Disclosures Offer Insight Into Scale of Ukrainian Strike Drone Launches and Production Targets

Whereas Russia’s employment of single-use propeller-driven strike drones against Ukraine has dominated headlines for much of the past two and a half years, Ukraine’s employment of single-use propeller-driven strike drones against Russia has largely remained under the radar in more ways than one. Ukraine is undertaking a far-reaching strike campaign that primarily targets oil infrastructure and military bases across western Russia. Through the use of single-use propeller-driven strike drones with a maximum range of up to 2000 km, Ukraine undertakes regular attacks on targets in the area west of the Ural Mountains and as far north as the shores of the Barents Sea. While Ukraine regularly boasts about its development, production, and employment of strike drones and other long-range strike munitions, observers interested in the question of effects and effectiveness have to date been forced to operate with very limited data. Recent disclosures by Ukrainian officials, however, offer insight into the scale of Ukrainian strike drone launches and production. 

With the future course of the Russia-Ukraine War increasingly uncertain and the potential for a short-term suspension of the employment of strike drones and other strike munitions against energy infrastructure unexpectedly reaching the top of the political agenda, observers require access to data and sound analytical frameworks to discern the realized and prospective effects and effectiveness of the employment of strike drones and other strike munitions in a conflict that has entered its fourth year. Recent Ukrainian disclosures allow observers to compare the Russian and Ukrainian experiences with strike drones and thereby develop a more holistic appreciation of the implications of this area of military technology beyond the Russia-Ukraine War.

A Note on Data

This briefing exclusively relies on Ukrainian disclosures of the number of strike drones launched by Ukraine against targets located in Russia. Regular – often daily – Ukrainian press releases provide observers figures for the number of strike munitions of a given type, including the Shahed-136/Geran-2 single-use propeller-driven strike drone, launched by Russia as well as the number of strike munitions that Ukraine claims to have intercepted. These regular Ukrainian press releases collectively amount to a dataset that, while imperfect, purposefully curated, and subject to considerable uncertainty, observers can use to track the effects and effectiveness of Russia’s employment of strike munitions including strike drones in the Russia-Ukraine War. The Russian military does not issue comparable press releases. Although Russia regularly claims to intercept x, y, or z Ukrainian strike munitions including strike drones in a given timeframe, Russian disclosures only offer observers a numerator without an accompanying denominator in the absence of a disclosure, however uncertain and unreliable, of the number of Ukrainian strike drones launched in a given timeframe. As a result, observers are forced to rely almost exclusively on occasional disclosures by Ukrainian officials for insight into the scale of Ukrainian strike drone employment.

How Many Strike Drones Did Ukraine Launch in 2024?

According to Vadym Sukharevsky, the head of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Force, a new military organization formally established in early February 2024, Ukraine launched more than 3500 strike drones and conducted over 220 long-range strikes against targets in Russia throughout 2024. Although this disclosure is invaluable for analysts interested in the conduct and effects of long-range strike capabilities in the Russia-Ukraine War, the Ukrainian disclosure is of limited analytical utility when viewed in isolation and several caveats are in order.

First, this disclosure appears to exclude strike drones launched by Ukraine against targets in Ukrainian territory under Russian occupation including Crimea. Observers can only speculate as to the total number of strike drones launched by Ukraine against targets on Russian-occupied territory throughout 2024 or in any other time frame. Second, it is not clear if the disclosed figures exclusively refer to the employment of long-range fixed-wing propeller-driven single-use strike drones. Ukraine also employs smaller and shorter-range fixed-wing strike drones as well as armed uncrewed multirotor drones to attack more proximate targets across the frontlines in Ukrainian territory as well as targets across the international border. In the interview with Ukrainian media, Vadym Sukharevsky referred to not just strike drones with a range of up to 2000 km – which are undoubtedly large, equipped with piston engines, and of the fixed-wing variety – but also the employment of armed uncrewed multirotor drones in – by the standards of small and typically human-portable multirotor drones – long-range strikes against targets in Russian occupied territory through the use of other drones as radio relays/repeaters. Third, it is unclear if these disclosures from the head of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces encompass strikes against targets in Russia undertaken by other parts of Ukraine’s military and/or Ukraine’s intelligence apparatus. Relatedly, it is unclear if the disclosed figures include launches undertaken by the units later subsumed into the Unmanned Systems Forces from 1 January 2024 through 6 February 2024, which is when the new force was formally established. Finally, it is unclear whether the disclosed figures include or exclude the employment of any unarmed decoy drones.

