Disclosures Offer Insight into Scale and Effects of Russian UMPK and UMPB Guided Glide Bomb Employment

Note: This SPAS Consulting briefing is the first of a two-part series that examines Russia’s employment of the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs in the Russia-Ukraine War. This briefing series expands upon a May 2024 SPAS Consulting briefing that focused on the then-recent introduction of Russia’s UMPB guided glide bomb. 

Part I: Disaggregating Available Data on the Scale of Guided Glide Bomb Production and Employment

Russia’s UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs are widely touted as one of several “game-changing” weapons systems introduced during the Russia-Ukraine War. No matter how effective a weapons system may be, numbers matter and discussions of the weapons systems that Russia has introduced and employed in the Russia-Ukraine War often fail to highlight the quantitative limitations of qualitative advances in Russian military capabilities. In early February 2025, a senior Ukrainian official disclosed that Russia had employed around 40,000 guided glide bombs against targets on Ukrainian territory over the course of 2024. This and other recent disclosures offer observers data points through which to assess the effects and implications of Russia’s belated introduction of standoff fire-and-forget guided glide bombs for its large fleet of crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft. This SPAS Consulting briefing uses recently disclosed data points on the scale at which Russia has built and employed its UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs as a starting point for an analysis of the effects and implications that these strike munitions have had on the Russia-Ukraine War. 

This SPAS Consulting briefing highlights the dilution of effects of the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs over time and across space in a geographically expansive high-intensity protracted conflict that has recently entered its fourth year. In so doing, this briefing directs attention to the enduring quantitative and qualitative limitations of Russia’s strike capabilities at a time in which international attention is fast shifting to the implications of wartime developments on Russia’s post-war military capabilities. Part II of this two-part SPAS Consulting briefing series will examine the technical particulars of the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs and the nature and trajectory of the highly dynamic measure-countermeasure competition that Russia is entangled in as a result of attempting to widely employ low-cost strike munitions in the form of the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bomb designs.

How Many Guided Bombs Has Russia Built and Employed?

Russia has made very limited disclosures as to the number of munitions it has produced and employed during the Russia-Ukraine War. Observers therefore have to rely on occasional disclosures by Ukrainian officials as well as officials from other countries for insight into such matters. These disclosures are, of course, highly selective and highlight what the discloser wants to communicate to both domestic and international audiences but are nevertheless often the only publicly available data points that observers can currently draw upon.

In early February 2025, a senior Ukrainian official disclosed that Russia had employed around 40,000 guided bombs over the course of 2024 against targets on Ukrainian territory alone. This figure appears to exclude guided bombs dropped on Ukrainian-controlled territory in Russia’s Kursk province. In January 2025, Ukrainian media reports cited the Ukrainian Air Force as the source for the figure of 51,000 guided aerial bombs – seemingly of all types – employed by Russia since the start of the war. This figure presumably refers to Russian guided bomb employment from 24 February 2022 onward. It also appears to refer to not just the UMPK and UMPB fire-and-forget guided glide bombs that Russia belatedly introduced from early 2023 onward but also the various non-fire-and-forget non-glide guided bombs that existed in limited numbers as part of Russia’s pre-2022 arsenal. A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report from February 2025 drawing upon interviews with Ukrainian military personnel claims that Russia produced around 40,000 UMPK guided glide bombs in 2024. This figure may also include the newer UMPB guided glide bomb design. The same Royal United Services Institute report also claims that Russia’s production target for 2025 is 70,000 guided glide bombs. This production target may refer to both the UMPK and the UMPB. These figures are laid out in Table 1.

Although the figures laid out in Table 1 amount to useful data points for observers to work with, it bears emphasis that the aforementioned recent disclosures do not disaggregate guided bombs produced and employed by type or weight class. The weight class of guided bombs is particularly important when it comes to the UMPK guidance and wing assembly. Whereas the UMPB, which is the newer design, is a 250-kg class standalone unitary guided glide bomb, the UMPK is a guidance and wing assembly that is attached to an existing unguided Soviet-pattern aerial bomb. Soviet pattern aerial bombs are welded monoliths that cannot be converted into guided bombs in the manner of the widely deployed American Mark 80 series, which are in effect modular designs to which various nose and tail assemblies can be attached. Russia has developed versions of the UMPK guidance and wing assembly that are compatible with 250-kg class, 500-kg class, 1500-kg class, and 3000-kg class unguided aerial bombs. Table 2 lays out the known universe of unpowered Russian guided bomb designs.

If taken at face value, the recently disclosed figures for Russian guided bomb employment and production throughout 2024 and projected production for 2025 are impressive, not least in a context in which the Russian Air Force went to war in 2022 with a virtually non-existent supply of fire-and-forget guided glide bombs. The figures laid out in Table 1, however, need to be disaggregated because the aggregate totals can mislead observers as to the effects and implications of Russian guided glide bomb production and employment in the Russia-Ukraine War. 

Although the total number of guided glide bombs produced and employed in a given year are undoubtedly important figures for observers to consider, the Russia-Ukraine War is a protracted conflict in which the effects of any given military system are necessarily diluted over time. A standard year is 365 days long and observers therefore benefit from consideration of the average number of guided glide bombs employed over this timeframe. Assuming that the publicly available figure of 40,000 guided glide bombs launched against targets on Ukrainian territory alone over the course of 2024 is correct, this amounts to an average of 109.58 guided glide bombs per day. A projected increase in production output to 70,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2025 will support the employment of an average of 191.78 guided glide bombs per day. Observers may object that these figures speak for themselves given that there is nothing unimpressive about averages of 109.58 realized and 191.78 projected guided glide bombs employed per day for 2024 and 2025, respectively. This is undoubtedly true if these figures are taken at face value, but the daily averages are independently misleading. A sound analysis must also take into account other considerations.

