbit, which acquired IMI, formally unveiled the MARS air-launched ballistic missile, which was later rebranded as Rampage. The Israeli Air Force reportedly employed the air-launched Rampage in attacks on targets in Syria as early as 2019. 

While the MARS-turned-Rampage was no surprise to observers keeping tabs on developments in air-launched munitions, its successful development and deployment highlighted the options available to militaries concerned about the effects of long-range surface-to-air missile systems on their combat capabilities. With the MARS-turned-Rampage, even an air force operating otherwise outdated combat aircraft could undertake standoff attacks at a distance of up to 250 km with a fairly small 306 mm diameter and ~600 kg weight air-launched ballistic missile. The MARS-turned-Rampage was, however, just the tip of a much larger air-launched ballistic missile technology iceberg. 

In the 1980s, Israel began to develop a national ballistic missile defence capability in collaboration with the United States. As with other forms of military equipment, ballistic missile defence systems must be tested to validate a design and improve upon it. Whereas militaries do not necessarily need to, for example, use a tank as a target to test the effectiveness of an anti-tank missile, subjecting a ballistic missile defence system to a rigorous test requires the use of a ballistic missile or a high-fidelity testing surrogate. To facilitate the testing of a ballistic missile system in a small country that could not practically launch a (unarmed) ballistic missile against itself as part of a ballistic missile defence test, the Israeli company Rafael developed what became the unarmed Sparrow family of ballistic target missiles.

What distinguished the Israeli Sparrow family of ballistic target missiles from the start was that these were launched by Israeli fighter aircraft and were, as such, de facto air-launched ballistic missiles that could be carried and launched by fighter aircraft (these are launched in the direction by Israel by Israeli Air Force fighter aircraft flying over the Mediterranean). The United States, in contrast, regularly employs ballistic target missiles that are released from a military transport aircraft and descend with a parachute prior to the ignition of the rocket motor. The Israeli Sparrow family of ballistic target missiles includes the Black Sparrow, Blue Sparrow, and Silver Sparrow. These simulate ballistic missiles – specifically Iranian ballistic missiles – of different performance classes. The latest Silver Sparrow, which shares a separable reentry vehicle with the Blue Sparrow, is reported to weigh around 3100 kg and have a length of over eight meters. With the Israeli Air Force not operating bomber aircraft capable of carrying such a large and heavy payload, the latest Silver Sparrow is likely to be released from a military transport aircraft and descend with a parachute prior to the ignition of the rocket motor.

In 2019, Rafael, the manufacturer of the Sparrow family of ballistic target missiles, unexpectedly unveiled the ROCKS air-launched ballistic missile at the 2019 Aero India airshow in Bengaluru. The ROCKS air-launched ballistic missile appears to be an armed derivative of the smallest member of the Sparrow family of ballistic target missiles, the Black Sparrow. Two – perhaps four – Black Sparrow ballistic target missiles can be carried by each Israeli F-15I and F-16I fighter aircraft. Although Rafael did not disclose the maximum range of the ROCKS and notwithstanding the standard caveats about the nominal nature of the maximum range figures associated with all air-launched munitions, the armed ROCKS air-launched ballistic missile is likely to have a nominal maximum range of 500 or more kilometers. Israel, in other words, not only developed and deployed a 250 km class air-launched ballistic missile by 2019 but also developed and possibly deployed an air-launched ballistic missile with a maximum range of 500 km or more by 2019.

In 2024, another Israeli company, IAI, which co-markets the MARS-turned-Rampage, unveiled an air-launched version of its longstanding LORA surface-launched ballistic missile, which is a close analogue to the better-known and more widely deployed extended-range versions of the American surface-launched MGM-140 ATACMS ballistic missile. Given that the surface-launched LORA ballistic missile has a demonstrated maximum range of around 400 km, the air-launched ballistic missile derivative of this design is likely to have a substantially greater nominal maximum range. As with the ROCKS air-launched ballistic missile, the LORA air-launched ballistic missile can be carried by the Israeli Air Force’s F-16I fighter aircraft.

The air-launched version of the LORA ballistic missile increased the number of known Israeli air-launched ballistic missiles – excluding the two Sparrow family ballistic target missiles that are not currently associated with an air-launched ballistic missile derivative – to three. By the end of 2024, however, observers operating with publicly available information learned of a possible fourth Israeli air-launched ballistic missile design, one that may have been used in combat as of this writing in March 2025. Amid the anticipation of an Israeli attack on Iran in October 2024, a leak of an American intelligence report revealed the existence of what the U.S. government designates the Golden Horizon air-launched ballistic missile. The leaked documents made an unambiguous distinction between the “IS02 (Rocks)” and the Golden Horizon, which is to say the latter appears to be a previously unknown air-launched ballistic design that is perhaps unrelated to the three publicly known members of the Sparrow family of ballistic target missiles.

Israel’s development of air-launched ballistic missile technology is striking in multiple respects. First, unlike the Cold War developments undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel’s development of air-launched ballistic missile technology appears to have little if anything to do with the employment of Israeli nuclear weapons – the notion of a nuclear-armed MARS/Rampage, for example, strains credulity – and has nothing to do with bomber aircraft, which Israel does not operate. The Israeli approach is also, for want of a better term, highly tactical in nature, and allows Israel to undertake short time-to-target and high probability of penetration attacks against very distant targets without requiring its afterburner-equipped primarily subsonic fighter aircraft to undertake very long transits to launch points close to the intended targets in, for example, Iran. Other than the smaller Rampage, these Israeli air-launched ballistic missiles are, of course, likely to be very expensive. These can, however, be used to rapidly neutralize key adversary capabilities, including long-range acquisition radars. This is how Israel is reported to have primarily employed its air-launched ballistic missile force in its October 2024 air and missile attack on Iran. 