Uncertainties notwithstanding, these decent disclosures offer observers figures to work with: the launch of a minimum of 3500 strike drones in a minimum of 220 “operations” – with “operations” presumably referring to launch salvos – over a 330-day timeframe in 2024. Given that there are more days in that timeframe than “operations”/salvos, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces sustained an average of less than one salvo per day throughout 2024. It is, of course, possible that multiple salvos were launched on a subset of days in 2024 but this would mean that there were even more days in the year in which zero strike drone salvos were launched. It is also possible that “operations” refer to the launch of large numbers of strike drones and that the disclosures do not capture the more sporadic launches of, for example, small salvos of one or two strike drones.

If the disclosed figures of 3500 strike drones launched in 220 salvos are taken at face value, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces launched an average of 15.90 strike drones per salvo over a 330-day day period in 2024. This is a surprisingly small figure given what is publicly known about the effects that Ukrainian strike drones have had on Russia’s oil industry as well as on Russian munitions production and storage facilities in 2024. It is possible that the average salvo size against targets in occupied Ukrainian territory – which is beyond the scope of both this recent Ukrainian disclosure and this briefing – is considerably larger given the high concentration of Russian air defence capabilities in such areas. 

It is productive to compare the disclosed figures for Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces with Ukrainian disclosures about Russian strike drone launch activity. According to the Ukrainian military, Russia launched a combined total of 17,734 single-use propeller-driven strike drones and single-use propeller-driven decoy drones, most of which are unarmed, against Ukraine throughout 2024. Ukrainian disclosures also indicate that Russia launched a combined total of 6574 strike drones and decoy drones in the first two months of 2025. While these figures dwarf the disclosed figures for Ukrainian strike drones launched against targets in Russia throughout 2024, it is important to note that the Ukrainian military does not disclose disaggregated figures for Russian strike drone activity. Although Russia reportedly continues to increase its production output of strike drones, observers need to be mindful that the majority of the Russian drones in Ukrainian disclosures from September 2024 onward are likely to have been decoy drones, most of which are unarmed. 

Given the decidedly imperfect and incomplete data that is publicly available at this time, it is productive to compare the recently disclosed number of Ukrainian strike drones launched against targets in Russia with Ukrainian disclosures of the number of Russian strike drones launched against targets in Ukraine throughout 2023. That is, it is productive to examine available data from a time before Russia significantly expanded the production and employment of strike drones and before Russia began to build and employ primarily unarmed decoy drones in ever-increasing numbers. 

Ukraine claims that Russia launched a total of 3123 propeller-driven strike drones throughout 2023 which is to say an average of just 8.55 strike drones per day in that year. The recently disclosed figures for Ukrainian strike drone launches against targets in Russia for 2024 not only reflect a larger total – a minimum of 3500 for Ukraine in 2024 compared to 3123 for Russia in 2023 – but also appear to refer to launches over a condensed 330-day timeframe in 2024 as opposed to the 365-day timeframe for Russian strike drone launches throughout 2023. If Russia sustained Ukraine’s 2024 launch tempo throughout 2023 – had Russia launched an average of 15.90 strike drones per day – it would have launched a total of 5804 strike drones throughout 2023 instead of just 3123. Uncertainties regarding the number of decoy drones launched by Russia in 2024 notwithstanding, the recently disclosed figures for Ukrainian strike drone launches in 2024 indicate that Ukraine has greatly exceeded the launch tempo that Russia sustained throughout 2023 and that Ukraine likely has a long way to go before matching let alone exceeding the launch tempo that Russia sustained throughout 2024.

How Many Strike Drones Does Ukraine Plan To Build In 2025?

The disclosed figure for the number of strike drones launched by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces is a lagging indicator. Observers require a leading indicator to assess the potential effects and effectiveness of Ukrainian strike drones going forward. Although Ukraine appears to have achieved greater success through the use of a smaller number of strike drones than Russia, Russian air defences are adapting and expanding their presence across Russian territory in tandem with the increasing reach of Ukraine’s strike munitions. Ukrainian strike drones are likely to be subject to the same measure-countermeasure dynamics that have diminished the per-unit effects and effectiveness of Russia’s employment of ever-increasing numbers of strike drones from late 2022 onward. Amidst the backdrop of a conflict that has entered its fourth year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently disclosed that Ukraine planned to produce 30,000 long-range strike drones and 3000 cruise missiles throughout 2025.