The Dilution of Effects Over Time

To assess the combat capabilities of the Russian Air Force including its capacity to undertake airstrikes with guided glide bombs, observers need to take into account the number of sorties generated over a given timeframe. The number of available combat aircraft that can be used to launch guided glide bombs and the average number of sorties generated per day by such aircraft determines the maximum number of guided glide bombs that the Russian Air Force can employ in a given timeframe independent of how many guided glide bombs are produced or available for employment. While neither Ukraine nor Russia have disclosed such detailed information on Russian Air Force activity, observers can use the available figures for realized and projected guided glide bomb production and employment to determine the minimum number of sorties that the Russian Air Force will have to generate to employ said quantities of guided glide bombs.

As of this writing in early March 2025, publicly available information indicates that the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs are primarily if not exclusively launched from the closely related Su-34 two-seat strike fighter and Su-35 single-seat multirole fighter, which are members of the same design family alongside the Su-27, Su-30, and Su-33. The Su-35 has the most formidable air-to-air combat capabilities of any fully operational Russian combat aircraft design – the newer and more advanced Su-57 does not appear to be fully operational at this time and is in any event only available in very small numbers. The Su-34 strike fighter therefore appears to be responsible for the employment of most guided glide bombs to date. While an imperfect measure, it bears emphasis that official and unofficial Russian disclosures of aircraft activity involving UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs almost exclusively put the spotlight on the Russian Air Force’s Su-34 fleet.

The Su-34 and Su-35 are very large combat aircraft designs with high maximum takeoff weights. On paper, these can carry up to 8,000 kg of payload but the practical payload of any combat aircraft design is determined by other factors. This includes the dimensions of a given munition, the effects that said munition has on aerodynamics and aircraft performance when carried on a given weapons station, the maximum capacity of a given weapons station, and the availability of suitable interfaces with the aircraft’s combat management system for the carriage and release of a guided – as opposed to unguided – munition on a given weapons station, among other considerations. Militaries oversee the integration of munitions onto aircraft and certify munitions for carriage and launch on a given weapons station. As a result, observers cannot simply assume, for example, that a maximum payload of 8,000 kg means that a Su-34 or Su-35 can carry sixteen 500-kilogram or thirty-two 250-kilogram class guided glide bombs. It also bears emphasis that a given combat aircraft design, including the Su-34 and Su-35, may be able to carry and launch a larger number of unguided bombs relative to guided munitions of a given weight class. This reflects how the constraints imposed by wiring to interface with an aircraft’s combat management system are distinct from the structural limits of the airframe itself.

As of this writing in early March 2025, there is no indication that either the Su-34 or Su-35 have been certified to carry and launch more than four UMPK or UMPB guided glide bombs in any given sortie. Stated differently, the Russian Air Force’s Su-34 and Su-35 fleets appear to be limited to some combination of up to four – two per wing – 250-kg class UMPB, 250-kg class UMPK, and 500-kg class UMPK guided glide bombs per sortie. The 1500-kg UMPK guided glide bombs are much larger and heavier. The Su-34 is therefore restricted to carrying up to a maximum of just three 1500-kg UMPK guided glide bombs per sortie – one on each wing and another on its centerline station – while the Su-35 appears to be limited to carrying just one 1500-kg UMPK guided glide bomb per sortie on its centerline station. The 3000-kg UMPK is exceedingly large by any standard and the Su-34 – the only aircraft known to have been certified to carry the 3000-kg UMPK – is limited to carrying one such guided glide bomb per sortie on its centerline station. 

Although the UMPK and UMPB appear to be primarily if not exclusively employed by Su-34 strike fighters and Su-35 multirole fighters as of this writing in early March 2025, it bears emphasis that other operational Russian non-bomber combat aircraft – the MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-24, Su-25, Su-27, and Su-30 – will face much the same restrictions as the Su-34 and Su-35 when it comes to carrying and launching UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs. While the Tu-22M, Tu-95, and Tu-160 bombers can carry a much larger number of munitions, publicly available information offers no indication as to the integration of UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs onto Russian bomber aircraft.

Given the above, the Russian Air Force appears to be limited to launching a maximum of just four UMPK and/or UMPB guided glide bombs per sortie. Observers can therefore divide the total number of guided bombs that Russia reportedly employed in a given timeframe and divide it by four to determine the minimum number of sorties required to deliver said quantity of UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs. It is, of course, possible that the Russian Air Force has undertaken and will undertake a larger number of sorties in which, on average, each Russian combat aircraft launches an average of less than four guided glide bombs. Although this is inevitable when it comes to the employment of the UMPK with 1500-kg and 3000-kg bombs, observers only have access to data that does not disaggregate guided glide bomb production and employment by weight class. It bears emphasis that while the Russian Air Force can in principle undertake sorties in which a Su-34 or Su-35 is equipped with fewer than four 250-kg or 500-kg class guided glide bombs, this will amount to inefficient use of the finite supply of serviceable combat aircraft deployed at airbases within range of the frontlines, the finite number of flight hours available for a given airframe prior to overhaul, and, above all, the finite number of sorties that can be generated in a given timeframe. 

Once we calculate the minimum number of sorties – with four guided bombs loaded onto a given Russian combat aircraft per sortie – required to deliver an annual total of guided bombs, we can determine the minimum number of sorties per day – with four guided bombs loaded onto a given aircraft on each sortie. The minimum number of daily sorties can be compared to the daily average of guided bombs employed, a figure that gives no consideration to the importance of sortie generation. These additional figures allow observers to develop a more holistic appreciation of the effects and implications of UMPK and UMPB guided glide bomb employment in the Russia-Ukraine War. These figures are laid out in Table 3.