Russia’s Development of an Air-Launched Ballistic Missile

If the Israeli experience with air-launched ballistic missile technology is best characterized as a story of innovation and adaptation, the same characterization cannot be made about what is publicly known about the post-Soviet Russian experience with air-launched ballistic missile technology, including Russia’s employment of air-launched ballistic missiles in the Russia-Ukraine War.

In March 2018, Russia formally unveiled the existence of the previously unpublicized Kh-47 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile. The Kh-47 was unveiled alongside several new and very unconventional – exotic – nuclear-armed weapons systems unveiled by Russian Vladimir Putin. These nuclear-armed weapons systems were unambiguously presented as a means of countering the increasingly widespread deployment of ballistic missile defence systems by the United States and its NATO allies. Russia, it appeared at the time, had developed a regionally-oriented air-launched ballistic missile for use with nuclear weapons. While Russia has never formally disclosed the origins of the Kh-47, it is likely to be related to the Russian Army’s surface-launched Iskander ballistic missile and is, therefore, likely to be a far larger and heavier design than the surface-launched MGM-140 ATACMS ballistic missile and the related Israeli LORA, the latter of which is notable for being developed into an air-launched ballistic missile. 

Whereas a Russian analogue to the Israeli LORA air-launched ballistic missile may have been widely deployed across the Russian Air Force’s large fleet of non-bomber combat aircraft, the Kh-47 was, at least initially, exclusively associated with a specially configured version of the longstanding Soviet-built supersonic MiG-31 interceptor designated the MiG-31K. This reflects the simple fact that the Kh-47 is far too large and heavy to be carried by the Russian Air Force's large fleet of fighter and strike aircraft. The Kh-47 was, as such, neither an air-launched ballistic missile intended for widespread use with Russian fighter aircraft and similar nor a new standoff munition intended for use with Russia’s nuclear-armed bomber aircraft. The Kh-47 was, however, reportedly set for eventual deployment with the supersonic Tu-22M bomber. 

The Tu-22M is a large bomber aircraft that is equipped with nuclear weapons for use in regional strikes against terrestrial and maritime targets, not so-called strategic strikes on terrestrial targets in North America, which typically require a bomber aircraft to undertake a polar flight to launch long-range nuclear-armed land-attack cruise missiles, namely the Kh-102 and the older Kh-55. When deployed with the supersonic Tu-22M bomber, the Kh-47 would presumably help replace the longstanding rocket-powered Kh-22, which Russia continues to employ as both a land-attack and an anti-ship cruise missile in both nuclear- and conventionally-armed versions. In so doing, the collective of the Kh-47-equipped MiG-31K de facto standoff bomber and Tu-22M bomber fleets could undertake regional nuclear and/or conventional strikes while Russia’s larger and longer-range subsonic Tu-95 and supersonic Tu-160 bombers could undertake polar flights to launch large salvos of long-range nuclear-armed land-attack cruise missiles toward targets in North America in support of Russia’s land- and sea-based intercontinental range ballistic missiles. 

It bears emphasis that the Soviet Union long operated regionally oriented nuclear forces, including a fleet of nuclear-armed bomber and strike aircraft, in parallel to its so-called “strategic” nuclear forces, including Soviet Long Range Aviation, that were primarily oriented toward the United States and North America more generally. As the above paragraphs make clear, the Kh-47 was part and parcel of Russia’s nuclear capabilities in more ways than one, and Russia’s pursuit of air-launched ballistic missile technology was, as such, intertwined with the modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces, a modernization process that was at least in part driven by concerns about American and NATO ballistic missile defence capabilities. In time, however, observers came to learn that the Kh-47 was also intended for use with a high-explosive warhead, a practice that raised questions about escalation dynamics emanating from warhead ambiguity independent of discussions of the effectiveness of the Kh-47 in the face of ongoing advances in the air and ballistic missile defence capabilities of the United States and other NATO countries.

It also bears emphasis that whereas the Soviet Union deployed regional nuclear forces when, in many respects, it benefited from a state of conventional superiority, Russia deploys regional nuclear forces when, in many respects, it encounters a state of conventional inferiority vis-a-vis the United States and NATO (that has been laid bare for the world to see in the Russia-Ukraine War). While Russia’s pre-2022 ground forces constituted a formidable threat to NATO in multiple respects, the non-nuclear offensive capabilities of the Russian Air Force were a pale shadow of the Soviet Air Force – a Cold War air force that was itself qualitatively inferior to NATO but could benefit from the effects of sustained and widespread offensives undertaken by the Soviet Army. The Russian Air Force of the 2010s, in contrast, was in an exceedingly poor position to undertake airstrikes against targets in NATO territory. Russia’s bomber fleet and its large fleet of Su-24 and Su-34 strike aircraft did not amount to a credible capability to penetrate NATO air defences, and Russia’s fleet of fighter aircraft was in no position to undertake offensive air-to-air operations in NATO airspace to create openings for Russian bomber and strike aircraft. Leaving aside nuclear weapons, all that the Russian military had at its disposal was a gradually expanding arsenal of fairly short range Iskander ballistic missiles and a heterogenous arsenal of conventionally-armed air-launched Kh-101 and surface-launched Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles that collectively did not exist in the quantity– or the quality – required to make a major dent in NATO’s conventional capabilities (or to make a major dent in Ukraine’s conventional capabilities). 

