Iran Expands Loitering Strike Drone Arsenal

Iranian single-use propeller-driven strike drone designs, above all the Shahed-136, are increasingly well-known worldwide. While often inaccurately characterized as loitering munitions, uncrewed aircraft designs like the Shahed-101, Shahed-131, and Shahed-136 are primarily deployed in a baseline configuration that, among other things, lacks an onboard visible band electro-optical and/or infrared band sensor. As a result, these are not loitering strike drones, with loitering here referring not to the mere act of repeatedly flying over a specific area – which essentially any uncrewed aircraft can be programmed to undertake – but an uncrewed aircraft equipped in a manner that allows it to loiter in search of potential targets such that the loitering strike drone, which is a single-use system, can attack a non-pre-programmed target by detonating upon impact with said target.

While Iran has been a pioneer in developing single-use propeller-driven strike drones – without necessarily expanding the global technological frontier – that allow it to attack stationary targets at range, it has until recently exhibited a far more limited interest in single-use loitering strike drones capable of attacking both stationary and mobile targets over shorter distances. This dynamic gradually changed in the late 2010s as Iran closely emulated, and in some cases apparently reverse-engineered, foreign loitering strike drone designs. Having been primarily developed by countries focused on low-intensity counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, these small, light, and often quite expensive loitering drone designs did not closely align with Iranian requirements and priorities. What Iran’s military and Iran’s non-state allies needed were loitering strike drone designs that would, in effect, facilitate the devolution of Iran’s long-range strike capabilities to lower echelons for use against more proximate stationary and mobile targets. 

This SPAS Consulting briefing examines four recently unveiled Iranian single-use propeller-driven strike drone designs: the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 loitering strike drones, a submerged launch capable encapsulated strike drone of unknown designation, and the Saeghe-1 loitering strike drone. As a collective, these mark a new direction in Iranian uncrewed aircraft technology and herald a significant enhancement of the military capabilities of Iran and its non-state allies across the Middle East. 

While the focus of this SPAS Consulting briefing is on Iran and Iranian military capabilities, the Iranian experience serves as an important case study relevant to other countries around the world. While Iran’s military industry rarely expands the global technological frontier in a meaningful way, the country has not only previously been a trendsetter but in important respects remains the pacesetter when it comes to developing and deploying lower-end long-range strike munitions, particularly those that make extensive use of off-the-shelf components. Iran, of course, developed the Shahed-131 by the early 2010s – it was discreetly on display at a 2014 exhibition – and used the Shahed-131 to undertake an audacious surprise attack on Saudi oil facilities in 2019. Iran also developed the larger and longer-range Shahed-136, which it deployed well before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Iran’s transfer of the Shahed-136 to Russia not only dramatically raised the profile of Iranian propeller-driven single-use strike drone designs but also drove Ukraine to emulate the Iranian approach and develop and deploy a diverse array of propeller-driven strike drone designs of its own. Other countries have taken notice and propeller-driven strike drones, as well as low-cost cruise missiles and turbojet-powered single-use strike drones/winged cruise missiles that Iran has also pioneered, are increasingly part of the threat landscape worldwide. This SPAS Consulting briefing focuses on a different area of Iranian uncrewed aircraft technology in which much smaller and lighter designs have the potential to facilitate high-accuracy strikes against targets located within several dozen kilometers of a frontline or an international border. Going forward, such designs are likely to become increasingly common worldwide.

Iran’s Pursuit of Larger and Longer-Range Loitering Strike Drone Designs

While Iran’s military industry has developed a diverse array of long-range single-use propeller-driven strike drones, Iran has until recently not allocated as much effort and resources toward developing and deploying shorter-range strike systems for use on the battlefield. Iran has, to be clear, developed a small number of short-range human-portable propeller-driven single-use loitering strike drones. This includes the Sina, which is an analogue to the original American Switchblade in terms of the design of its airframe. Iran has unveiled a similar design under the designation Meraj-521. There is also the Zhubin, which is an analogue to the Polish Warmate-1. These are very small and light human-portable designs primarily intended for use by the lowest echelons in ground combat units (i.e., at the level of a platoon, company, and in some cases at the battalion level). Being human-portable, the aforementioned designs also have very small warheads. As of this writing, there is no indication that any of the aforementioned small loitering strike drones, which at the very least closely imitate foreign designs, have been produced in large numbers or deployed beyond perhaps a small number of elite, better-equipped, and high-readiness Iranian ground combat formations.