Table 3 highlights the importance of disaggregating data on munitions expenditures so as to take into account the dilution of effects over time. In 2024, Russia reportedly launched around 40,000 guided glide bombs against Ukrainian territory alone – the figure appears to exclude guided glide bombs launched against Ukrainian military units occupying parts of Russia’s Kursk province. If taken at face value, this total number is very impressive but nevertheless only amounts to an average employment of just 109.58 guided glide bombs per day and, more importantly, an average of at least 27.37 sorties per day (with each sortie resulting in the launch of four guided glide bombs). The 175% increase reflected in the recently disclosed projection for Russian guided glide bomb production over the course of 2025 is also very impressive if taken at face value but will only facilitate an average employment of 191.78 guided glide bombs per day and an average of at least of 47.94 sorties per day (with each sortie resulting in the launch of four guided glide bombs). 

Additional information is required for observers to make sense of the figures laid out in Table 3. According to the 2025 issue of the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual Military Balance report, Russia deploys around 120 Su-34 strike fighters and around 115 Su-35 multirole fighters. Collectively, the Su-34 and Su-35 fleets amount to a total of 241 aircraft, which is to say just 22.15% of the 1088 crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft – bombers, fighters, interceptors, strike fighters, strike aircraft, and attack aircraft – deployed by the Russian Air Force and 20.29% of the combined total of 1188 crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft collectively deployed by the Russian Air Force and Russian Naval Aviation (as per the 2025 issue of the IISS Military Balance).

All crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft designs require extensive maintenance and the total number of aircraft deployed by a given air force is therefore misleading. Even in an idyllic peacetime context far removed from what the Russian Air Force currently finds itself in, only a subset – generally 60% to 80% – of combat aircraft are likely to be fully mission-capable on a given day. Given the high and unsustainable tempo at which the Russian Air Force has been operating for over three years, it would not be surprising if fully mission-capable rates are below 50% across Russia’s crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft fleet. If a very generous assumption is made that 60% of deployed Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft are fully mission capable on a given day, this will yield an estimated total of 72 Su-34 and 69 Su-35 aircraft that are fully mission capable and available to launch UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs on a given day. To provide some context for these figures, it is instructive to refer back to Table 3. The 40,000 guided glide bombs that Russia reportedly employed against targets on Ukrainian territory over the course of 2024 required an average of at least 27.37 sorties per day while the projected production of 70,000 guided glide bombs throughout 2025 will require an average of at least 47.94 sorties per day. As previously noted, the Su-35 has the most formidable air-to-air combat capabilities of any fully operational and widely available Russian crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft design, and the Su-34 strike fighter fleet – one that is likely to amount to around 72 or so fully mission-capable aircraft on a given day – appears to bear most of the burden for generating sorties to launch up to four UMPK or UMPB guided glide bombs per sortie. 

While publicly available data can be used to determine the minimum value for the average number of sorties that Russia will have to generate per day to deliver a given quantity of guided glide bombs over a longer timeframe, observers do not benefit from publicly available aggregated let alone highly disaggregated data on Russian sortie generation rates. Observers can, however, estimate the total number of fully mission-capable Su-34 strike fighters – 72 aircraft – and Su-35 multirole fighters – 69 aircraft – that are likely to be available for use on a given day. It is important to note that not all Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft are deployed close to the frontlines to undertake combat sorties in the Russia-Ukraine War – the Russian Air Force continues to garrison aircraft across the vast expanse of Russian territory. Hence, observers should not simply assume that an estimated fleet of 72 fully mission-capable Su-34 strike fighters and 69 fully mission-capable Su-35 multirole fighters amounts to a capacity to deliver up to 564 guided glide bombs per day – if said aircraft undertake an average of just one combat sortie per day while carrying four guided glide bombs each – or up to 1128 guided glide bombs per day – if said aircraft undertake an average of two combat sorties per day while carrying four guided glide bombs per sortie each – and so forth. 

It bears emphasis that sortie generation rates are likely to be characterized by considerable variance across aircraft types given the highly heterogeneous fleet of crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft deployed by the Russian Air Force. Although the Su-34 and Su-35 fleets are of more recent production than the rest of the Russian Air Force fleet and are therefore likely to have an above-average readiness rate, all else equal, the Su-34 fleet appears to be bear a disproportionate burden in generating sorties to launch UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs and the Su-35 fleet is likely to undertake many of the highest risk combat air patrols in which a Su-35 is configured for maximum endurance while equipped with a large number of air-to-air missiles. Stated differently, all else is not equal when it comes to the readiness of the Russian Air Force’s Su-34 and Su-35 fleets.

While aircraft serviceability has a major effect on sortie generation rates for a given fleet of crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft, it is not the most important factor to consider. The single most important factor is the flight distance – flight duration – from the airbase that an aircraft departs to the point at which guided glide bombs are launched and back to an airbase to refuel and rearm (not necessarily the same airbase that a given aircraft originally departed). There are, of course, only twenty-four hours in a day, and all crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft require extensive maintenance. Aircraft returning from a combat sortie must be refuelled and rearmed and often require other forms of servicing. The Su-34 strike fighter, for example, deploys a drogue parachute upon landing. Ground crews must service such equipment before the aircraft can undertake another sortie. Aircrews, moreover, are subject to not only fatigue but also higher levels of stress when undertaking combat sorties and the ratio of mission-ready available le aircrews to fully mission-capable aircraft is therefore also of great importance when attempting to estimate the number of combat sorties that can be generated per day with the aim of launching up to four UMPK or UMPB guided glide bombs per sortie.

Uncertainties notwithstanding, the (unpowered) UMPK and UMPB are practically limited to a maximum range of several dozen kilometers – the exact range is determined by the velocity and altitude of the host aircraft at the time of launch – and are not long-range standoff munitions. That is, a Su-34 or Su-35 will have to take off from a Russian airbase and fly to a launch point located at least several dozen kilometers from the frontlines for a UMPK or UMPB guided glide bomb to hit a target in Ukrainian-controlled territory. The greater the distance between the airbase and the launch point, the longer the flight time and, all else equal, the lower the number of sorties that can be generated by a given airframe operating from a given airbase per day, week, month, and year. Stated differently, the Russian Air Force will, all else equal, be able to sustain a higher sortie generation rate if it can garrison its crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft at airbases closer to the frontlines – ideally within 300-400 km. Russian airbases have, however, been subject to a mounting threat of Ukrainian air and missile attacks over the course of 2024.