In the 2010s, Russia confronted this state of conventional inferiority while still restricted by the now defunct Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), which formally proscribed the deployment of long-range surface-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles irrespective of whether these were equipped with conventional or nuclear warheads. Short of forgoing military and military-technological competition with the United States and NATO, which Russia’s senior political and military leadership was loath to do, Russia had to lean on its regional nuclear arsenal to compensate for its conventional inferiority vis-a-vis NATO, break the INF Treaty by pursuing new ground-launch ballistic and cruise missiles, or pursue new air-launched strike munitions including air-launched ballistic missiles. By the mid-2010s, Moscow appears to have selected all of the above. This is the context in which Russia developed and deployed the Kh-47 Kinzhal.

As the above paragraphs make clear, not only is the Kh-47 air-launched ballistic missile a nuclear capable design, but it cannot be meaningfully understood without reference to a context in which a conventionally inferior Russia leaned heavily on its regional nuclear strike capabilities. Discussions about the Kh-47 rarely center on any specific targets of substance, such as the long-range surface-to-air missile systems or the airbases of NATO countries. The Kh-47 does not, as such, exist for the reasons that Israel has developed and deployed a diverse array of air-launched ballistic missiles to undertake standoff conventional strikes against targets at a depth of 100-1000 km (perhaps considerably more than 1000 km). To put this into context, the conventionally armed air-launched ballistic missiles developed and deployed by Israel would, in the hands of the Russian Air Force, allow Russia to undertake standoff strikes against Riga – some 220 km from Russia proper – and Berlin – some 1000 km from Russia proper. Instead, Russia developed and deployed a very niche – and likely very expensive – air-launched ballistic missile primarily for use in a regional nuclear strike role.

As of March 2025, the Kh-47 has been a topic of public discussion for no less than seven years and has been employed in the Russia-Ukraine War over the past years. Its wartime performance raises questions not only about Russia’s claims about its performance but also the breathless apprehension with which the unveiling of the Kh-47 was greeted. The disruptions the war has had to pre-war plans for Russian military procurement notwithstanding, observers confront the fact that, seven years after its introduction, the Kh-47 air-launched ballistic missile is still associated with a small fleet of specifically MiG-31K de facto standoff bomber aircraft that are organizationally part of the Russian Air Force’s Long Range Aviation force, which operates all of Russia’s Tu-22M, Tu-95, and Tu-160 bomber aircraft. If the Kh-47 was intended to undertake large-scale conventional strikes deep inside NATO territory, it has neither been procured in the required numbers nor, more to the point, have a meaningful number of MiG-31 aircraft been adapted to serve as de facto standoff bombers. Despite claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that the Kh-47 has been integrated with the supersonic Tu-22M bomber of the Russian Air Force’s sizable fleet of Su-34 strike aircraft. Instead, the Kh-47 air-launched ballistic missile remains what it was in March 2018: a largely token novel strike munition in both qualitative and quantitative terms. 

Russia now operates in a post-INF Treaty world and can simply develop and deploy a ground-launched ballistic missile with a greater maximum range than the Iskander rather than an air-launched ballistic missile. Russia is understood to be doing that in a wartime context with a reported 1000 km extended-range version of the Iskander as the larger and longer-range Oreshnik, which was first used against Ukraine in November 2024. While an air-launched ballistic missile has advantages in terms of launch geometry and in terms of rapid redeployment between Russia’s western and eastern frontiers, this comes at a high sustainment cost and at the cost of a lower launch tempo, all else being equal. All things considered, the Russian Kh-47 air-launched ballistic missile does not appear to have been developed with a meaningful mission other than regional nuclear strike in mind. The Kh-47 cannot be compared to the various conventionally armed Israeli air-launched ballistic missiles that have not only been developed to fulfill very niche roles but have also been effectively employed in such very niche roles, unlike the Russian Kh-47 in the Russia-Ukraine War.

The Emergence of a Chinese Air-Launched Ballistic Missile Capability

In early 2017, rumours began to circulate on Chinese social media that the PLAAF was set to receive a new version of the H-6 bomber aircraft that was designed to launch an anti-ship ballistic missile. In August 2017, a low-definition image was shared on Chinese social media that indicated the existence of a previously unseen H-6 bomber variant equipped with an aerial refueling probe. These data points offered observers working with publicly available information the first indications that China was developing an air-launched ballistic missile.

Given the rumoured payload of an anti-ship ballistic missile in the vein of the SAC-turned-PLARF’s DF-21D, there was little indication at the time that the interrelated development of a new version of the longstanding H-6 bomber and a reported air-launched anti-ship ballistic missile was motivated by a desire to improve China’s regional nuclear strike capabilities. In September 2015, China unveiled its latest long-range ballistic missile, the DF-26, and the DF-26 appeared to both extend the reach of the PLARF’s conventional strike capabilities and offer China its first high-accuracy regional nuclear strike capability. By early 2018, however, official U.S. disclosures and media reports indicated that U.S. intelligence believed that China had undertaken multiple tests of a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile with the American designation CH-AS-X-13 since 2016. The Chinese air-launched ballistic missile with the American designation CH-AS-X-13 – CH-AS-13 once it is deployed – was notably described in media reports as having a maximum range of 3000 km and the characteristics required to serve as an anti-ship ballistic missile.