Iran also has access to a range of Iranian-developed loitering strike drone designs that appear to be primarily if not exclusively operated by Iran’s non-state allies, namely Hizballah in Lebanon and Ansarallah in Yemen. This includes the Mirsad, which is Hizballah’s designation for the loitering strike drone version of the decades-old Ababil-T design, and the Khatif-1 and Khatif-2 deployed by Ansarallah. These likely amount to low-cost designs but are, in effect, (non-loitering) strike drone designs adapted for use as loitering strike drones as opposed to purpose-built loitering strike drones designed to operate over the battlefield, identify potential targets, particularly mobile targets, and crash into one and detonate upon impact.

In February 2024, Iranian media released a video containing a few seconds of footage that captured the launch sequence of a previously unknown propeller-driven loitering strike drone analogous to the Israeli HERO family and the Russian Lancet family. Iran appeared to have finally developed a loitering strike drone capable of attacking both stationary and mobile targets beyond the immediate frontlines. 

This loitering strike drone design of unknown designation has a distinctive cruciform wing configuration that it shares with the HERO and Lancet families. Designers in multiple countries have converged upon this cruciform wing configuration for loitering strike drone designs, as opposed to a conventional monoplane used on most uncrewed aircraft, because it is conducive to undertaking the fine-tuned maneuvers required to accurately deliver a munition equipped with a relatively small 3-10 kg class warhead in a terminal dive against a moving target. 

A cruciform wing configuration is not without disadvantages, however. Most importantly, it results in very large and cumbersome designs if the cruciform wings are fixed and do not fold, as is the case with the Iranian loitering strike drone of unknown designation that was informally unveiled in February 2024. Folding wings are an option and in practice require an encapsulated design that is launched from a capsule. Encapsulation adds to the cost and complexity of any uncrewed aircraft design. Iran did not release any information about this loitering strike drone of unknown designation at the time but the single brief video indicated that it employed electric propulsion to cruise in flight while reliant on a solid rocket booster for rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) from a simple launch rail. While some observers were quick to claim that this Iranian loitering strike drone of unknown designation was related to the Russian Lancet family, the Iranian design is distinct from all known members of the Israeli HERO family, all known members of the Russian Lancet family, as well as an encapsulated North Korean cruciform wing loitering strike drone design of unknown designation that was unveiled in the summer of 2024.

In January and February 2025, Iran formally unveiled several cruciform wing propeller-driven single-use loitering strike drone designs. Notably, these appear to be part of at least two design families but the full extent of commonality within each design family in terms of hardware, software, and control interfaces cannot be discerned through an examination of the imagery and videos that have been released to date. It bears emphasis that commonality in software can be as important, if not more important, than commonality in hardware among airframes. A common control unit, for example, will allow operators to be readily cross-trained on different members of a loitering strike drone family even if the airframes share little in the way of components.

The first loitering strike drone design that Iran formally unveiled is the Rezvan, which is an encapsulated design with folding cruciform wings that is distinct from the design that was informally unveiled in February 2024.

Several weeks later, the Rezvan appears to have been presented at a different exhibition under the designation Ra’ad-2, which is to say as a member of a new Ra’ad family of single-use propeller-driven loitering strike drones. Iran formally unveiled the Ra’ad-3 at the same exhibition and this appears to be the designation of the fixed cruciform wing design that was informally unveiled in February 2024. It is unclear why the Rezvan appears to have been redesignated the Ra’ad-2 but it is possible that Rezvan is the designation given to this design by the IRGC Ground Force, which appears to be its primary if not only operator, while Ra’ad may be the designation given to the design family by its developers and/or the IRGC’s procurement office.

The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 Encapsulated Loitering Strike Drone

According to Iranian officials, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is electrically powered and carries a 5 kg warhead. Iran has not disclosed the loitering strike drone’s take-off weight or the weight of a loaded ready-to-launch capsule. The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has a claimed maximum range of 20 km and a maximum endurance of 17 minutes.

The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has folding cruciform wings to facilitate integration into the launch capsule. Although the specific folding wing configuration on this Iranian design is not unique, the airframe is not a direct copy of any known existing design. In other words, not only is the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 unrelated to the Russian Lancet family but it is also not a reverse-engineered copy of any known foreign loitering strike drone design.

That the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is a distinctively Iranian design can be seen in its peculiar launch method. The encapsulated members of the Israeli HERO family of loitering strike drones utilize a pneumatic system to eject the uncrewed aircraft from the launch capsule. This results in a so-called soft launch that allows operators to be situated next to the launch capsule at the time of launch and for a loitering strike drone to be launched from an enclosed space. The Russian Lancet family, which is primarily if not exclusively deployed to date in versions with fixed cruciform wings that do not fold and therefore do not fit inside capsules, employs a pneumatic catapult and a launch rail in much the same manner as many ISR drones. While it is an encapsulated design, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 does not appear to have a soft launch capability. It is, rather, equipped with a jettisonable solid rocket booster for RATO and therefore has a significant backblast.

