Iranian Ballistic Missiles for Russia? Addressing the Questions of Which and How Many Missiles May Be Transferred

A growing number of media outlets are reporting that Iran either has or is set to transfer ballistic missiles to Russia. This briefing, the first of a two-part series from SPAS Consulting, will cover these reported transfers, examine candidate Iranian missile systems, and highlight some of the many sources of uncertainty as to the implications of this reportedly forthcoming and potentially realized transfer of strike munitions on the Russia-Ukraine War. Having established some of the knowns and unknowns that can be discerned based on publicly available information, this briefing will set the stage for a second forthcoming briefing that will directly address the question of how Russia may employ any ballistic missiles that it receives from Iran as well as the implications of the potentially forthcoming if not already realized transfer of such missiles on the Russia-Ukraine War. 

Has The Reported Transfer Of Ballistic Missiles Taken Place? If Not, Will It Take Place?

Such questions may come across as strange given the fact that a transfer is being reported on by a growing number of major news organizations. It is nevertheless important to recognize that this is not the first time that a purported transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia has been reported by major news organizations. There have been recurring reports that such a transfer was on the horizon since the fall of 2022, which is when Russia began to employ Iranian-designed and built Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 propeller-driven strike drones under the Russian designations Geran-1 and Geran-2. This includes not only media reports citing anonymous officials but also on-the-record statements from the likes of Ukraine’s head of military intelligence. As of this writing, the transfer of Iranian armaments to Russia appears to have been limited in scope, with propeller-driven strike drones and artillery shells being the primary publicly known manifestations of such transfers.

It is important to acknowledge that previous media reports may not have been wholly inaccurate. Russia and Iran may have been negotiating for the transfer of ballistic missiles only for an agreement to have not been concluded for any number of potential reasons including a possible recalculation on the part of Iranian decision-makers. It also bears emphasis that Iran is likely to exact a steep price for any such transfer of higher-end armaments and that Russia may have balked at Iranian demands. It should suffice to say that any deal between Tehran and Moscow for the transfer of ballistic missiles in wartime (i.e., for use against Ukraine) is likely to be far more complex than a peacetime sale of more mundane forms of military equipment or the transfer of Iranian armaments to a conflict in which the United States and Europe are more or less passive bystanders. Any deal is, moreover, likely to be highly transactional – Iranian decision-makers appear to care little for Russia’s fortunes in its war against Ukraine provided that Russia remains an independent pole in international politics that is not hostile toward the Islamic Republic when fighting comes to an end.

Given the above, it remains to be seen whether the current round of reporting on the transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia is accurate or at least not as premature as prior reporting may have been.

Which Ballistic Missile Designs Is Iran Reportedly Transferring/Has Potentially Already Transferred To Russia?

There is a lot of uncertainty over this important question, uncertainty that is compounded by the fact that Iran builds and operates an exceptionally diverse array of shorter-range (under 500 km range but typically under 300 km range), medium-range (500-1000 km range), and longer-range (1000-2000 km range) ballistic missile designs. If the situation were reversed with Iran reportedly set to receive ballistic missiles from Russia, then it could be safely assumed that a transfer of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles would involve the Russian 9K720 Iskander or the older and shorter-range Soviet 9K79 Tochka. Simply stated, Russia may be set to receive/may have already received any number of ten or so distinct and highly differentiated Iranian ballistic missile designs.

There has been no consistency in reporting on potential/realized transfers of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia since the fall of 2022. In February 2024, Reuters reported that Russia was set to receive around 400 ballistic missiles from Iran, with Reuters explicitly mentioning Iran’s (diverse) Fateh-110 ballistic missile family and the longer-range Zolfaghar. This suggested that Russia was interested in Iranian ballistic missile designs that could essentially serve as substitutes for the Russian Iskander, which remains in limited supply despite what is reported to be a very significant wartime increase in production output. Stated differently, reporting suggested that Russia was as of February 2024 uninterested in Iran’s longer-range ballistic missiles (1000+ km range), or at least Iran was unwilling to offer for export ballistic missiles that it develops and builds primarily for use against Israel. In August 2024, however, reporting from Reuters suggested that Russia was set to receive the Fath and Ababil missiles. Notably, Iran has displayed models of both the Fath and Ababil at the Army-2023 and Army-2024 defence industrial exhibitions in Moscow, the latest iteration of which was held in August. It is, however, worth noting that Iran has also displayed models of other ballistic missiles at these events in Moscow that are not mentioned in reporting from Reuters.