In itself, the existence of a new version of the H-6 bomber equipped with a presumably conventionally armed air-launched anti-ship ballistic missile with a reported maximum range of 3000 km amounted to a very significant development. American officials, however, disclosed that this development was tied with a major shift in China’s nuclear force structure. In March 2018, the director of the American Defense Intelligence Agency publicly disclosed that (A) China was developing “two new air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may include a nuclear payload” and that the “the PLA Air Force is developing a strategic bomber that we expect to have a nuclear mission; when combined with Rocket Force and Navy capabilities, this bomber would complete China’s first credible nuclear “triad.” If these official American disclosures were accurate, then China was pursuing air-launched ballistic missile technology for reasons more akin to those of Russia and than those motivating Israel. It should be noted that the reported emergence of a PLAAF nuclear-armed bomber force following the introduction of the CH-AS-X-13 indicated that the H-6K bomber and KD-20 air-launched cruise missile were, at the time, not associated with the use of nuclear weapons. This was not surprising given how China was reported to have transitioned to ballistic missiles for nuclear strike roles following a brief period in which PLAAF H-6 bombers were used in atmospheric testing and amounted to China’s sole means of nuclear delivery.

From the beginning, international reports and discussions of China’s development of air-launched ballistic missile technology highlighted the use of such a novel strike munition in nuclear roles. The director of the American Defence Intelligence Agency, however, unequivocally remarked that China was developing “two new air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may include a nuclear payload.” (emphasis added) In other words, China was developing one air-launched ballistic missile for use in a purely conventional role and another for use in a possible nuclear role – official American government disclosures did not rule out the possibility that the possible nuclear-armed air-launched ballistic missile could not also be equipped with a conventional high explosive warhead. China’s motivations for pursuing air-launched ballistic missile technology were not as such akin to those motivating Russia. With the SAC-turned-PLARF also being one of the two largest operators – alongside Iran – of long-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, China’s motivations were for developing “two new air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may include a nuclear payload” were also clearly distinct from those of Israel. Unlike Israel, which was developing long-range air-launched ballistic missiles suitable for launch from fighter aircraft that were only capable of delivering a small payload, China was developing a “full-size” air-launched ballistic missile capable of delivering a large payload – large enough to serve as an anti-ship ballistic missile – that would be carried by a specially configured new version of a bomber aircraft design. 

Very Large Air-Launched Ballistic Missile(s) Mod 1 and Mod 2

Observers operating with publicly available information first learned of the American CH-AS-X-13 designation – the designation will be CH-AS-13 once the system is deployed – for a previously unknown Chinese air-launched ballistic missile design from media reports in early 2018. Official U.S. government disclosures from 2018 and 2019 revealed that China was developing two air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may be nuclear-armed. Over half a decade later, observers operating with publicly available information cannot confidently discern what the CH-AS-X-13 designation refers to, given the existence of publicly available imagery of what appear to be two distinct but likely related very large air-launched ballistic missiles carried by the PLAAF’s reportedly nuclear-capable H-6N bomber. 

Neither the Chinese nor the American designations for these two distinct but likely related very large air-launched ballistic missile designs are public knowledge as of this writing in March 2025. Chinese social media, the source of most early unofficial disclosures – “leaks” – of information, imagery, and video about previously unknown developments in Chinese military technology including the existence of what came to be known as the H-6N bomber, typically features use of the designation KF-21 for the air-launched ballistic missiles associated with the H-6N. The use of the KF prefix – which denotes “standoff” – for PLAAF munitions appears to be a practice that only started in the early 2020s. The KF prefix is thus far associated with the KF-98 air-launched cruise missile and KF-088C loitering anti-radiation missile, both of which were unveiled at the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow and were examined earlier in this SPAS Consulting report, as well as the much smaller and shorter-range primarily if not exclusively helicopter-launched KF-9, KF-10, and KF-11 air-to-surface missiles. KF-21 may or may not be the PLA designation for one or both of the distinct but likely related very large air-launched ballistic missiles associated with the H-6N bomber. 

Given the uncertainty as to the designation of these two very large air-launched ballistic missile designs, these will be referred to as VL-ALBM Mod 1 and VL-ALBM Mod 2 for the purposes of this report. VL-ALBM Mod 1 refers to an air-launched ballistic missile equipped with an apparent manoeuvrable reentry vehicle (MARV) similar to those used with MARV-equipped PLARF ballistic missile designs. VL-ALBM Mod 2 refers to a large ballistic missile equipped with a manoeuvrable glide vehicle (MGV), also known as a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) or a boost glide vehicle (BGV). The relationship between the MARV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 1 and the MGV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 2 cannot be reliably discerned on the basis of publicly available information or currently available low-definition imagery and video.