Unsurprisingly, the videos of Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 launches that have been released to date depict a seemingly unsafe area around the launcher that is devoid of any personnel. 

Given its use of RATO without a pneumatic ejection soft launch capability, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 cannot be launched from an enclosed space. A launch crew can, however, remotely launch one or more of these encapsulated loitering strike drones from some distance and will ultimately control the uncrewed aircraft through a radio frequency data link following launch. As a result, the primary benefit of this particular approach to encapsulation is that the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is a more compact design that a crew of two to four personnel can transport and quickly prepare for launch. The encapsulated nature of its design may also make the Rezvan/Ra’ad something of a ready-to-fire all-up-round, but this cannot be confirmed with currently available information.

Although the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has major limitations as a loitering strike munition transported, emplaced, launched, and operated by mobile infantry, the design can be readily employed as a vehicle-launched strike munition. Iran has unveiled a version of the Aras-3 tactical vehicle adapted to serve as a launcher carrying at least five and possibly up to six of these loitering strike drones. It is worth noting that the very same, or perhaps a very similar, Aras-3-based launcher is also used to launch encapsulated Ghaem-118 missiles, which is a turbojet-powered loitering surface-to-air missile that closely emulates the design of the American RTX Coyote. Hence, a single Aras-3 launcher may be equipped with both loitering strike drones and surface-to-air missiles with which to intercept loitering strike drones (use of the Ghaem-118 will, however, require the launcher to be accompanied by another vehicle equipped with a suitable radar to detect aerial targets).

As with the Israeli HERO family of single-use propeller-driven loitering strike drones and the Russian Lancet family, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 employs electric propulsion. This contributes to a reduced acoustic and thermal signature, which is important in a strike drone design intended to loiter over a battlefield home to potential armed targets before diving to detonate upon impact with one such target, preferably without alerting said target of an impending attack. This is in stark contrast to a design like the Iranian Shahed-136 single-use propeller-driven strike drone, which employs a small piston engine as a low-cost propulsion system and one that, relative to even the latest in electric battery technology, utilizes a higher energy density and higher specific energy petroleum-based fuel. The Shahed-136 is, of course, now infamous for the acoustic signature of its moped-like two-stroke engine. The electrically-powered Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, in contrast, has a much lower acoustic signature, and the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has a smaller infrared signature than would be the case if it were equipped with a small piston engine.

Like all loitering stroke drones, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 requires an onboard sensor to locate targets. While a highly automated loitering strike drone with adequate onboard automated target recognition capacity is a possibility, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is more likely to be a less complex and lower-cost human-in-the-loop design in which an enhanced autopilot relieves the remote human operator of the need to directly fly the uncrewed aircraft to a designated area or the designated point of impact. That is, the remote human operator is essentially a sensor operator that directs the loitering strike drone to fly in a particular direction and altitude. When the remote human sensor operator selects a specific target, the loitering strike drone’s enhanced autopilot handles the necessary calculations to plot the trajectory required to intercept the target – impact the target – at a specific location selected by the remote sensor operator. This is in contrast to an armed first-person view (FPV) uncrewed multirotor drone in which the remote human operator directly flies the aircraft and has full control authority (throttle, pitch, roll, and yaw) as if it were a radio-controlled hobby aircraft (i.e. an “RC plane”) with an onboard sensor providing feedback to the remote human pilot.

It is important to note that it is incorrect to suggest that there are only two types of loitering strike drones: fully autonomous loitering strike drones, which require no human-in-the-loop to operate, and less complex conventional human-in-the-loop loitering strike drones in which the remote human operator primarily controls the onboard sensor and identifies a target with the enhanced autopilot flying the aircraft toward a designated area or the designated point of impact. In the world of uncrewed aircraft technology, automation exists on at least one spectrum – the latter ideal type and the currently prevalent form of automation in loitering strike drones is evidently far more automated than the approach undertaken in most armed FPV multirotors in which the remote human operator directly flies the aircraft and has full control authority. There is, moreover, an intermediate set of approaches to automation that have existed for some time in various munitions and have also been recently integrated on otherwise remotely piloted armed FPV multirotors. This requires sufficient onboard automation to allow a loitering strike drone to lock on to a target selected by the remote human operator, an approach best characterized as automated target lock. Once a target is locked by the remote human operator, an enhanced autopilot takes over and plots a trajectory to intercept the selected stationary and perhaps even a moving target. It bears emphasis that an automated target lock capability may or may not be accompanied by automated target recognition, which requires onboard image processing to identify potential targets for a remote human operator to select, or an automated target selection mechanism, in which an onboard computer, not a remote human operator, selects one of multiple possible targets for attack with automated target lock engaged.