The distinction Zelenskyy made between long-range strike drones and cruise missiles, which Ukrainian officials sometimes inaccurately characterize as “rocket drones,” leaves relatively little room for ambiguity and observers can therefore more confidently make sense of this claimed production projection, which may or may not be realized in 2025. Several assumptions are required to make sense of this recent disclosure.

• Ukraine expects to realize the production of 30,000 long-range strike drones of unknown type(s) throughout 2025, which is very ambitious

• Production output is evenly distributed throughout 2025, which is unrealistic

• Ukraine had a stockpile of zero ready-to-use strike drones on 1 January 2025, which is unlikely

• Ukraine will launch all available ready-to-use strike drones in 2025 with the objective of having a stockpile of zero strike drones remaining on 1 January 2026, which is also unlikely

If the above assumptions hold, then Ukraine will be able to build an average of 82.19 strike drones per day and launch an average of 82.19 strike drones per day throughout 2025. This is a very large figure and a very ambitious target for both production and employment by any standard. For context, Ukraine claims that Russia launched a combined total of 27,840 strike and decoy drones from September 2022 to the end of February 2025, which is to say a thirty-month period. Ukraine claims that Russia launched a combined total of 17,734 strike drones and decoy drones throughout 2024, a twelve-month period in which Russia launched an average of 48.45 strike and decoy drones per day. It bears emphasis that Ukraine does not disaggregate Russian decoy drones, most of which are unarmed, from these totals. It also bears emphasis that most of the combined total of 14,172 strike drones and decoy drones that Ukraine reports Russia as having launched from September 2024 through the end of February 2025 – 79.9% of the total of 25,342 strike drones and decoy drones that Russia reportedly launched from September 2022 through the end of February 2025 – are likely to have been decoy drones. 

If Zelenskyy’s public disclosure is taken at face value, Ukraine has extremely ambitious targets for strike drone production in 2025. An annual production output of 30,000 strike drones amounts to an average production output of 2500 strike drones per month, 82.19 per day, and 3.42 per hour. Few types of military equipment are produced in such numbers beyond firearms and associated ammunition, grenades, mortar bombs, artillery shells, and other types of ammunition for reusable weapons systems. Supposing an average unit cost of just US$25,000 per strike drone, the cost of producing such a large number of strike drones will be US$750 million (excluding the fixed costs of production and related expenses or the cost of transporting, storing, servicing, and operating such a large number of strike drones). Supposing an average cost of US$50,000 per strike drone, then the cost of producing such a large number of strike drones will be US$1.5 billion. Although these numbers are small in the context of a conflict that has resulted in tens of billions of dollars in economic damage alone, it is unlikely that most of Ukraine’s resources and industrial capacity will be directed toward the production of long-range strike drones in a context in which the Ukrainian military requires a constant supply of a long list of equipment to maintain its positions along the frontlines.

It is, of course, possible that Zelenskyy engaged in hyperbole with the aim of impressing foreign audiences at a time when the future of American military aid in particular is increasingly uncertain. Perhaps the total figure of 30,000 long-range strike drones of unknown type(s) is a production target set by Ukraine’s senior political leaders rather than a figure that Ukraine's military industry considers to be realistic. It is also possible that the total figure of 30,000 strike drones of unknown type(s) disclosed by Zelenskyy encompasses decoy drones. Decoy drones, which are either unarmed or carry a very small payload – often less than 1 kg of explosives – are smaller, less complex, and therefore less expensive and easier to manufacture than strike drones and do not necessarily need to accompany strike drones over the entire flight path toward the intended target. That is, small low-cost decoy drones with a maximum range of just 200 km can be productively used to facilitate the penetration of Russian airspace by, for example, one or more larger and more expensive strike drones with a maximum range of 1000-2000 km. As with Russia, simple low-cost decoy drones, whether armed with a very small warhead or unarmed, can be produced in very large numbers in a manner that larger, heavier, more complex, and more expensive armed long-range single-use propeller-driven strike drones cannot.