Little is known about these Chinese air-launched ballistic missiles, including their range and payload. Early American media reports from 2018 referred to an air-launched anti-ship ballistic missile with a maximum range of 3000 km while official U.S. government disclosures in the 2018-2019 timeframe referred to not one but two air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may carry a nuclear payload and may as such have a longer range than a potential conventionally-armed version. While it is possible that the MARV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 1 is the reported air-launched anti-ship ballistic missile, the same air-launched ballistic missile may or may not be nuclear armed. It is worth noting that official U.S. government disclosures only note the existence of two air-launched ballistic missiles without any reference to the use of an air-launched MGV as seen on the VL-ALBM Mod 2. While observers can postulate that a process of elimination would suggest the the MGV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 2 is the nuclear-armed air-launched ballistic missile referred to in official U.S. disclosures from 2018-2019, it bears emphasis that China formally unveiled the DF-17, a ground-launched ballistic missile equipped with a MGV payload, in 2019, and that the MGV-equipped surface-launched DF-17 operated by the PLARF appears to be a primarily if not exclusively non-nuclear strike system. It is possible that the U.S. military has a designation other than CH-AS-X-13 for the VL-ALBM Mod 2.

Even as the magnitude of analytical uncertainty concerning the MARV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 1 and MGV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 2 air-launched ballistic missiles cannot be overstated, observers can nevertheless consider the implications of the development and possible deployment of one or more conventionally armed long-range air-launched ballistic missiles for the PLAAF contribution to China’s long-range strike capabilities. As with the other types of air-launched strike munitions examined in this report, the maximum practical range of both the MARV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 1 and the MGV-equipped V-ALBM Mod 2 is affected by its flight profile. All else being equal, the maximum practical range of the unpowered manoeuvring payloads released by these air-launched ballistic missiles are affected by the speed and altitude of the host aircraft at the time that the air-launched ballistic missile is separated from the host aircraft as well as the speed an altitude of the host missile at the time the MARV/MGV payload separates from the host missile. It bears emphasis that the H-6N is a subsonic bomber powered by two low-bypass turbofan engines. As with the turbofan-powered H-6K from which it is derived, the H-6N bomber is neither associated with a very high service ceiling – not least when carrying such an oversized payload in a semi-recessed station under the modified fuselage – nor a high rate of acceleration and a high top speed. The H-6N is not, in other words, comparable to the supersonic Soviet Tu-22M and American B-1B bomber aircraft designs. The H-6N is also not comparable to the much smaller and shorter-range supersonic MiG-31K, which is the only aircraft currently known to launch the Russian Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile.

Supposing that the MARV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 1 and MGV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 2 are both equipped with conventional high-explosive warheads or at least exist in non-nuclear versions, a large long-range air-launched ballistic missile will significantly enhance the PLAAF’s long-range strike capabilities and, in effect, challenge the monopoly over China’s long-range strike capabilities long maintained by the PLARF. H-6N bombers – of which only a small number are currently known to exist – equipped with a single VL-ALBM Mod 1/Mod 2 per sortie can be used to attack high-value stationary terrestrial targets and perhaps mobile maritime targets. An aerial mode of launch is, however, likely to increase not only the accuracy required of the MARV and MGV payloads but also that of the H-6N bomber itself, the aircrew of which will have to accurately discern their position at the time of launch for the MARV payload of the VL-ALBM Mod 1 and MGV payload of the VL-ALBM Mod 2 to accurately reach the intended target. 

While China’s technological capacity is likely to sufficient to allow the PLAAF to meet the interrelated challenges of launch aircraft navigation and missile guidance, it bears emphasis that the combination of the aerial-refueling capable and reportedly nuclear-armed H-6N, which is presumably intended to operate over the Pacific Ocean, and the VL-ALBM Mod 1/Mod 2 is likely amount to the first time that PLAAF aircrews – who have little experience with such operations unlike their American and Soviet counterparts – require such high accuracy positioning data. For context, Cold War American and Soviet long-range nuclear-armed bombers were equipped with some of the highest-end inertial navigation systems, often assisted by stellar navigation, produced by these countries. The accurate employment of a long-range fire-and-forget presumably GNSS independent conventionally-armed ballistic missile from a launch position over open water – in wartime conditions – is not a trivial undertaking. The challenge of GNSS-independent navigation also applies when the H-6N is employed to launch a nuclear-armed air-launched ballistic missile, but is somewhat moderated by the much larger destructive radius of a nuclear warhead. Observers should note that while the H-6N incorporates an aerial refueling probe and has a modified lower fuselage to facilitate the carriage of an oversized payload, nothing is publicly known about its avionics and the navigation systems that it is equipped with.

A Possible KF-22 Air-Launched Ballistic Missile

As noted earlier, the Chinese designation for the distinct but likely related VL-ALBM Mod 1 and/or VL-ALBM Mod 2 may be KF-21, and one or both of these distinct but likely related Chinese air-launched ballistic missiles may have the American designation CH-AS-13 when deployed. In March 2025, observers operating with access to publicly available information received an unexpected new data point in the form of a video posted on Chinese social media. This video, which was seemingly filmed by Chinese civilians in the open deserts of Xinjiang, depicted the debris of an apparent spent rocket booster. The apparent spent rocket booster is clearly labelled the AKF-22, which is to say that it is part of the KF-22 missile – the formal designation of the KF-98 air-launched cruise missile, for example, is the AKF-98, which is the designation seen on the KF-98 specimens on display at the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow. Given the presence of a spent rocket booster, the seemingly official KF-22 designation appears to refer to a previously unknown air-launched ballistic missile, one that is likely to be associated with one or more versions of the PLAAF’s H-6 bomber aircraft.