An automated target lock capability has many benefits in a loitering strike drone design, which is an expendable single-use munition that detonates upon impact, but requires additional onboard computation and, all things equal, a higher-definition sensor. This adds to the complexity and, more importantly, the cost of a loitering strike drone design. Iran has displayed the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 in a configuration equipped with what is likely to be a low-cost nose-mounted gimballed visible band electro-optical sensor. In itself, an electro-optical sensor is not useful in low light conditions or at nighttime and is usually accompanied by an infrared band sensor to facilitate operation in low light conditions and in variable atmospheric conditions. While a version of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 may exist with a higher-end gimballed sensor ball that incorporates both a visible band electro-optical sensor and an infrared band sensor, the version seen to date is likely to only employ a low-cost visible band electro-optical sensor. Beyond the implications that this has on the effectiveness of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 in combat at night or in low visibility atmospheric conditions, it also means that this encapsulated Iranian loitering strike drone design is unlikely to be equipped with much more than an enhanced autopilot that allows the remote human operator to function as a remote sensor operator responsible for identifying and selecting a target while the enhanced autopilot is responsible for flying the uncrewed aircraft.

Loitering strike drones are inherently capable of diving toward a target in a manner that, to invoke the terminology used in the context of the related area of anti-tank missile technology, amounts to a top-attack capability. That is, loitering strike drones can impact an armoured vehicle such as a tank on the roof, the area in which vehicular armour is typically far less resilient than the armour found on the frontal sector or the sides of a vehicle. The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is reportedly equipped with a 5 kg warhead, which is typical for many anti-tank missile designs.

If the objective is to use the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 to target armoured vehicles, then this Iranian loitering strike munition design may be equipped with a shaped charge warhead with enhanced fragmentation. All else equal, the weight and diameter of a shaped charge warhead are important proxies for the expected level of armour penetration. A generic 5 kg class shaped charge warhead that fits inside the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 fuselage is suitable for use against most armoured vehicles and all unarmoured vehicles, but will likely be of limited effectiveness when used against heavily armoured vehicles such as the Israeli Merkeva IV tank and the Israeli Namer armoured personnel carrier, which is based on the Merkeva IV chassis. More generally, a loitering strike drone will not always impact the roof of a target vehicle, especially if the target is moving. The warhead may, for example, detonate upon impact with the frontal arc of the turret of a target tank, which is very heavily armoured, or impact the side of a turret, which may be protected by explosive reactive armour. In such cases, a 5 kg class shaped charge warhead that fits inside the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 fuselage may be inadequate to have a high probability of penetration. That will require a larger warhead or a tandem shaped charge warhead. The point here is that although a Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 can destroy an unarmoured vehicle and can inflict significant damage on most armoured vehicles, it will likely be unable to destroy the most heavily armoured vehicles, including some of those deployed by Israel. It bears emphasis that although Iran does not share a border with Israel, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has likely been developed with use by Hizballah against Israel in mind.

Although measures can be undertaken to enhance fragmentation and thereby modify a shaped charge warhead into something amounting to a multipurpose warhead, it is important to recognize that the destructive effects of all shaped charge warheads are highly concentrated in one direction by design. That is, the detonation of high explosives, however small the amount, will inherently result in a lethal radius that is subject to blast effects and the fragmentation of the casing containing the explosives as well as nearby material, including the airframe of a loitering strike drone. Shaped charge warheads are optimized to have a high-velocity kinetic effect on a very small surface area that is perpendicular to the airframe containing the warhead. Any other destructive effect is, all things considered, essentially incidental. Any 5 kg class high explosive warhead has a limited destructive radius and a 5 kg class shaped charge warhead has inferior destructive effects unless the warhead detonates upon impact with an armoured vehicle or similar, in which case the designer’s primary concern is the extent of damage made to the interior of the armoured vehicle rather than persons and objects around the vehicle’s exterior.