While the projected production figure for 2025 offered by Zelenskyy may or may not encompass decoy drones, it is possible that the figure encompasses not just truly long-range strike drones with a maximum range of around 1000-2000 km but also smaller and lower-cost strike drones with a shorter maximum range and/or a smaller payload. Such strike drones are valuable, not least for the purposes of attacking targets in Russian-occupied territory, but it is nevertheless very important for observers to distinguish between, for example, a single-use propeller-driven strike drone that can deliver a 30 kg payload over 1000 km and a single-use propeller-driven strike drone that can deliver a 3 kg payload over 100 km. It is also important to note that Ukraine possesses a decidedly heterogeneous arsenal of single-use propeller-driven strike drones and that these designs are for the most part inferior to the Iranian-designed Shahed-136/Geran-2 in terms of range and payload. Whereas Russia employs the Shahed-136/Geran-2 as its primary long-range strike drone, Ukraine uses an ever-expanding roster of designs which is to say that Ukrainian strike drone production – and employment – is decidedly fragmented and that Ukraine is unlikely to benefit from the maximum possible economies of scale in the manner that, all else equal, Russia has attained by concentrating its resources and production capacity on the Shahed-136/Geran-2 design and its Russian derivative, the Garpiya-A1.

The Uncertain Future of Ukraine’s Long-Range Propeller-Driven Strike Drone Arsenal

Although there are reasonable grounds for circumspection as to whether Ukraine will successfully increase production from a level sufficient to have supported a total of at least 3500 long-range strike drone launches by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces against targets in Russia over a 330-day timeframe in 2024 to a total of perhaps 30,000 long-range strike drones launches throughout 2025, observers should be open to the possibility that Ukraine may successfully leverage international support and commercial-off-the-shelf components to undertake an unprecedented surge in long-range strike munition production. The Iranian Shahed-136 has a design that is more complex than it needs to be for a system that is produced in wartime and intended for near-immediate destructive use – Iran developed the Shahed-136 as a strike munition intended for stockpiling in peacetime, not expedited wartime production and rapid wartime employment/consumption. Several Ukrainian strike drones, in contrast, have less refined designs and are better suited to mass production with widely available industrial capacity and labour and at a lower price point. It is, therefore, possible that what is publicly known about Russian production of the Shahed-136 under licence and Russia’s reported development of its own Shahed-136 derivative, the Garpiya-A1, can mislead observers as to how quickly Ukraine can surge production output toward the highly ambitious target of 30,000 long-range strike drones of unknown type(s) through 2025. 

It is important to note that the Russian experience, which is shaped not only by sanctions but also by corruption and other structural factors that may be unique to Russia, is not the only data point driving the circumspection articulated in this briefing. While Ukrainian industry may be able to put together most of the components for the airframes of 30,000 long-range strike drones of unknown type(s) in light industrial units dispersed across the country, Ukraine will still need to source 30,000 piston engines, 30,000 resilient GNSS antenna arrays, 30,000 warheads and so forth. While Ukraine can independently produce many of the components that are assembled into a long-range strike drone, others will have to be imported and the likely heterogeneous components of a half dozen or more distinct Ukrainian long-range strike drone designs will ultimately have to be assembled by a limited pool of sufficiently skilled labour. All else equal, as Ukraine more widely distributes the production process so as to avoid single points of failure in the event that Russia successfully attacks parts of the distributed production process, the more capital and labour that Ukraine will have to allocate to sustain the production of what appears to be at least a half dozen different single-use propeller-driven strike drone designs. 

Although many observers worldwide have been mesmerized by the apparent effectiveness of low-cost single-use propeller-driven strike drones that cost several tens of thousands of US Dollars to manufacture, it bears emphasis that the effectiveness of low-cost single-use propeller-driven strike drones is facing headwinds as a result of the successful employment of GNSS spoofing, the increasing prevalence of anti-aircraft artillery in areas in which none were previously deployed, and the employment of commercial-off-the-shelf sensors including acoustic sensors, among other developments in countermeasures. Iran, which in many respects pioneered low-cost long-range strike munitions including not only the Shahed-131/Geran-1 and Shahed-136/Geran-2 single-use propeller-driven strike drones but also designs like the low-cost Paveh/Quds cruise missile and the Sayyad/Samad single-use propeller-driven strike drone, provided observers with some of the earliest indications that the proverbial days of plenty – a veritable “Happy Time” – in which very low-cost strike munitions could be effectively employed was likely to come to an end. 