The Russian Air Force, which can only draw upon a very small number of suitable hardened aircraft shelters to protect its aircraft on the ground at airbases close to Ukraine, has redeployed its combat aircraft to airbases that are increasingly distant from the frontlines as the air and missile threat posed by Ukraine to Russian airbases has increased. That is, Su-34 strike fighters and Su-35 multirole fighters must undertake ever longer two-way flights in order to launch UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs that have a maximum range of several dozen kilometers. As a result, there is downward pressure on the sortie generation rates for the Su-34 and Su-35 fleets when it comes to guided glide bomb launches independent of the increasing challenges that the Russian Air Force faces in terms of readiness following more than three years of non-stop combat operations. Hence, the Russian Air Force is poorly positioned to sustain an average of much more than one to two strike sorties per day – to release UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs – with its Su-34 and Su-35 fleets. It bears emphasis that the focus here is on an estimated average daily sortie rate – the Russian Air Force can undertake an intertemporal tradeoff by surging combat sorties for a brief timeframe only to have lower than average sortie generation rates afterward while maintenance crews work to return aircraft to a higher fully mission capable rate.

As noted in Table 3, the Russian Air Force had to generate an average of at least 27.37 sorties per day – with each aircraft carrying four guided glide bombs per sortie – to employ 40,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2024 (the actual number of sorties would be higher given the non-zero level at which 1500-kg and 3000-kg UMPK guided glide bombs were launched in 2024). To employ all of the projected total of 70,000 guided glide bombs set for production over the course of 2025, the Russian Air Force will have to generate an average of at least 47.94 sorties per day – with each aircraft carrying four guided glide bombs per sortie. The Russian Air Force, however, is unlikely to have more than 72 fully mission-capable Su-34 strike fighters at its disposal on a given day or more than 69 fully mission-capable Su-35 multirole fighters. As previously explained, the Su-35 fleet is likely to be primarily tasked with air-to-air sorties – combat air patrols, quick reaction alert duties, and so forth, and not all Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft are deployed at airbases close to Ukraine. 

Even if Russia were to deploy the entirety of its Su-34 fleet to airbases close to Ukraine despite the mounting air and missile threat posed to Russian aircraft on the ground, a fleet of 72 fully mission-capable Su-34 strike fighters can only generate so many sorties per day. If this fleet sustains an average of just one sortie per day in which each aircraft carries four guided glide bombs (i.e., a scenario in which Russia employs zero 1500-kg and 3000-kg UMPK guided glide bombs), then the Su-34 fleet will be capable of covering the average of at least 27.37 sorties per day required for 40,000 guided glide bombs to have been employed in 2024. The Russian Air Force will also be capable of generating the average of at least 47.94 sorties per day required to employ all of the projected 70,000 guided glide bombs set to be produced over the course of 2025. 

Suppose that the Su-34 fleet can sustain an average of two combat sorties per day in which each aircraft carries four guided glide bombs (i.e., a scenario in which Russia employs zero 1500-kg and 3000-kg UMPK guided glide bombs). In that case, the Su-34 fleet will be capable of generating an average of 144 sorties per day – nearly three times the number required to employ all of the projected 70,000 guided glide bombs set to be produced over the course of 2025. As a result, the constraint on guided glide bomb employment will be the number of guided glide bombs that are produced and available for use rather than sortie generation rates. Sustaining an average of two sorties per day with a rather small fleet of around 120 Su-34 strike fighters following over three years of intensive use is, however, easier said than done. The operative word here is average: the Russian Air Force can undertake a higher number of daily sorties for a brief timeframe but cannot sustain the higher sortie generation rate indefinitely and any surge is likely to have repercussions in terms of lower readiness over the short, medium, and long term. 

The Dilution of Effects Across Space

This SPAS Consulting briefing has so far focused on the number of guided glide bombs produced and employed by Russia, the dilution of effects over time, and the importance of sortie generation rates in assessing the effects of guided glide bomb employment in the Russia-Ukraine War. The dilution of effects over time must be given due consideration because the Russia-Ukraine War is a protracted conflict that has entered its fourth year. The Russia-Ukraine War is, however, also a very geographically expansive conflict and the effects of guided glide bomb employment are therefore also diluted across space, which is the focus of this section.

To assess the effects of Russia’s employment of guided glide bombs across space, observers require an estimate of the length of the frontlines. Since the withdrawal of Russian forces from positions west of the Dnieper River in November 2022, the Russia-Ukraine War has been primarily waged over around 1,000 kilometers of actively contested frontage. As of this writing in early March 2025, this includes some 600 kilometers of actively contested terrestrial frontage east of the Dnieper as well as some 400 kilometers of riverine frontage which includes land that was previously submerged by the Kakhovka Reservoir. While Russian and Ukrainian ground forces primarily take up defensive positions along this largely unchanging riverine frontage, both sides regularly subject opposing forces across the Dnieper to artillery fire and, more to the point, regularly use strike munitions of various types to do the same. 