Assuming that the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2’s standard payload is a 5 kg shaped charge warhead, this warhead has likely been designed for enhanced fragmentation to increase lethality against soft targets including personnel. As a result, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 simply offers Iran a different way to deliver the equivalent of a 5 kg anti-tank missile warhead around the battlefield. The destructive effect of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is, as such, nothing like, for example, a Tomahawk cruise missile or similar, a typical aerial bomb released from a crewed combat aircraft, or a much larger and much heavier (non-loitering) single-use propeller-driven strike drone like the Shahed-136. This is not surprising given that the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 airframe likely has a total weight of less than 30 kg while the Tomahawk cruise missile is equipped with a 450 kg class warhead, combat aircraft typically employ 200-500 kg class aerial bombs, and the Shahed-136 is typically equipped with a 50 kg class warhead.

It is important to note that some of Iran’s anti-tank missiles, which are in practice short-range and inherently multi-purpose non-ballistic surface-to-surface missiles, exist in versions equipped with thermobaric warheads for use against targets other than armoured vehicles. Thermobaric warheads can be highly effective against personnel, including personnel concealed within structures. The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 may be available with various warhead options including a thermobaric warhead, in which case it will provide a capability to undertake non-line-of-sight attacks on structures occupied by enemy personnel (i.e., deliver a warhead through a window on the other side of the fourth floor of a building). As with all munitions, fusing is as important as the design and weight of the warhead itself. The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 may be equipped with an airburst fusing option for more effective employment against soft targets such as personnel concentrations but this cannot be confirmed with available information.

The Ra’ad-3 Loitering Strike Drone

The second loitering strike drone design that Iran formally unveiled in early 2025 is the Ra’ad-3, which appears to be very closely related to if not the same as the non-encapsulated cruciform wing design that was informally unveiled in February 2024. According to Iran, the electrically-powered Ra’ad-3, which has fixed wings and is configured for rocket-assisted take-off from a launch rail, is equipped with a rather large 12 kg warhead. In contrast, the encapsulated Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is equipped with a 5 kg warhead. While Iran has not disclosed the takeoff weight of the Ra’ad-3, it is likely to be several times greater than that of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2. The Ra’ad-3 has a claimed maximum range of 100 km and a maximum endurance of 40 minutes. In contrast, the encapsulated Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has a claimed maximum range of just 20 km and a maximum endurance of 17 minutes. 

Like the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, the Ra’ad-3 is equipped with a gimballed nose-mounted sensor ball. The sensor ball seen to date may be the same design as that which has been seen to date on the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2. It is not clear if the Ra’ad-3 is equipped with an infrared band nose-mounted sensor. It would be unusual for such a relatively high-end loitering strike drone with a reported maximum range of 100 km to be incapable of effectively operating at night or in low visibility conditions. It is, of course, possible that the baseline version of the Ra’ad-3 is equipped with a lower-cost electro-optical sensor for use in daytime while another more expensive version is equipped with an infrared band sensor for use at night and in low visibility atmospheric conditions.

One of the most distinctive features of the Ra’ad-3 specimen featured at the formal unveiling event is what appears to be a large antenna that extends above the fuselage just behind the nose. It bears emphasis that this feature does not appear on what is understood to be a Ra’ad-3 specimen on display at an IRGC Ground Force exhibition – which can be seen in the preceding image – following the design’s formal unveiling. The presumed Ra’ad-3 specimen that was informally unveiled in February 2024 is also different from the two other Ra’ad-3 specimens seen to date. This small but not insignificant variance in the design cannot be explained at this time. That said, the only known recent image of a Ra’ad-3 in flight, that of a specimen that detonated upon impact in an exercise, incorporates the large antenna on top of the fuselage that was seen installed on the specimen on display at the Ra’ad-3’s formal unveiling.

While Iran has disclosed that the Ra’ad-3 is equipped with a 12 kg warhead, it has not disclosed the type of warhead carried by this loitering strike drone. A 12 kg shaped charge warhead, perhaps a tandem shaped charge warhead, is a possibility but is not optimal for use against many potential targets. As with all munitions, the destructive effects are strongly shaped by the selection of both a warhead and a fusing option that is optimized for damaging or destroying a particular target. It is not known if the Ra’ad-3 is available with various warhead options, including a thermobaric warhead, or, for example, an airburst fusing option. Given the larger size of its warhead, the Ra’ad-3 is a candidate for use of a (light) penetrating warhead designed to apply blast and fragmentation effects after a hardened structure, such as a bunker or the doors of a munitions storage bunker, has been penetrated. 

