Iran's IRGC Ground Force Expands Its Long-Range Strike Capabilities: Part I

Part I: The Strike Drones on Display at a February 2025 IRGC Ground Force Exhibition

Observers of military affairs will not be surprised to hear that Iran possesses one of the largest and most diverse arsenals of strike munitions – ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and single-use propeller-driven strike drones. What is less well known is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force is no longer the primary let alone the sole operator of Iran’s long-range strike munitions. Over the past five or so years, other parts of the Iranian military have been deploying an increasingly diverse array of strike munitions of their own thereby breaking what used to be the IRGC Aerospace Force’s monopoly over such capabilities. 

The IRGC, which is known as the Sepah in Persian, exists in parallel with Iran’s regular military, the Artesh, and amounts to a second and highly politicized military force that has, among other things, its own ground force, aerospace force, and navy. While primarily tasked with internal and regime security, the IRGC has for decades used its outsize political influence to not only replicate much of the regular military’s capability set, such as mechanized ground forces and rotary aviation, but also establish a monopoly on Iran’s long-range strike capabilities. For decades, Iran’s long-range strike capabilities have primarily been within the purview of the IRGC Aerospace Force. This has bolstered the standing of the IRGC in Iranian decision-making in a context in which Tehran leans heavily upon its long-range strike capabilities to coerce and deter its adversaries. It bears emphasis that Iranian decision-makers have no real alternative to the long-range strike capabilities operated by the IRGC Aerospace Force, not least in a context in which the regular military’s air force is grossly under-resourced and operates a low-readiness fleet of obsolescent combat aircraft that are for the most part 30-50 years old.

As of this writing in early 2025, the IRGC Aerospace Force only retains a monopoly over a specific subset of Iran’s diverse arsenal of strike munitions: ballistic missiles with a maximum range exceeding 500 or so kilometers. When it comes to shorter-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles of all types, and strike drones of all types, the IRGC Aerospace Force remains the dominant player by a large margin but has nevertheless lost its monopoly over Iran's strike capabilities. Iran’s regular military, the Artesh, is deploying long-range strike munitions in its ground, air, and naval forces. This includes some strike munitions – designs that are often not deployed by any part of the IRGC – that overlap with the designs employed by the IRGC Aerospace Force in terms of range. Other parts of the IRGC are also deploying long-range strike munitions. This includes the IRGC Ground Force, which not only operates helicopters as well as both armed and unarmed reusable runway-dependent uncrewed ISR aircraft but also ballistic missiles with a maximum range of at least 250 km, cruise missiles with a maximum range of at least 450 km, and propeller-driven strike drones with a maximum range that likely approaches 1000 km.

This SPAS Consulting briefing is the first of a two-part series examining the expansion of the IRGC Ground Force’s strike capabilities. Part I examines some of the winged cruise missiles and propeller-driven single-use strike drones displayed at a recent exhibition held by the IRGC Ground Force. Part I offers a fairly technical analysis that will help observers better understand the capabilities that these long-range strike munitions do and do not offer the IRGC Ground Force and Iran more generally. A second forthcoming briefing – Part II of this two-part series – will focus on possible inter- and intra-service rivalry in Iran’s highly fragmented military landscape, the inefficiencies of seemingly uncoordinated procurement in a highly fragmented military industry, as well as some of the logistical and command and control challenges that the IRGC Ground Force and the rest of Iran’s two militaries are likely to face in effectively employing long-range strike munitions in times of crisis and war.

While the focus of this SPAS Consulting briefing is on Iran and Iranian military capabilities, the Iranian experience serves as an important case study that is relevant to other countries around the world. Although Iran’s military industry rarely expands the global technological frontier in a meaningful way, the country has not only previously been a trendsetter but in important respects remains the pacesetter when it comes to developing and deploying lower-end long-range strike munitions, particularly those that make extensive use of off-the-shelf components. Iran, of course, developed the Shahed-131 by the early 2010s - it was discreetly on display at a 2014 exhibition - and used the Shahed-131 to undertake an audacious surprise attack on Saudi oil facilities in 2019. Iran also developed the larger and longer-range Shahed-136, which it deployed well before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Iran’s transfer of the Shahed-136 to Russia not only dramatically raised the profile of Iranian propeller-driven single-use strike drone technology but also drove Ukraine to emulate the Iranian approach and develop and deploy a diverse array of propeller-driven strike drone designs of its own. Other countries have taken notice and propeller-driven strike drones, as well as low-cost cruise missiles and turbojet-powered single-use strike drones/winged cruise missiles that Iran has also pioneered, are increasingly part of the threat landscape worldwide. While Iranian strike munition designs are increasingly familiar to observers, Iran appears to be reorganizing its two parallel militaries to facilitate a major quantitative and, more importantly, qualitative expansion of its strike capabilities in a manner that will likely be of interest to other militaries worldwide.