Since May 2024, Russia and Ukraine have respectively opened – reactivated – two fronts along what was previously an almost wholly inactive frontage along the hundreds of kilometers of the international border west of the Oskil River. This includes the Vovchansk sector of Ukraine’s Kharkiv province and the Sudzha sector of Russia’s Kursk province. The Vovchansk sector currently amounts to around 50 kilometers of actively contested frontage and the Sudzha sector currently amounts to around 50 kilometers of actively contested frontage. This results in a total of around 700 kilometers of actively contested terrestrial frontage as of early March 2025 as well as some 400 kilometers of riverine frontage. In addition, there are some 1000 kilometers of mostly inactive frontage along the rest of the international border (excluding the actively contested Vovchansk and Sudzha sectors). These segments of the international border are not actively contested in terms of even sporadic ground combat and are very thinly garrisoned relative to the actively contested frontlines that stretch across Ukrainian territory from the international border to the Dnieper. There are, however, occasional small unit raids, sporadic artillery fire, and attacks using various types of strike munitions along the primarily inactive segments of the international border.

For the present purposes, it is analytically productive to leave aside the Vovchansk and Sudzha sectors and instead focus on convenient round numbers of 600 km of actively contested terrestrial frontage and 1000 km of actively contested frontage in total (60% terrestrial, 40% riverine). Table 4 lays out the average daily number of guided glide bombs employed per kilometer over 600 km and 1000 km of actively contested frontage, respectively.

Table 4 highlights the importance of disaggregating data on munitions expenditures so as to take into account the dilution of effects across space. In 2024, Russia reportedly launched around 40,000 guided glide bombs against Ukrainian territory alone – the figure appears to exclude guided glide bombs launched against Ukrainian military units occupying parts of Russia’s Kursk province. If taken at face value, the total number is very impressive but nevertheless amounts to an average of just 0.182 guided glide bombs per day over 600 km of actively contested frontage and 0.109 guided glide bombs per day over 1000 km of actively contested frontage. The 175% projected increase to 70,000 guided glide bombs produced over the course of 2025 is also very impressive if taken at face value but will only facilitate an average employment of just 0.319 guided glide bombs per day over 600 km of actively contested frontage and 0.191 guided glide bombs per day over 1000 km of actively contested frontage.

It is important to offer some context for the figures laid out in Table 4. Suppose that the actively contested frontlines are divided into approximately 1 km wide sectors that are each assigned to a single Russian infantry platoon – several dozen infantrymen. If an (unrealistic) assumption is made that the Russian Air Force evenly allocates guided glide bomb launches to cover targets across the entirety of actively contested frontage, then a notional Russian infantry platoon assigned to an approximately one-kilometer-wide sector in 2024 would have been supported by an average of just 1.27 guided glide bombs per week over 600 km of actively contested frontage and an average of just 0.766 guided glide bombs per week over 1000 km of actively contested frontage. 

The Russian Air Force did not, of course, evenly allocate guided glide bomb launches in 2024 to cover the entire length of actively contested frontlines. Some sectors were prioritized and became the focus of a disproportionately large number of UMPK and UMPB guided glide bomb launches. This is to say that other sectors logically received below-average levels of fire support from the Russian Air Force in a context in which the weekly averages for 2024 are very unimpressive to begin with. If Russian units across half the frontline were prioritized and received twice the average level of fire support possible with an equal allocation of guided glide bombs across the length of the actively contested frontlines, then half of the notional Russian infantry platoons in 2024 would have been supported by an average of just 2.56 guided glide bombs per week over 600 km of actively contested frontage and an average of just 1.53 guided glide bombs per week over 1000 km of actively contested frontage. In this hypothetical scenario, the other half of notional Russian infantry platoons each operating along an approximately one- kilometer-wide section of the frontline would have received no fire support in the form of UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs whatsoever.

Ukrainian sources report a projected total production of 70,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2025. While this amounts to an impressive 175% increase in guided glide bomb production relative to 2024, what does it mean for notional Russian infantry platoons that occupy positions in approximately one-kilometer-wide sections of the actively contested frontlines? If an (unrealistic) assumption is made that the Russian Air Force evenly allocates guided glide bomb launches to cover targets across the entirety of actively contested frontage, then in 2025 a notional Russian infantry platoon can expect to receive fire support in the form of an average of 2.23 guided glide bombs per week over 600 km of actively contested frontage and an average of just 1.34 guided glide bombs per week over 1000 km of actively contested frontage.

Some observers may object that dividing the actively contested frontlines into one-kilometer-wide sectors will greatly lower averages, and this is of course the effect of division with a larger divisor. Perhaps it is more analytically productive to divide the frontlines into larger sectors, such as sectors that are approximately 20 km wide. This is approximately what would ordinarily be assigned to a brigade-sized force, although it bears emphasis that higher force concentrations are commonplace in sectors prioritized for offensive and/or defensive operations. Table 5 lays out the average daily guided bombs employed per 20 km wide sectors along 600 km and 1000 km of actively contested frontage, respectively.

If an (unrealistic) assumption is made that the Russian Air Force evenly allocates guided glide bomb launches to cover targets across the entirety of actively contested frontage, then each notional 20 km wide sector in 2024 would have been supported by an average of 25.56 guided glide bombs per week over 600 km of actively contested frontage and an average of 15.33 guided glide bombs per week over 1000 km of actively contested frontage. With Ukrainian sources reporting a projected total production of 70,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2025, each notional 20 km wide sector in 2025 may be supported by an average of 44.74 guided glide bombs per week over 600 km of actively contested frontage and an average of 26.84 guided glide bombs per week over 1000 km of actively contested frontage.

Unsurprisingly, the larger the denominator in terms of time and/or space, the more impressive the effects of guided glide bomb employment appear even though the average weekly employment figures for each 20 km sector can be further divided to ultimately yield the very same average daily employment figures for each one-kilometer-wide sector laid out in Table 4. Changes in the manner in which available data is presented do not change the fact that the reported figures for Russian guided glide bomb employment over the course of 2024 and projected production over the course of 2025 are inadequate to enable more widespread effects of UMPK and UMPB guided glide bomb employment in such a geographically expansive conflict. In other words, the effects of Russia’s guided glide bomb employment are highly diluted across space much as the effects are highly diluted over time.