While Iran may develop an encapsulated derivative of the Ra’ad-3, the version seen to date is a very cumbersome loitering strike drone design that is best deployed from a self-propelled wheeled launcher that will in turn have to be supported by one or more other vehicles carrying reloads. With a claimed maximum range of 100 km, which should in practice be viewed as range-endurance, the Ra’ad-3 considerably expands the reach of Iranian ground combat commanders. There is nevertheless a very large 80 km gap between the claimed maximum range of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 that begs the question as to the nature of the presumably as yet unseen Ra’ad-1. Although it is possible that the Ra’ad-1 is more of a technology demonstrator not intended for deployment, it may also amount to a more practical intermediate design, which is to say a design that is neither encapsulated nor oversized in pursuit of longer range-endurance. The Ra’ad-3 will complement the rather short-range Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 well if such an intermediate design exists but will otherwise amount to a more of a standalone system used to attack targets between 20 and 100 km from the frontline.

Although the seemingly successful development of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 amount to significant achievements for Iran’s military industry, it bears emphasis that the specifications that Iran disclosed to date suggest that these are designed to a lower price point than the loitering strike drone designs of other countries. The specifications for the Ra’ad-3, for example, compare quite poorly with that of the Israeli HERO-400, a class-leading optionally encapsulated electrically-powered 50 kg design with a claimed maximum range of over 150 km and 120 minutes of endurance while equipped with an 8 kg warhead. While both the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 appear to have been developed to a much lower price point than other loitering strike drone designs and notwithstanding the fact that the Israeli company UVision is a world leader in this area of uncrewed aircraft technology, the specifications of the two members of the Ra’ad family of loitering strike drones that have been unveiled to date leave much to be desired. It remains to be seen if there exists a Ra’ad-1 that can serve as an intermediate design with a maximum range of 40-50 kilometers and perhaps even a prospective Ra’ad-4 with specifications more in line with the designs offered by the fast-expanding roster of vendors offering cruciform wing loitering strike drones.

A Submerged Launch Capable Encapsulated Strike Munition of Unknown Designation

Whereas Iran appears to have formally unveiled the Rezvan at one event only to formally unveil it once more several weeks later under the designation Ra’ad-2, in early 2025 Iran informally unveiled what is likely to be a separate submerged launch capable encapsulated strike munition of unknown designation. That is, Iran has developed a distinct encapsulated strike drone that can be launched from a submerged crewed submarine or an uncrewed underwater vehicle. A land-based version of this design, in what is likely to be a different encapsulated form, may also exist but this is speculative. It bears emphasis that this submerged launch-capable encapsulated strike drone design may or may not be capable of loitering with or without a human in the loop.

This encapsulated submerged-launch capable strike drone of unknown designation has a very different design than the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and is unlikely to form part of the Ra’ad family of loitering strike drones. Although the wing folding configuration is similar to that used on the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, the rest of the airframe has major differences. Unlike the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, the fuselage of this design is not of uniform diameter. The launch capsule also appears to be of rather robust construction when compared with the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, and this is of course required to facilitate a submerged launch. This submerged launch-capable loitering strike drone is also notably equipped with what is likely to be a CRPA GNSS antenna array on top of the fuselage just behind the nose section. GNSS antenna arrays of this type are typically installed on single-use strike drones that autonomously navigate to attack predesignated targets without a human in the loop.

Whereas the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is a human-in-the-loop loitering strike drone with a maximum range of just 20 kilometers, it is possible that this submerged-launch capable strike drone of unknown designation may not operate in human-in-the-loop mode or, alternatively, it may be capable of operating autonomously without a human-in-the-loop. The very limited imagery and video that is currently available of this design is insufficient to confirm the existence of a nose-mounted electro-optical and/or an imaging infrared sensor.

While it is possible that a nose-mounted sensor is installed but maintained in a stowed position to prevent damage during the multi-phase launch process, it is also possible that this design lacks a nose-mounted sensor. This design of unknown designation may therefore constitute not a submerged-launch capable (human-in-the-loop) loitering strike drone but a submerged-launch capable autonomous strike drone with a guidance system that is reliant on INS and GNS that is restricted to attacks on preprogrammed stationary targets. It is, of course, also possible that this submerged launch-capable design exists in two or more variants, one of which may be wholly reliant on INS and GNSS. This would not be surprising given that this drone appears to have been developed for launch from, but possibly not yet tested with, crewed submarines and uncrewed underwater vehicles.

As explained earlier in this briefing, absent sufficient onboard automation to facilitate automated target detection, a loitering strike drone requires a human in the loop to identify potential targets and select one for attack. A remote human operator typically undertakes this vital role through a radio frequency data link through which a sensor mounted on the uncrewed aircraft offers feedback from the perspective of the uncrewed aircraft. Radio frequency datalinks are line-of-sight systems and operate at frequencies that do not penetrate water. It is not practical for a crewed submarine or an uncrewed surface vehicle to surface or even elevate a communications mast at periscope depth for a prolonged time to support the operation of what is likely to be a propeller-driven strike drone with a maximum speed of just 100-200 km/h. A crewed submarine and uncrewed underwater vehicle can, of course, also release a communications buoy to the surface, but this will only add to the cost and complexity of employing such a loitering strike drone.