The Golaleh: A Winged Cruise Missile/Turbojet-Powered Single-Use Strike Drone 

Perhaps the highlight of the recent IRGC Ground Force exhibition is what appears to be a new and previously unknown member of Iran’s well-known Shahed-131/136 family of cropped delta wing single-use strike drones. Whereas the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 are propeller-driven uncrewed aircraft equipped with a piston engine, this newly unveiled design, which the IRGC Ground Force designates the Golaleh, is equipped with a small turbojet engine. The Golaleh is, therefore, a cropped delta-wing cruise missile or a turbojet-powered single-use strike drone.

Iran has previously displayed turbojet-powered versions, or derivatives, of the well-known Shahed-136. This includes the Shahed-238, which appears to be a modified Shahed-136 airframe adapted to incorporate a turbojet engine in the rear of the fuselage. Unveiled in late 2023, the Shahed-238 incorporates an air intake as well as revised control surfaces and is not therefore a simple modification that can be undertaken in the field. The Shahed-238 appears to be closely related to, if not the same as, the MC-237, the designation the Russian manufacturer of the Shahed-136/Geran-2 has given to a turbojet-powered derivative of the Iranian cropped delta-wing strike drone design. In September 2024, Iran unveiled another turbojet-powered member of the Shahed-136 design family under the confusing designation of “Shahed-136 jet.” The specimens of the “Shahed-136 jet” included in the September 2024 military parade held in Tehran are not identical to the Shahed-238 that was previously unveiled. It is unclear why this distinct design was not given a new designation. It is possible that Iran has not settled on a final design configuration for a turbojet-powered version or derivative of the Shahed-136 design. The distinctive design features found on the recently unveiled much smaller Golaleh, which is to date only associated with the IRGC Ground Force, offer some evidence in support of this hypothesis.

While a specification sheet was taped to one of the Golaleh specimens at the exhibition, it was placed in a sheet protector and the text is not clear in the pictures and video that have been released to date. Uncertainties notwithstanding, the Golaleh is likely to be closer in size to the Shahed-131, the propeller-driven strike drone design from which the larger and better-known Shahed-136 is derived. This is a notable development given that the Shahed-131 appears to have fallen out of favour with the IRGC Aerospace Force following the deployment of the larger and longer-range Shahed-136.

The Golaleh has a distinctive pointed nose section, which is an unusual feature for what the IRGC Ground Force has characterized as a subsonic uncrewed aircraft. In itself, this aspect of the Golaleh’s design makes it stand out from the Shahed-238 and “Shahed-136 jet,” which retain the rounded nose section of the propeller-driven Shahed-131 and Shahed-136.  Another distinctive feature of the Golaleh is that it incorporates a set of vertical wing stabilizers that are different from those found on the Shahed-136 and Shahed-238, as well as the Russian MC-237. This wing stabilizer design has to date only been seen on the “Shahed-136 jet” specimens on display at the September 2024 military parade in Tehran. While the Golaleh is likely to be closer in size to the Shahed-131 than the Shahed-136, the vertical wing stabilizers extend both above and below the wing as is the case with the Shahed-136 as well as the Shahed-238 and “Shahed-136 jet.” The smaller propeller-driven Shahed-131, in contrast, has vertical wing stabilizers that only extend above the wing.