Although the central claim about the dilution of the effects of Russian guided glide bomb employment across space has been sustained, there are other ways to conceptualize and measure effects. One such approach is to focus on the number of sorties per day in support of guided glide bombs launched on targets along one-kilometer-wide stretches of the actively contested frontlines. Table 6 lays out these figures, which can of course be multiplied and divided into different units of time and different sector widths. 

Guided glide bombs, other than the 3000 kg UMPK of which a single specimen can be delivered in a single Su-34 sortie, are not launched one at a time but in salvos of up to four guided glide bombs that are typically used to attack targets located 20-30 kilometers behind the frontlines. As a result, the figures presented in Table 6 – the number of sorties per day resulting in the release of four guided glide bombs over each one-kilometer-wide stretch of the actively contested frontlines – are in many respects of greater analytical importance than the figures laid out in Table 4 and Table 5.

It is worth noting that the total length of the actively contested frontlines of the Russia-Ukraine War is not an unproblematic metric. After all, combat – whether assaults by foot-mobile and/or mechanized infantry, artillery strikes, or attacks undertaken with armed uncrewed multirotor drones – takes place at some depth behind the frontlines. As a result, observers stand to benefit from conceptualizing the effects of guided glide bomb employment over surface area not least in a context in which UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs are regularly employed to not only target Ukrainian positions along the frontlines but also some 20-30 km behind the frontlines (and in some cases against even more distant targets).

Returning to the analytically convenient estimates of 600 and 1000 km of actively contested frontlines and assuming the ability of UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs to attack targets located up to 30 km behind the frontlines in Ukrainian-controlled territory, it is possible to estimate a total “combat zone” amounting to some 18,000 km2 and 30,000 km2 of surface area. These are, of course, very rough estimates given that the frontlines are not perfectly straight and are subject to the coastline effect. It is possible to divide the surface area of the “combat zone” into sectors that are 20 km wide – across the frontlines – and extend 30 km behind the frontlines, which is to say sectors with a uniform surface area of 600 km2. Table 7 lays out the average daily guided bombs employed in 30 such sectors – over 600 km of actively contested frontage – and 50 such sectors – over 1000 km of actively contested frontage.

Supposing a hypothetical world in which the Russian Air Force makes an equal allocation of guided glide bombs for each of thirty or fifty 600km2 sectors with the aim of simply cratering the ground with UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs, the Russian Air Force would not be very competitive in the cratering business. In 2024, the Russian Air Force could only create an average of 3.652 craters per day in each of the thirty 600 km2 sectors over 600 km of actively contested frontage and just 2.191 craters per day in each of the fifty 600 km2 sectors over 1000 km of actively contested frontage. The weekly and monthly figures will of course be larger and more impressive as a result, but a 600 km2 sector is nevertheless a very large surface area. The monthly – assuming 30-day months – figures for 2024 amount to 109.56 craters in each of the thirty 600 km2 sectors over 600 km of actively contested frontage and 65.73 craters in each of the fifty 600 km2 sectors over 1000 km of actively contested frontage. These monthly figures for 2024 are not unimpressive but nevertheless amount to an average of just 0.1826 craters per square kilometer per month in each of the thirty 600 km2 sectors over 600 km of actively contested frontage and just 0.109 craters per square kilometer per month in each of the fifty 600 km2 sectors over 1000 km of actively contested frontage. Most of the surface area of the 600 km2 sectors would as such be largely untouched by UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs.

 Why The Numbers Matter

The central point of the preceding sections of this SPAS Consulting briefing should be clear: however one presents the limited number of publicly available data points, the effects resulting from Russia’s employment of the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs are heavily diluted over time and across space. UMPK and UMPB impacts are, on a given day and in a given location near the frontlines of the Russia-Ukraine War, quite rare events. The employment of these guided glide bombs is, of course, in practice concentrated in priority sectors and the effects are therefore unmissable in those sectors, but this logically means that the effects of UMPK and UMPB employment are lower if not non-existent in other sectors. Stated differently, the effects of UMPK and UMPB guided glide bomb employment are concentrated across specific sectors and over specific timeframes but the averages across the immense geographical expanse and lengthy duration of the Russia-Ukraine War do not change. If Ukrainian reports about the realized production, actual usage, and projected production of Russian guided glide bombs for 2024 and 2025 are accurate, then it can only be said that Russia has not and will not for the foreseeable have such a number of UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs at its disposal for these types of strike munitions – which did not exist in the Russian arsenal of 24 February 2022 – to fundamentally change Russia’s fortunes in a war that has been a catastrophe for the Russian military and Russian military industry.

Some observers may object and point out that the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs have already had a major effect on Ukraine and the Ukrainian military such that analytical discussion may be left at that. Given that Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022 with what amounted to an essentially non-existent arsenal of standoff fire-and-forget guided munitions for use by the Russian Air Force’s large fleet of non-bomber crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft (Russia’s heterogeneous bomber force is primarily used to launch long-range air-launched cruise missiles), the transition from zero UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs or similar to a reported production output of 40,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2024 and a projected production output of 70,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2025 is undoubtedly one of the most significant developments in Russian military capabilities in a conflict that has entered its fourth year. Even so, it is analytically problematic to primarily view the effects of the UMPK and the UMPB guided glide bombs from a Ukrainian perspective. It bears emphasis that Russia relies very heavily on the UMPK and UMPB and, more to the point, Russia has no substitutes for the use of these air-launched strike munitions. No sound analysis can therefore afford to avoid approaching the question of numbers from a Russian perspective.