Much is uncertain about this submerged launch capable encapsulated strike drone design of unknown designation. There is currently no indication that this system has been tested at sea, let alone deployed on a crewed submarine or an uncrewed underwater vehicle, and the design may not even amount to a loitering strike drone – it may simply be yet another (non-loitering) Iranian strike drone. This design is nevertheless important for the purposes of this briefing because an encapsulated ground-launched version may emerge and join Iran’s steadily expanding roster of loitering strike drones. A ground-launched version can, after all, readily incorporate an electro-optical sensor in the same manner as the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and the Ra’ad-3.

The Saeghe Family of Low-Cost Loitering Strike Drones

The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, Ra’ad-3, and the submerged launch loitering strike drone of unknown designation are all quite large and, all things considered, fairly complex designs. That is, these are likely to be low-cost strike munitions by the standards of purpose-built military equipment produced by the world’s best-resourced militaries but not low-cost in the manner of, for example, the armed FPV uncrewed multirotor drones made of inexpensive commercial off the shelf components that are widely employed in the Russia-Ukraine War. For Iran, which has limited resources and cannot afford to deploy systems like the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 in very large numbers across its military without forgoing other procurement efforts, and for its non-state allies, which encounter challenges in terms of storage, transport, and, not least the availability of trained manpower to operate let alone sustain complex military equipment, a smaller, lower-cost, and less sophisticated loitering strike drone is likely to have much appeal.

In early 2025, Iran unveiled a small cruciform wing loitering strike drone design with the designation Saeghe-1. The electrically-powered Saeghe-1 has a claimed maximum range of 20 km and a maximum endurance of 30 minutes while carrying a 1 kg warhead. The 1 kg warhead of unknown design is quite small and unsuitable for use against most armoured vehicles. It is, however, adequate for use against personnel, unarmoured vehicles, and various soft targets as well as for use as a fire support system. 

According to an IRGC Ground Force officer interviewed in an Iranian media report, the Saeghe-1 is but one member of the Saeghe family. While the Saeghe-1 is equipped with a 1 kg warhead, there is reportedly a version equipped with a 3 kg warhead and another with a 7 kg warhead. The range and endurance of the heavier payload members of the Saeghe family are not known at this time. While multiple Saeghe family specimens were placed on display at a February 2025 IRGC Ground Force exhibition, Iran has not formally unveiled the Saeghe-2 and Saeghe-3 and it is possible that the airframes seen on display are all Saeghe-1 specimens. According to an IRGC Ground Force officer, all three members of the Saeghe family utilize a single control system. This should allow operators to be cross-trained on all members of the Saeghe family and make the Saeghe family a more versatile design analogous to a multi-purpose anti-tank missile family in the manner of the American BGM-71 TOW and the Russian Kornet in Iranian service.

The most striking attribute of the Saeghe-1 design is its nose-mounted sensor. Loitering strike drones are typically equipped with a nose-mounted sensor ball that can pan and tilt, with the sensor able to undertake optical zoom through its lens. The Saeghe-1, in contrast, is equipped with a small nose-mounted electro-optical sensor in a fixed aperture that cannot pan or tilt and likely has negligible optical zoom. This is likely to be a low-cost commercial off-the-shelf electro-optical sensor, which is to say much the same type of low-cost – and low-definition– electro-optical sensor that is used on most armed FPV multirotors in the Russia-Ukraine War as well as some fixed-wing FPV loitering strike drones such as the Russian Molniya-1 and Molniya-2. Very low-cost electro-optical sensors can be purchased on AliExpress at a starting unit cost of less than US$10 (higher quality components are available at a somewhat higher price point and Chinese vendors typically offer bulk discounts).

The cruciform wing Saeghe-1 appears to be Iran’s take on a factory-built and more sophisticated counterpart to the very crude Russian Molniya-1 and Molniya-2. While armed multirotors, including those of the FPV variety, have proven to be very effective in the Russia-Ukraine War, these have a major limitation in terms of cruise speed and therefore have a long time to target. As a result, armed multirotors are very effective when used to actively search for targets to attack and when used to support a preplanned assault or defensive action but are less useful in offering a more responsive fire support capability against time-sensitive targets identified by other means. Fixed-wing designs like the very crude electrically-powered Russian Molniya-1 and Molniya-2 constitute a practical and low-cost approach to delivering a larger payload than a typical single-use armed uncrewed multirotor drone and doing so at a greater range and a higher cruise speed than is possible with a low cost armed and laden, as opposed to unarmed and unladen uncrewed multirotor drone. The Saeghe-1 offers Iran a comparable capability albeit with a far more sophisticated cruciform wing airframe than the Molniya-1 and Molniya-2 that complements the comparatively much higher-end Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3. That is, what the Saeghe-1 lacks in quality is likely to be made up for by a very large scale of production and employment.