Uncertainties notwithstanding, the debris captured in the brief video posted on Chinese social media indicates that the apparent KF-22 is much smaller than the VL-ALBM Mod 1/Mod 2, which are designed for carriage on the semi-recessed centerline station located underneath the modified fuselage of the H-6N. While it is possible that the apparent KF-22 is also carried on the semi-recessed centerline station of the H-6N, another possibility is that the seemingly much smaller KF-22 air-launched ballistic missile is designed to be carried on one of the wing stations of the H-6N and perhaps the H-6K and, as such, the H-6J. The heaviest payload associated with the wing stations of China’s H-6K and H-6J bombers is either the YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, which is likely to weigh around 3000 kg, or a different and much smaller air-launched ballistic missile design examined later in this section that may weigh 3000-4000 kg. The maximum capacity of the wing stations on the H-6K and H-6J are likely to be around 3000 kg for the innermost pair of wing stations, 3000-4000 kg for the central pair of wing stations, and around 2000 kg for the outermost pair of wing stations. The H-6N may or may not have a reinforced airframe with higher capacity wing stations. Supposing that the apparent KF-22 air-launched ballistic missile is launched from the wing stations of H-6K/H-6J/H-6N bomber aircraft, it may be restricted to a maximum weight of around 3000-4000 kg.

Medium Air-Launched Ballistic Missile (M-ALBM)

In 2018, observers operating with publicly available information first learned of the American CH-AS-X-13 designation for a previously unknown Chinese air-launched ballistic missile. In 2018, observers learned from official U.S. government disclosures that China was developing two air-launched ballistic missiles, one of which may be nuclear-armed. Leaving aside the apparent KF-22 air-launched ballistic missile, which was informally unveiled in March 2025, observers operating with publicly available information confront the fact that the H-6N bomber has been seen carrying two distinct but likely related very large air-launched ballistic missiles, the MARV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 1 and the MGV-equipped VL-ALBM Mod 2. In September 2022, the PLAAF formally unveiled a separate and previously unknown air-launched ballistic missile at the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow. This air-launched ballistic missile is not carried on the semi-recessed centerline station of a specially configured reportedly nuclear-capable H-6N. It is, rather, mounted on the wing stations of the earlier turbofan-powered H-6K bomber and may also be compatible with both the H-6J and the H-6N. Observers operating with publicly available information cannot discern whether this much smaller air-launched ballistic missile is one of the two such missiles referred to in official U.S. government disclosures in the 2018-2019 timeframe or an entirely separate air-launched ballistic missile design.

The air-launched ballistic missiles seen loaded onto the wing stations (x2) of an operational PLAAF H-6K bomber at the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow were labelled 2PZD-21, which appears to indicate that these were inert captive carry missiles designed for use in training flights – these simulate the load and aerodynamic effects of carrying a functional air-launched ballistic missile of this type. With the suffix of the inert captive carry missile being -21, Chinese social media users refer to this air-launched ballistic missile design as the KD-21. The American designation for this distinct and much smaller Chinese air-launched ballistic missile design, which was unexpectedly unveiled around two and a half years ago, is not public knowledge as of March 2025. China’s senior military leaders appear to have approved the unexpected formal unveiling of this medium-size air-launched ballistic missile, which will be referred to as M-ALBM for the purposes of this report, at the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow, where it was notably displayed alongside two other previously unknown PLAAF strike munitions. The previously unknown KF-98 air-launched cruise missile and the KF-088C loitering anti-radiation missile were also part of what is best characterized as a primarily “show, don’t tell” PLAAF display.

While VL-ALBM Mod 1/Mod 2 are launched from the semi-recessed centerline station of the specially modified turbofan-powered H-6N, the M-ALBM has, to date, only been seen on the wing stations of the earlier turbofan-powered H-6K. The H-6K has a total of six wing stations available for carrying munitions, and only the innermost four wing stations appear to be regularly employed to carry munitions with a weight of more than 1000 kg (each of the two outermost of the six stations appears to be reserved for use with a maximum 2000 kg payload in wartime overload conditions). The H-6K on display at the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow carried two 2PZD-21 inert captive carry missiles on the two central wing stations. It is possible but unlikely that the H-6K bomber can carry two additional M-ALBM on the two innermost wing stations, which is to say a total of perhaps four M-ALBM. This, however, remains to be confirmed, and it is possible that this will amount to an overload configuration restricted for use in wartime and at the cost of a likely significant reduction in range-endurance. 

The development of the M-ALBM not only provides an air-launched ballistic missile for use with the H-6K and perhaps the H-6J – a combined fleet of 128 bomber aircraft according to the 2025 IISS Military Balance – but also offers the PLAAF’s large H-6K/H-6J fleet a (theoretical) maximum salvo capacity of 256 M-ALBM. Stated differently, a formation of just four H-6K/H-6J bombers can launch up to 8 M-ALBMs, and a formation of eight H-6K/H-6J bombers can launch up to 16 M-ALBMs (or up to 16 and 32, respectively, of a lighter air-launched ballistic missile). Although the M-ALBM can be intercepted by increasingly prevalent ground- and ship-based ballistic missile defence systems, it nevertheless constitutes both a shorter time-to-target and a higher probability penetration munition than the KD-20 air-launched cruise missile. If employed against targets that are undefended by terminal endo-atmospheric ballistic missile defences, the effects and effectiveness of the PLAAF’s employment of the M-ALBM will, in effect, be limited by the reliability and accuracy of this Chinese air-launched ballistic missile design. 