In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with an air force that essentially lacked an arsenal of standoff fire-and-forget guided bombs. This contributed to the rapid neutralization of the Russian Air Force and forced Russia to rely heavily on two (conventionally-armed) ballistic missile designs – the surface-launched Iskander and the related air-launched Kinzhal – and two (conventionally-armed) land-attack cruise missile designs – the air-launched Kh-101 and the surface/subsurface-launched Kalibr – until the autumn of 2022, at which time Russia began to deploy ever increasing numbers of Iranian designed Shahed-136/Geran-2 single-use propeller-driven strike drones. Unlike Iran, Russia initially used the Shahed-136/Geran-2 as an ersatz cruise missile to make up for the unavailability of the four aforementioned Russian strike munitions in the numbers required in a context in which the Russian Air Force did not dare to operate behind Ukrainian lines. The Shahed-136/Geran-2 expanded Russia’s strike capabilities but did nothing in terms of enabling the more productive use of Russia’s large force of crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft or, more to the point, facilitating large numbers of attacks on targets located near the expansive frontlines of the Russia-Ukraine War. This situation did not change until late 2023, by which time the UMPK was produced and employed in steadily increasing numbers. The UMPK and later the UMPB guided glide bombs offered the Russian military something very different – a short-range low-cost and high-accuracy strike capability that did not previously exist and for which other existing strike munitions were very poor substitutes. It is productive to briefly explain the qualitative limitations of most Russian munitions as substitutes for the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs before returning to the question of numbers.

The Iskander ballistic missile is so complex and therefore so expensive as to be unaffordable in very large numbers even in pressing wartime conditions characterized by a major reorientation of the Russian economy toward military production. All ballistic missile designs reflect a steep premium in terms of complexity and cost in pursuit of a shorter time to target and a means of bypassing air defences (at the cost of being exposed to ballistic missile defences instead). This premium is often unnecessary when attempting to attack targets located close to the frontlines. It is, for example, one thing for the Russian military to be forced to launch an Iskander ballistic missile at a Ukrainian air defence system or even a high-end artillery system due to the unavailability of a more suitable strike munition. It is another matter entirely for the Russian military to launch an Iskander ballistic missile at an aimpoint under which Russian intelligence suspects exist of a small command bunker that is part of a Ukrainian trench network. It is, moreover, overkill to employ a 500 kg class warhead delivered by a ballistic missile against most battlefield targets (this is why the 250-kg UMPK and 250-kg class UMPB are in many respects more important than the 500-kg, 1500-kg, and 3000-kg UMPK versions).

In a world of unlimited resources, the Russian Army, which operates the Iskander ballistic missile, would have likely deployed a different ballistic missile design with a shorter range, smaller payload, and, most importantly, a lower unit cost to replace the doctrinal role previously occupied by the Soviet era OTR-21 Tochka short-range ballistic missile system. Instead, the Russian Army deployed the Iskander as both a Tochka substitute, a role for which it is wholly unsuited, and as part of Russia’s long-range strike capabilities, a mission that the pre-2022 Russian Army was otherwise essentially unconcerned with. While Russian military industry developed guided versions of existing 220 mm and 300 mm diameter artillery rocket systems that could not only substitute for the 650 mm diameter Tochka but also fulfil the same roles as the American 227 mm diameter M30 and M31 GMLRS guided rockets (which are loaded onto the better known tracked M270 MLRS and wheeled M142 HIMARS launch vehicles), these munitions appear to have only been available in near negligible quantities in February 2022. Russia’s wartime industry, moreover, does not appear to have prioritized munitions of this type for reasons that are not publicly known. Russia therefore continues to launch available 920 mm diameter Iskander ballistic missiles against previously unidentified high-value targets on the battlefield when necessary for want of more suitable munitions. It should be noted that the Russian aircrews appear to be unable to program the UMPK and possibly even the UMPB, both of which exclusively rely on INS and GNSS for guidance, with new coordinates while in flight. This is to say that these guided glide bombs cannot be used to attack previously unidentified fleeting and mobile targets.

Most of what can be said of the Iskander ballistic missile also applies to the related Kinzhal, an air-launched ballistic missile. The Kinzhal is launched from a small fleet of modified MiG-31K interceptor aircraft that have in effect been converted into standoff bombers. The small fleet of converted MiG-31K aircraft is likely to be subject to even lower readiness than the much younger Su-34 and Su-35 fleets. As a result, the Kinzhal is no substitute for the UMPK and UMPB given the MiG-31K fleet's limited sortie generation capacity even if there existed an essentially unlimited supply of free Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles.

In terms of land-attack cruise missiles, the Kh-101 and Kalibr are also too complex and therefore too expensive and too scarce to be available for regular employment in large numbers. Both designs have also been proven to have rather low penetration rates in the face of constantly improving Ukrainian air defences and this has had the effect of raising the quantitative floor as to what amounts to a successful attack against the most heavily defended potential targets in Ukraine. More generally, the Kh-101 and Kalibr, which have maximum ranges of well over 1000 km, are wholly unsuited to attacking targets located some 20-30 km behind the actively contested frontlines. The Russian Air Force can employ much shorter-range powered air-to-surface munitions like the Kh-29, Kh-59, and Kh-69 for such roles, but powered air-launched munitions are inherently more complex and therefore more expensive than unpowered air-launched munitions equipped with comparable payload. The tradeoff that accompanies the much lower unit cost of the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs is, of course, a much lower maximum range than is attained by powered standoff munitions.

The aforementioned strike munitions were all part of Russia’s arsenal on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The Iranian-designed Shahed-136/Geran-2 single-use propeller-driven strike drone, in contrast, was only deployed long after Russia’s original gambit for a quick and victorious failed without any realistic prospect of recovery. Although the Russian Air Force did not adopt the Shahed-136/Geran-2 as a substitute for its Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile let alone its large fleet of crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft, the Russian military, on the whole, has primarily employed the Iranian single-use propeller-driven strike drone design and its Russian derivatives as an ersatz cruise missile to compensate for the unavailability of the much more complex and higher cost Kh-101 and Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles in the required numbers. As such, the Shahed-136/Geran-2 has had the effect of compensating for the inability of the Russian Air Force to operate in the airspace over Ukrainian-controlled territory behind the frontlines. The Shahed-136/Geran-2 is not, however, used to attack battlefield targets located at distances of up to 50-100 km from the frontlines, let alone 20-30 km from the frontlines. All things considered, the Shahed-136/Geran-2 is optimized for long-range strikes against targets located 500 or more kilometers from the launch point. The notion of launching a Shahed-136/Geran-2 to target a building in Pokrovsk or a trench outside Toretsk is not only absurd but also a profoundly wasteful allocation of scarce – albeit low-cost – and high-in-demand long-range strike munition. 