The Fath and Ababil in particular are much smaller and shorter-range designs than the Fateh-110 and Zulfaghar that Reuters mentioned in its earlier reporting, and the most recent round of Reuters reporting suggests that Russia is interested not in a substitute for the Russian Iskander but missiles that could essentially fill the vacancy created by the retirement – later partially reversed prior to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine – of the Soviet Tochka without a direct and widely deployed replacement. Russia appears to have only deployed limited quantities of guided artillery rockets for its 220 mm diameter BM-27 Uragan artillery rocket system and its 300 mm diameter BM-30 Smerch artillery rocket system. The Iranian Fath and Ababil can be used to plug this glaring capability gap, one that severely undermines the Russian Army's preferred approach to ground combat operations.

Iran’s longer-range (1000-2000 km) ballistic missile designs tend to receive the most attention from international observers as these are central to the military balance between Iran and Israel. Iran’s shorter-range (under 500 km) and medium-range (500 km to 1000 km) ballistic missiles, in contrast, tend to fly under the proverbial radar even as these are of central importance in the military balance between Iran and the Gulf Arab States and the intimately intertwined military balance between Iran and the United States (with American forces primarily deployed in the Gulf States, Iraq, and, until 2021, in Afghanistan). It bears emphasis that the above range-based typology is entirely arbitrary – as are all range-based typologies for ballistic missiles including the very notion of an intercontinental range ballistic missile (ICBM) – and is only offered as a productive typology through which to understand Iranian ballistic missile designs primarily intended for use by Iran.

Iran’s shorter-range ballistic missiles (under 500 km range) have the range required to attack most potential targets in the Gulf Arab states and Iran’s longer-range ballistic missiles (1000-2000 km range) have the range required to target Israel from launch positions in Iranian territory. Iran’s intermediate grouping of medium-range ballistic missiles is primarily deployed to attack targets in the interior of Saudi Arabia and, no less importantly, to facilitate launches against the Gulf Arab states from positions further in Iran’s interior, which reduces the exposure of launchers to attack by American and Gulf Arab combat aircraft. Some of Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile designs are also artifacts of Iran’s approach to missile development. Iranian missile designers are adherents to the spiral model of development, and this results in something approximating a fossil record of progressively improved – and often longer-range – designs, not all of which necessarily enter full-rate production or widespread service.

Iranian military systems have a confusing series of designations which sometimes change as the design evolves. If the intent of this perplexing practice is deception, then the level of confusion caused is likely to also result in collateral self-deception unless the Iranian military itself uses a separate unpublicized series of designations that are more differentiated and more difficult to conflate. This briefing is not an appropriate venue for a complete description of Iran’s many ballistic missile designs and the various designations that Iran has publicized. Instead, it will focus on the ballistic missile designs that have either been explicitly mentioned in reporting or openly advertised by Iran at the Army-2023 and Army-2024 defence industrial exhibitions in Moscow. This briefing will specify and thereafter state in parentheses the export designation of a given Iranian missile design when it is available.

Before proceeding to examine the candidate Iranian missile designs, it is important to explicate that Russia is reported to have only expressed interest in, and Iran appears to have only offered, Iranian ballistic missile designs that employ solid propellant. All of the Iranian missiles mentioned in this briefing are solid-fuelled designs. Iran does operate large numbers of liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles, all of which have a Soviet design ancestry by way of North Korea, and these remain in frontline service (some were launched against Israel in April 2024). Although there is a case to be made that these could be productively employed by Russia against Ukraine, Iran’s liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles are nevertheless beyond the scope of this briefing.

One of the first Iranian ballistic missiles to be mentioned in reporting on a potential transfer to Russia is likely the most ubiquitous in Iranian service. The Fateh-110 is a 610 mm diameter ballistic missile that is advertised as having a maximum range of 300 km while equipped with a 450 kg warhead. Iran advertises the Fateh-110 as the BM-300 to export customers with the number in the export designation referring to the missile’s nominal maximum range.