Iran has in recent years developed sensor-equipped versions of the Shahed-136 that are not as reliant on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data, which GNSS spoofing attempts to deny, as well as faster turbojet-powered versions of the Shahed-136. While these changes to the underlying design result in a considerably higher cost strike munition, Iranian designers are unlikely to be scratching an itch and aimlessly developing progressively more expensive (albeit still low-cost in the scope of things) strike munitions. Iranian designers are rather responding to and anticipating unfolding measure-countermeasure dynamics: the proverbial rules of the game are changing mid-game and the quantitative and/or qualitative floor – as opposed to a ceiling – for what amounts to a high probability of success strike keeps increasing. Militaries can employ much larger numbers of low-cost strike munitions to compensate for diminishing per-unit effectiveness and/or pursue progressively higher-end strike munitions to reduce exposure to the lowest cost and most widely deployed countermeasures. It bears emphasis that these approaches are not mutually exclusive in the eyes of the Iranian military and Iranian designers. Rather, Iran continues to develop an extremely diverse “ecosystem” of complementary strike systems built to various price points for use in a synergistic combined arms manner. 

In the autumn of 2022, the small number of initially Iranian-built propeller-driven strike drones that Russia began to deploy operated over Ukraine with near impunity not because these were impossible to shoot down but because Ukraine’s air defences were not fully prepared and lacked the quantity of low-cost short-range air defences required to extend air defence coverage across such a large expanse of territory. In time, the Ukrainian military not only extended stationary low-cost short-range air defence capabilities across the country but also improved its sensor network and command and control capabilities so as to provide early warning to stationary air defence units and direct mobile air defence units to intercept propeller-driven strike drones with a cruise speed of less than 200 km/h. 

The slow speed of single-use propeller-driven strike drones, the long-range manifestations of which are typically powered by a small low-cost commercially-sourced piston engine, is analytically important for two primary reasons. First, it results in a several-hour long flight time to attack targets located 500-1500 or so kilometers from the frontlines or the international border. This offers potential targets in Ukraine’s interior with ample early warning. It also means that Ukraine is well positioned to track strike drones in Ukrainian airspace through radar, acoustic sensors, and other means. This facilitates the redeployment of mobile air defences to attempt to intercept strike drones over open ground before these reach a potential target. 

Second, low-cost air defence capabilities and the Ukrainian approach to mobile air defence, in particular, would be much less effective if the Shahed-136/Geran-2 had a cruise speed of, for example, 600 km/h. Instead of flying at a cruise speed of around 40 meters per second, a notional turbojet-powered Shahed-136/Geran-2 would fly at a cruise speed of around 165 meters per second. Low-cost air defences built around the massed employment of machine guns and autocannons, which have a maximum effective range of no more than 2-4 km, are far less effective against a much faster turbojet-powered target and Ukraine’s primarily low-cost approach to air defence against the Shahed-136/Geran-2 would be greatly undermined (at the same time, a turbojet-powered Shahed-136/Geran-2 will cost more and be more susceptible to other more expensive air defence capabilities).

Although there is uncertainty as to how quickly and how comprehensively Russia will improve its air defences in the face of mounting damage inflicted by Ukrainian strike drones, observers have no basis for assuming that Ukraine’s single-use propeller-driven strike drones are not caught up in the same measure-countermeasure dynamics that have diminished the effects and per unit effectiveness of Russia’s employment of ever-increasing numbers of strike drones. In fact, there is a case to be made that Ukraine’s claimed production target of 30,000 long-range strike drones of unknown type(s) – the details of which are not public and are subject to considerable uncertainty – throughout 2025 is more reflective of the increasingly elevated quantitative floor – as opposed to a ceiling – for what amounts to a high probability of success strike against targets in Russia. 

It is therefore appropriate for observers to not only be circumspect about the feasibility of a surge in Ukrainian long-range strike drone production to an output of 30,000 units of unknown type(s) throughout 2025 but also the astuteness of investing so heavily in long-range single-use propeller-driven strike drones at this stage of a highly dynamic measure-countermeasure competition that is pushing Iran, Russia, Ukraine, and other countries toward higher-end – relative to the strike drones that Russia and Ukraine have primarily employed to date – strike munitions. To be clear, this is not a purely theoretical claim and observers need look no further than Ukraine’s development and deployment of an increasingly diverse array of turbojet-powered low-cost cruise missiles alongside an increasingly diverse array of single-use propeller-driven strike drone designs. All else equal and in a world of unlimited resources, Ukraine would likely prefer to build and launch as many turbojet-powered low-cost cruise missiles as possible. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, however, recently claimed that Ukraine planned to produce 30,000 long-range strike drones and 3000 cruise missiles throughout 2025. The order of magnitude difference in projected long-range strike drone and cruise missile production is unlikely to be an accident and Ukraine appears to be allocating its finite resources in pursuit of the situationally appropriate and not necessarily ideal balance between quantity and quality when it comes to its long-range strike capabilities for 2025 and beyond.