Although the Russian Lancet family of single-use propeller-driven loitering strike drones, which are much smaller than the Shahed-136/Geran-2, is not usually characterized as a strike munition, it is analytically productive to highlight its regular employment as an ersatz short-range light strike munition by the Russian Army for use against previously unidentified stationary and mobile targets located up to several dozen kilometers from the frontlines. This, to be clear, is not the role for which the Lancet family of loitering strike drones was originally developed. The wartime Russian Army, however, regularly finds itself detecting previously undetected targets with reusable ISR drones and through other means, but cannot realistically expect a scarce Iskander ballistic missile to be launched against all such targets. Instead, the Russian Army regularly launches the Lancet-1 and the larger and longer-range Lancet-3 to attack such previously unidentified targets, which is to say the Lancet-1 and Lancet-3 are employed as lighter propeller-driven ground-launched analogues to shorter-range guided air-to-surface munitions. While the Lancet family has been effectively employed in this role, it is also too complex and expensive to be available for regular use in very large numbers. The Lancet-1 and Lancet-3 also have a very limited payload of just 1 kg and 3 kg, respectively. This results in a very small destructive radius and therefore places very high demands in terms of accuracy. The Lancet family of propeller-driven strike drones is as such no substitute to a 220+ mm diameter guided artillery rocket let alone a 250 kg class UMPK or UMPB guided glide bomb in attacking a wide range of targets on the battlefield.

Given the qualitative and quantitative limitations of most Russian strike munitions, Russia relies very heavily on the UMPK and UMPB for attacks on battlefield targets and has no real substitutes available for its guided glide bomb designs. It bears emphasis that the unavailability of substitutes for the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs is not simply a qualitative claim. It is also a quantitative claim supported by the dramatic variance in the resources that Russia appears to be allocating toward the production of various strike munitions following three years of sustained wartime industrial mobilization. In recent months, Ukrainian officials have disclosed estimates for the projected production output of various Russian strike munitions over the course of 2025. A February 2025 Royal United Services Institute report that draws upon interviews with Ukrainian military personnel offers additional data points for projected production output over the course of 2025. These data points are compiled in Table 8.

The production figures laid out in Table 8 highlight the extent to which the production of the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs exceeds that of other Russian strike munitions. The combined projected production figures for the four Russian strike munitions that dominated headlines and regularly featured in analysis prior to the introduction of the Shahed-136/Geran-2 and the later introduction of first the UMPK and later the UMPB guided glide bombs – the Kinzhal, Iskander, Kh-101, and Kalibr – likely amount to little more than 2000 units over the course of 2025. Viewed in isolation and, more to the point, when compared with the projected production figures for the Shahed-136/Geran-2 as well as the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs, the projected production output of 2000 or so ballistic and cruise missiles appears insignificant following three years of wartime mobilization even though it reflects a very significant increase over the annual production output that Russia sustained before February 2022. The realized production output of 40,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2024 and the 70,000 guided glide bombs projected to be built over the course of 2025 dwarf the publicly disclosed projections for all other Russian strike munitions including the non-disaggregated figures for single-use propeller-driven strike drones and single-use propeller-driven decoy drones. The projected output of 70,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2025 is over thirty-eight times larger than the total projected output of Iskander ballistic missiles, Kh-101 air-launched land-attack cruise missiles, and Kalibr surface/subsurface-launched land-attack cruise missiles. There is, as such, little doubt that the Russian military has in purely quantitative terms no substitutes available for the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bomb designs.

* * *

All things considered, the reported production of 40,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2024 and the projected production of 70,000 guided glide bombs over the course of 2025 amount to impressive data points indicative of the cumulative effects of Russia’s wartime industrial mobilization. The realized and projected output of guided glide bombs nevertheless remains far short of what Russia requires to fundamentally change its fortunes in the protracted high-intensity conflict that is the Russia-Ukraine War. Although the aggregate figures for UMPK and UMPB guided bomb production and employment are impressive if taken at face value, the central claim of this briefing stands: however one presents the limited number of publicly available data points – whether in terms of the figures presented in Table 3, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, or Table 7 – the effects resulting from Russia’s employment of the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs are heavily diluted over time and across space in a geographically expansive high-intensity conflict that has recently entered its fourth year.

This SPAS Consulting briefing directs attention to the enduring quantitative and qualitative limitations of Russia's strike capabilities at a time in which international attention is fast shifting to the implications of wartime developments on Russia's post-war military capabilities. All things considered, the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs are likely to be a case of “too little, too late” for Russia’s war effort. This, to be clear, is not to deny the non-zero effects and implications of the introduction and increasingly widespread employment of the UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs in the Russia-Ukraine War. Rather, the UMPK and UMPB have monadic limitations that curtail the contribution of these munitions to Russia’s war effort independent of the scale of production and employment. Moreover, Russia’s UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs are a core part of an ever-intensifying wartime measure-countermeasure competition that holds the potential for a reversion to the mean type scenario, which is to say a return to a situation in which Russia is for the most part once again limited to the types of more complex, more expensive, and more scarce strike munitions that it had at its disposal in February 2022. The technical particulars of the Russian UMPK and UMPB guided glide bombs and the nature and trajectory of this highly dynamic measure-countermeasure competition will be addressed in Part II of this two-part SPAS Consulting briefing series.