The origins of the M-ALBM are unclear, but it may be related to one of several surface-launched ballistic missile designs that China’s fragmented military industry has offered international customers – and exported in a few cases – over the years. This includes the M20 and CM-401 ballistic missiles developed by CASIC, the BP-12 ballistic missile developed by CPMIEC, as well as the Fire Dragon 480 marketed by NORINCO. Although the M-ALBM is much smaller than the VL-ALBM Mod 1/Mod 2, it is a fairly large ballistic missile that likely weighs 3000-4000 kg. That is, the M-ALBM appears to be significantly larger and heavier than the American MGM-140 ATACMS, which is a surface-launched ballistic missile design, and the similar Israeli LORA, of which an air-launched ballistic missile variant exists, and perhaps similar in size and weight to the Russian Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, which is reported to weigh around 4000 kg. As explained in the context of the apparent KF-22 air-launched ballistic missile, the heaviest payload associated with the wing stations of the H-6K/H-6J prior to the unveiling of the M-ALBM was the YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, which reportedly weighs around 3000 kg. Should the M-ALBM weigh around 4000 kg, then a notional H-6K carrying the M-ALBM of four of its six wing stations will be carrying a total munitions load of 16,000 kg, which is likely to greatly exceed the limits of the modified Tu-16-derived turbofan-powered bomber aircraft. It is, therefore, possible, even likely, that the H-6K, H-6J, and H-6N are limited to carrying two M-ALBMs per sortie.

The weight and configuration of the warhead(s) installed in the M-ALBM is not public knowledge. While a conventional blast-fragmentation warhead fused to detonate on impact is the simplest warhead and fusing combination, the M-ALBM may be equipped with one or more other warhead types. The M-ALBM is particularly well-suited for use with a penetrating blast-fragmentation warhead against hardened targets. It is also a candidate for use as a submunitions dispenser or at least for use with an airburst fusing mode alongside a blast-fragmentation warhead in order to effectively attack targets such as concentrations of parked aircraft. Given the existence of the KD-20 air-launched cruise missile in the PLAAF arsenal, the M-ALBM will likely be most productively used by the PLAAF against targets against which the KD-20 is not optimized and/or with warheads that the KD-20 is not equipped with. It bears emphasis that there is no indication that the M-ALBM is a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile.

As with all air-launched munitions in general and long-range air-launched ballistic missiles in particular, the H-6K launch aircraft must accurately discern its position at the time of launch or else an otherwise perfectly accurate M-ALBM munition may not accurately impact the intended target. While the baseline version of the M-ALBM is likely to rely on INS and GNSS guidance, it is worth noting that Chinese industry has marketed ballistic missiles of this class with active radar homing seekers for use as an anti-ship and perhaps a land-attack munition as well as a passive radar homing seeker for use as an anti-radiation and perhaps an anti-ship munition. 

While the maximum range of the M-ALBM is not public knowledge, it may have a nominal maximum range of 1000 or more km when launched from the wings of the subsonic H-6K bomber. As with the other types of air-launched strike munitions examined in this report, the maximum practical range of the M-ALBM is affected by its flight profile. All else being equal, the maximum practical range of this air-launched ballistic missile is affected by the speed and altitude of the host aircraft at the time that the air-launched ballistic missile is separated from the host aircraft. It bears emphasis that the H-6K is a subsonic bomber powered by two low-bypass turbofan engines. The H-6K bomber is neither associated with a very high service ceiling – not least when carrying such oversized payloads on its wing stations – nor a high rate of acceleration and a high top speed. The H-6K is not, in other words, comparable to the supersonic Soviet Tu-22M and American B-1B bomber aircraft designs. The H-6N is also not comparable to the much smaller and shorter-range supersonic MiG-31K, which is the only aircraft currently known to carry the Russian Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile.

Although it is natural to compare the Chinese M-ALBM with the Russian Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, it bears emphasis that the Kh-47M2 is, to date, exclusively launched by specially configured MiG-31K aircraft. While the MiG-31 is a supersonic interceptor developed for the Soviet Air Force, a small fleet of specially configured MiG-31K aircraft serve as de facto stand-off bombers in the Russian Air Force’s Long Range Aviation force, which operates all of Russia’s Tu-22M, Tu-95, and Tu-160 bomber aircraft. The baseline MiG-31 supersonic interceptor aircraft is capable of flying at a maximum speed of over Mach 2.5 and at a ceiling of around 80,000 feet in a clean/unladen configuration. While a specially configured MiG-31K cannot, of course, fly so fast or so high when carrying a large and heavy Kh-47M2 air-launched ballistic missile on its centerline station, it can nevertheless release an air-launched ballistic missile at a much higher speed and altitude than the PLAAF’s subsonic H-6K/H-6J/H-6N bombers. All else being equal, the M-ALBM cannot match the range of the Kh-47M2 for as long as it is released from a subsonic aircraft with a ceiling of around 40,000 feet in a clean/unladen configuration. 