The Golaleh also features different control surfaces than the Shahed-131, Shahed-136, Shahed-238, and “Shahed-136 jet.” The contrast is particularly notable with the Shahed-238, which appears to be a comparatively simple adaptation of the Shahed-136 airframe into a turbojet-powered uncrewed aircraft. Last but not least, the Golaleh has a small turbojet engine installed on top of the rear section of the fuselage. The Shahed-238 and “Shahed-136 jet,” in contrast, are equipped with a turbojet engine that is contained within the fuselage. That is, these designs have an air intake built into the airframe. Had the Golaleh been equipped with a turbojet engine that was rather crudely installed on top of the fuselage, this could suggest that the Golaleh is perhaps a conversion of existing Shahed-131 airframes or a low-cost adaptation of the Shahed-131 design that does not require major changes to the production line. The Golaleh, however, incorporates multiple distinct design features that collectively suggest a fully-fledged development process and a new-build design that is delivered to the IRGC Ground Force in this exact configuration. 

It is important to note that Iranian designers and the Iranian military are strikingly accepting of designs that place a turbojet engine outside of the fuselage, which contributes to an increase in an aircraft’s radar signature and reflects zero effort toward reducing the infrared signature of the turbojet engine. With respect to the widely deployed Paveh family of land-attack cruise missiles, a turbojet engine appears to have been mounted on top of the fuselage in order to lower the complexity and cost of the design while also maximizing its range by increasing the volume of fuel that can be contained within the fuselage. It is possible that the Golaleh reflects a similar design compromise. While the specifications of the Golaleh are not currently known, it is likely to be equipped with a low-cost turbojet engine that delivers a maximum thrust of at least 400-500 newtons.

Iranian media reports that the Golaleh has a nominal maximum range of 450 km while equipped with a 50 kg warhead. As with all aircraft designs, there is some scope to increase range at the cost of payload or, alternatively, to increase payload at the cost of range. Observers should be open to the possibility that one or more versions of the Golaleh may be equipped with a heavier payload (internal volume permitting). Consider that Russia has installed heavier 90 kg, as opposed to 50 kg, class warheads on its Shahed-136/Geran-2, which is to say that Russia has traded range for greater payload. Given that the IRGC Ground Force, not the IRGC Aerospace Force, operates the Golaleh, it would not be surprising if a greater payload is valued more than a longer range.

Like the baseline Shahed-136 versions widely deployed by Iran and Russia, the Golaleh lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This makes the Golaleh dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and makes it vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.   

A Twin Turbojet Winged Cruise Missile/Turbojet-Powered Single-Use Strike Drone of Unknown Designation

The Golaleh was not the only turbojet-powered design on display at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition. Another design, the designation of which is not currently known, employs not one but two small turbojet engines and appears to be the first Iranian winged cruise missile/turbojet-powered single-use strike drone with this peculiar propulsion configuration. With two small turbojets mounted in the rear of the fuselage, this design of unknown designation has a distinctive T-tail configuration primarily associated with certain types of passenger aircraft with rear-mounted engines as well as military transport aircraft with high wings. 

The IRGC Ground Force and Iranian media have so far only made limited disclosures about the specifications of this peculiar design. While it is reportedly equipped with a 50 kg warhead, no figure has been provided for its maximum range. As with all aircraft design, there is some scope to increase range at the cost of payload or, alternatively, to increase payload at the cost of range. 

This undesignated twin-turbojet design lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This undesignated design is therefore dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and is vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.

An Iranian media report on the exhibition records an IRGC officer saying that this undesignated T-tail design was set to be used in a live fire exercise the next day. The IRGC and Iranian media have to date not released additional information as to whether this design was used in a live fire test. If taken at face value, this data point may indicate that this undesignated t-tail design is at an advanced stage of development and may already be deployed by the IRGC Ground Force. With a reported payload of just 50 kg, which is the same as the figure associated with the Golaleh, and in the absence of disclosure as to the range of this design, it is not clear why the IRGC appears to be pursuing both designs or what design objective justifies the peculiar use of two small turbojet engines.

Dalahu/Hadid-110: A Winged Cruise Missile/Turbojet-Powered Single-Use Strike Drone

Another peculiar design on display at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition is a relatively small turbojet-powered winged cruise missile/single-use strike drone designated the Dalahu. This design was recently unveiled at another IRGC exhibition under the designation Hadid-110. It is possible that the Dalahu is the IRGC Ground Force’s internal designation for this design and/or that the new designation may refer to a specific version of the design.