It is important to note that the Russian Molniya-1 and Molniya-2 are both fixed-wing FPV loitering strike drones that require remote human operators to directly fly the aircraft – the remote human pilot has full control authority (throttle, pitch, roll, and yaw) over the uncrewed aircraft as if it were a radio-controlled hobby aircraft (i.e. an “RC plane”) with an onboard sensor providing feedback to the remote human pilot. This approach to remotely operating an uncrewed aircraft is very labour intensive, requires personnel trained to serve as remote pilots, is intrinsically susceptible to adversary electronic warfare and signals intelligence capabilities, and imposes a wide range of limitations on the performance of uncrewed aircraft. On the other hand, these minimally automated single-use uncrewed aircraft can be built at a very low unit cost. While Iranian disclosures give no indication that the Saeghe-1 is an FPV loitering strike drone, the low-cost – and low definition – commercial off-the-shelf electro-optical sensor installed in a fixed position on the nose is highly indicative of a low-cost FPV design or at least a minimally automated non-FPV design. If this is the case, then the Saeghe family of loitering strike drones will be most effectively employed when supported by one or more reusable ISR drones equipped with superior electro-optical and/or infrared band sensors to identify priority targets for the Saeghe-1 to attack. This is a very different approach than that which is typically undertaken with loitering strike drones like the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and the Ra’ad-3, which are designed to independently search for targets to attack and are functionally better characterized as armed single-use ISR drones that detonate upon impact with the target instead of dropping one or more munitions on the target or calling in fire support from another source.

Conclusion

The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, Ra’ad-3, the submerged launch-capable encapsulated strike drone of unknown designation, and the Saeghe-1 collectively mark a new direction in Iranian uncrewed aircraft technology. The new Iranian loitering strike drones examined in this SPAS Consulting briefing have many shortcomings but have the potential to engender a major expansion of the combat capabilities of Iran and its non-state allies across the Middle East. Longer-strike capabilities exemplified by the Iranian Shahed-136 remain important but are impractical and inefficient when employed to attack more proximate targets at a distance of several dozen to a hundred or so kilometers from the frontlines or international border. It bears emphasis that longer- and shorter-range strike systems do not exist in isolation. Shorter-range strike systems can be used to create opportunities to more effectively employ longer-range strike systems, such as when, for example, a Ra’ad-2 is used to neutralize a gap-filler radar located close to the frontlines or international border, or when a Ra’ad-3 is used to target a mobile short-range air defence system along the planned route of longer-range strike drones. In so doing, Iran and its non-state allies can more effectively employ longer-range strike capabilities including the Shahed-136.

While the limitations of the recently unveiled uncrewed designs covered in this SPAS Consulting betray Iran’s resource limitations and the enduring limitations of Iran’s fast-improving military industry, it bears emphasis that these designs appear to have been purposefully developed with a low price point in mind. All things equal, lower cost tends to equal lower capability as well as greater exposure to lower cost countermeasures, but quantity can nevertheless have a quality all of its own in a world in which even the most lavishly resourced militaries cannot afford to service their very long target lists with high-end strike munitions alone. Iran has demonstrated the viability of lower-cost strike munitions through its development and deployment of an increasingly diverse and ever-expanding arsenal of long-range single-use propeller-driven strike drones as well as low-cost cruise missiles and turbojet-powered single-use strike drones. The Russia-Ukraine War has demonstrated the value and effectiveness of such designs – which Iran independently pursued for well over a decade before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 – to a global audience while also demonstrating the value and effectiveness of armed uncrewed multirotor drones of various types (an area of technology development that Iran in contrast appears to have largely ignored prior to the Russia-Ukraine War). With the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, Ra’ad-3, the submerged launch capable encapsulated strike drone of unknown designation, and the Saeghe-1, Iran appears to be turning its attention to an area of uncrewed aircraft technology it has not previously given much priority. It remains to be seen if Iran has developed loitering strike drone designs that are not only cost-effective but also effective on a battlefield subject to an ever-intensifying measure-countermeasure competition now that observers worldwide are alerted to the threat that loitering strike drones can pose.