Small Air-Launched Ballistic Missile (S-ALBM)

In September 2024, an image shared on Chinese social media revealed the existence of yet another Chinese air-launched ballistic missile, one that has not been formally unveiled as of March 2025. This much smaller air-launched ballistic missile, which will be referred to as S-ALBM for the purposes of this report, is distinguished not only by its smaller size but also its folding rear fins. The M-ALBM associated with carriage on the wings of H-6K bombers, in contrast, has fixed rear fins. The existence of folding fins on a ballistic missile seen attached to a pylon is highly indicative of an air-launched ballistic missile designed primarily intended for use with fighter aircraft subject to greater constraints on payload dimensions.

While the S-ALBM may be a “private venture” developed by one of China’s state-owned enterprises that develops ballistic missiles, it is a very niche system and has likely been developed with the PLAAF in mind. As of this writing in March 2025, the only publicly known competitor to the S-ALBM is the air-launched version of the Israeli LORA ballistic missile, which was unveiled in June 2024 but was likely developed some years prior. The surface-launched 624 mm diameter LORA ballistic missile weighs around 1600 kg and is in the same weight and performance class as the American surface-launched 610 mm diameter AGM-140 ATACMS. The S-ALBM may be related to one of the smaller-diameter ballistic missiles marketed to international customers by Chinese industry, such as the surfaced-launched 610 mm diameter Fire Dragon 300, a design that NORINCO has exhibited alongside the larger 750 mm diameter Fire Dragon 480. It bears emphasis that the market for standoff munitions like the S-ALBM is very small, not least in a world in which a Chinese munition is unlikely to ever be integrated onto an American or European-built combat aircraft. The S-ALBM is, therefore, likely to have either been developed for the PLA or developed to bolster the export competitiveness of the Chinese J-10C fighter, possibly the Chinese JF-17 fighter, and perhaps one or more Chinese uncrewed aircraft designs. 

As of March 2025, there is next to no publicly available information on the S-ALBM. Uncertainties notwithstanding, it is productive to use the disclosed specifications of the air-launched version of the Israeli LORA ballistic missile to consider the potential implications of the recently unveiled S-ALBM for the strike capabilities of the PLAAF and the PLANAF. This is important in a context in which the V-ALBM Mod 1/Mod 2, KF-22 air-launched ballistic missile, and the M-ALBM are exclusively carried by the PLAAF bomber fleet and none of the combined fleet of ~2220 non-bomber combat aircraft that PLAAF and PLANAF reportedly deployed in early 2025. Should the PLAAF adopt a smaller and lighter air-launched ballistic missile for use with its fighter aircraft and similar, it will emulate the approach to air-launched ballistic missile technology pioneered by Israel.

According to its manufacturer, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the surface-launched LORA is a 624 mm diameter missile that weighs around 1600 kg and has a length of 5.2 meters. IAI has disclosed pictures of an Israeli Air Force F-16I fighter carrying two LORA air-launched ballistic missiles on two of its wing stations, wing stations that are typically used to carry two 2270 liter drop tanks that have a filled weight of approximately 2000 kg each. 

The payload restrictions for each of the wing stations on PLAAF combat aircraft is not public knowledge. The PLAAF’s J-10C multirole fighter, however, regularly carries two 1600 liter drop tanks that likely have a filled weight of around 1500 kg each. The JH-7A strike aircraft regularly carries two 1400 liter drop tanks that likely have a filled weight of around 1350 kg each. As with all Soviet-Russian Su-27/Su-30 family aircraft other than the heavily modified Russian Su-34 strike fighter, the Chinese-built J-16 multi-role fighter does not employ drop tanks. Su-27/Su-30 family aircraft excluding the heavily modified Su-34 are, however, rated to carry up to three 1500 kg bombs – one on each wing and another on a centerline station. Given this, a smaller and lighter analogue to the Israeli LORA air-launched ballistic missile – something like the recently unveiled Chinese S-ALBM – that weighs no more than 1500 kg may be carried by the J-10C (x2 per aircraft) and the J-16 (x2-x3 per aircraft). Weight is not, of course, the only factor at play when it comes to integrating munitions on an aircraft, and it is possible that the aerodynamic effects of carrying an S-ALBM prevent the use of this small air-launched ballistic missile design on the J-10C and/or the J-16. If this is the case, observers must question why the developer, which is very likely to be a Chinese state-owned enterprise, allocated the resources required to develop the S-ALBM.

Uncertainties notwithstanding, a non-exclusive possibility – indicated by the folding rear fins – is that the S-ALBM is set for integration with H-6 bomber aircraft. There is a case to be made that the M-ALBM is too large, heavy, and has excessive range for many of the missions that the PLAAF is likely to undertake in wartime. A standoff range of 400-500 km, for example, will place PLAAF bombers well beyond the reach of land- and sea-based surface-to-air missiles, and the PLAAF may benefit from a smaller, lighter, and likely lower-cost air-launched ballistic missile that can be built and employed in larger numbers. Insofar as such an air-launched ballistic missile can also be launched by PLAAF and perhaps the PLANAF’s carrier-borne fighter aircraft, the PLA would benefit from greater economies of scale in its manufacture.

The developmental and operational status of the S-ALBM is uncertain, and it may not be intended for deployment with the PLAAF or PLANAF. Supposing that the S-ALBM weighs around 1500 kg, a wide range of PLA combat aircraft may carry this smaller air-launched ballistic missile design.