According to the IRGC Ground Force, the Dalahu has a maximum range of 350 km, carries a 30 kg payload, and can sustain a cruise speed of 510 km/h. As with the Hadid-110, the Dalahu has a very distinctive airframe, one that is carried over to the peculiarly shaped non-rectangular containers in which it appears to be stored and transported. The Dalahu/Hadid-110 has design characteristics that are typically associated with target drones. It is possible that use as a target drone is what this airframe was originally developed for prior to adaptation for use as a winged cruise missile or turbojet-powered single-use strike drone. In January 2025, the IRGC released imagery of two Hadid-110 specimens, one of which was painted red in the manner of a target drone. 

The Dalahu/Hadid-110 lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This undesignated design is therefore dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and is vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.

A Carbon Fiber Propeller-Driven Single-Use Strike Drone of Unknown Designation

While the recent IRGC Ground Force exhibition indicates the service’s interest in faster turbojet-powered designs, the exhibition also featured several propeller-driven strike drones. As with the rest of the Iranian military, the IRGC Ground Force is likely to continue deploying propeller-driven single-use strike drones due to the lower cost and complexity associated with this propulsion configuration.

One of the propeller-driven designs on display, the designation of which is not known, employs a carbon fiber airframe. According to an IRGC officer recorded in an Iranian media report, this design can carry a payload of 30-60 kg and is equipped with a piston engine. The rear sections of the two specimens of this design on display were, however, covered in publicly available images and video of the exhibition. It is not clear why this was the case, and the operational status of this undesignated design is unclear. 

The primary benefit of using carbon fiber in an airframe is weight reduction. All things equal, the lighter the total weight of the airframe, the greater the maximum range with a given fuel weight and volume of fuel or, alternatively, the greater the payload (volume permitting) that can be carried relative to another aircraft of similar dimensions and internal volume. The issue that Iran and other countries face is that the most desirable attributes of propeller-driven single-use strike drones are lower complexity and lower cost of manufacture. This facilitates the deployment and use of hundreds if not thousands of such strike drones in a world in which few states can afford to purchase large numbers of strike munition designs with a unit cost of half a million to a million U.S. Dollars if not significantly more.

While a carbon fiber design has advantages, it is not a design characteristic that is likely to be conducive to cost reduction or mass production in wartime conditions. It is worth noting that Russia has reportedly made various changes to the design of the Shahed-136/Geran-2 with the aim of reducing complexity and cost and supporting mass production in wartime conditions. Given these considerations and the fact that an IRGC officer introducing the various strike drones on display was rather enthusiastically pointing out how the Golaleh turbojet-powered winged cruise missile employs a foam-like material in its construction, this undesignated carbon fiber propeller-driven strike drone may be more of a research and development project or technology demonstrator than a design that is set to be produced in large numbers and widely deployed as part of the IRGC Ground Force arsenal.

This carbon fiber propeller-driven strike drone design of unknown designation lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This undesignated design is therefore dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and is vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.

Ketral Propeller-Driven Single-Use Strike Drone

One of the more unusual designs on display at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition is the Ketral, a propeller-driven single-use strike drone design that has its piston engine placed at the front of the fuselage in a tractor configuration. 

Most propeller-driven strike drone designs, including other Iranian designs, employ a pusher configuration with the engine located at the rear of the fuselage. According to an IRGC Ground Force officer recorded in an Iranian media report, an individual who is not an aerospace engineer, the designers selected a tractor configuration for improved air cooling. While this may be a valid reason for pursuing a tractor configuration over a pusher configuration, it results in a design that cannot readily incorporate an onboard sensor, which would ordinarily be mounted in the nose. While the baseline versions of the various propeller-driven strike drone designs that Iran deploys, including the Shahed-136, are equipped with guidance systems using INS and GNSS, several designs have at least one version that is equipped with a nose-mounted sensor. Given the tractor configuration, this is not an option for the Ketral. 

An additional consequence of a tractor configuration is that it creates challenges in terms of warhead design and fusing. While the Ketral is unlikely to be employed as an anti-armour munition, a highly directional shaped charge warhead, should one be used, will have to perforate the engine in order to reach the target. Although this is not a concern if the Ketral is equipped with a high explosive-fragmentation warhead optimized for use against a wider range of target types, the tractor configuration impedes the installation of an impact fuse in the nose and, more generally, forces designers to place the warhead further behind in the fuselage. This, in turn, will affect the center of gravity of the Ketral. All of this is to say that there are reasons why propeller-driven strike drones typically employ a pusher configuration and that the Ketral’s design reflects distinct trade-offs and limitations that its designers and the IRGC Ground Force appear to have accepted.

Iran’s military industry and its multiple military services have a lot of experience with propeller-driven strike drone designs and are unlikely to have been ignorant of the limitations of a tractor configuration design. The declared selection of a tractor configuration in pursuit of enhanced air cooling is indicative of a long range-endurance design that is set to spend many hours in flight. The Ketral is indeed a quite large – very long – design with a large wingspan, which is to say it is nothing other than a propeller-driven strike drone intended to fly several hours to its intended target. While a specification sheet was taped to one of the Ketral specimens at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition, it was placed in a sheet protector and the text is not clear in the pictures and video that have been released to date. Uncertainties notwithstanding, the Ketral is likely to have a nominal maximum range approaching 1000 km (maximum range is, of course, determined by the flight profile and the weight of the payload, among other factors) if not more, and is therefore likely to spend five to ten hours in flight.

Several Ketral specimens were mounted on a simple tripod launch rail at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition. As with other propeller-driven strike drones, the engine’s power output is insufficient for the drone to attain flight without a lengthy take-off run and the Ketral therefore has a jettisonable solid rocket booster attached to the rear of the fuselage for rocket-assisted take-off (RATO). Many Iranian drones employ RATO, including the Shahed-136 and much smaller loitering strike drone designs. One advantage of a tractor configuration is that it facilitates the use of RATO on an airframe that seemingly requires nothing more than a very simple launch rail for take-off. Strike drones with a pusher configuration typically feature jettisonable RATO canisters underneath the fuselage and require somewhat more complex launchers. 

The Ketral lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This undesignated design is therefore dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and is vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.

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Although the diverse array of strike munitions on display at the recent IRGC Ground Force exhibition was far from groundbreaking or indicative of an expansion of the global technological frontier, these nevertheless herald a major expansion of the strike capabilities of the IRGC Ground Force and Iran more generally. As a result, the recent IRGC Ground Force exhibition amounts to yet another data point indicating a major quantitative and qualitative expansion of Iran’s long-range strike capabilities and the unmistakable end of what had for several decades amounted to the IRGC Aerospace Force’s monopoly over Iran’s long-range strike capabilities.

Leaving aside the carbon fiber propeller-driven strike drone design of unknown designation, which may well be a technology demonstrator, the other designs on display effectively complement the strike munitions that the IRGC Ground Force is already known to operate. This includes the likes of the Meraj-532, a propeller-driven single-use strike drone with a claimed maximum range of 450 km while carrying a 50 kg payload. The turbojet-powered designs on display are likely intended to complement the Meraj-532 and similar designs with a faster and shorter time to target strike munition. That said, it is important to note that there is considerable overlap in the claimed performance of the three distinctive winged cruise missiles/turbojet-powered strike drones on display – the Golaleh, the twinjet of unknown designation, and the Dalahu/Hadid-110. 

While there is little that is ground-breaking in the design of the Ketral propeller-driven strike drone, the presence of this design indicates that the IRGC Ground Force intends to possess strike munitions through which to attack even more distant targets. The IRGC Ground Force can, of course, simply deploy the Shahed-131 or the larger and longer-range Shahed-136 – or any number of other Iranian strike drone designs – if it wanted to merely expand the reach of its formations with propeller-driven strike drones but instead appears to be interested in a smaller and more portable design that can be more readily deployed by small IRGC Ground Force units and, no less importantly, by those of Iran’s non-state allies across the Middle East.

A forthcoming SPAS Consulting briefing – Part II of this series – will focus on possible inter- and intra-service rivalry in Iran’s highly fragmented military landscape, the inefficiencies of seemingly uncoordinated procurement in a highly fragmented military industry, as well as some of the logistical and command and control challenges that the IRGC Ground Force and the rest of Iran’s two militaries are likely to face in effectively employing long-range strike munitions in times of crisis and war.