The Fateh-110 (BM-300) is not a new system but one originating in the 1990s and has been supplanted by newer and more capable Iranian missile designs. The heavy warhead carried by this missile is a vestigial feature reflective of a time when Iranian ballistic missiles were highly inaccurate – a more accurate ballistic missile can be equipped with a smaller warhead while being lighter and less expensive to produce while a heavier warhead can help compensate for inaccuracy by increasing the lethal radius of the warhead. It is important to recognize that the Fateh-110 is not a single unchanging design but a series of closely related and progressively improved – and increasingly accurate – versions of a base design that has played a central role in the development of Iranian solid-fuelled ballistic missile technology and the evolution of Iran’s missile arsenal into a means of increasingly accurate long-range strike. As a result, some caution is called for when considering the potential transfer of the Fateh-110 (BM-300) to Russia as it is not clear which Fateh-110 version is being referred to in media reports.

The Fateh-110 (BM-300) served as the basis for the development of a closely related longer-range derivative, the Fateh-313. This member of the Fateh family may have the export designation of BM-440, which is to say it has an advertised nominal maximum range of 440 km. While the Fateh-313 is part of Iran’s Fateh family of ballistic missiles, it has not been explicitly mentioned in reporting as of this writing. Moreover, Iran does not appear to have displayed models of the Fateh-313 at either the Army-2023 or Army-2024 defence industrial exhibitions in Moscow and a BM-440 does not appear in publicly available material from Iran’s official export catalogue, unlike the Fateh-110/BM-300.

With the production status of the Fateh-110 (BM-300) being uncertain as of 2024, it is an open question whether Iran offers export customers like Russia newly built or existing/“used” specimens that are currently part of Iran’s arsenal. As a single-use weapon system, the notion of a “used” ballistic missile is effectively a contradiction in terms, but it is important to consider given the limited service life of missiles of all types that employ solid propellant (typically 10-15 years). For Russia, which presumably intends to employ – launch – any ballistic missiles sourced from Iran as soon as possible, “used” Fateh-110 (BM-300) missiles with a limited remaining service life are likely to be perfectly fine. For Iran, transfers of “used” ballistic missiles to Russia would allow it to productively dispose of older-production Fateh-110 specimens.

Iran also displayed a model of a different missile, the Zoheir/Raad-500, at the Army-2023 defence industrial exhibitions in Moscow. The Zoheir/Raad-500 is part of a new series of Iranian solid-fuelled ballistic missile designs with a design ancestry different from members of the Fateh family. Unveiled in 2020, the Zoheir/Raad-500 is advertised as having a maximum range of 500 km while equipped with a 320 kg warhead. Given these specifications, the Zoheir/Raad-500 appears to be the intended successor to the older Fateh-110 and Fateh-313 designs in Iranian service.

While the Zoheir/Raad-500 does not appear to have featured in the most recent Army-2024 exhibition in Moscow, Iran did display a model of the guided version (i.e., “missile version”) of the Zelzal series of 610 mm artillery rockets. The Fateh-110 (BM-300) was developed on the basis of the Zelzal series, so the emergence of an upgraded version of the Zelzal blurs the distinction between the two. As with the Fateh-110 (BM-300), the production status of the Zelzal is uncertain and it is possible that Iran is offering Russia “used” specimens from its arsenal.

A separate and longer-range Iranian ballistic missile design, the 680 mm diameter Zolfaghar, has been previously mentioned as a candidate missile set for transfer to Russia. Part of the Fateh family of ballistic missiles, the Zolfgahar is reported to have a maximum range of 700 km while equipped with a 590 kg separating warhead. The production status of the Zolfaghar is uncertain as of 2024 given that the design may have been supplanted by a longer-range derivative, the Dezful, as well as ongoing advances in Iranian ballistic missile technology. Notably, the Zolfaghar has a greater maximum range than the deployed version of the Russian Iskander. The transfer of this Iranian ballistic missile would therefore allow Russia to target all but the westernmost parts of Ukraine.

Complementing these larger Iranian ballistic missiles is a smaller and much less well-known 456 mm diameter missile known by its export designation of BM-250. The BM-250 is advertised as having a maximum range of 250 km while equipped with a 225 kg warhead. Iran has not disclosed its designation for the BM-250 and the operational status of this missile within Iran is unclear. As a result, the production status of the BM-250 is also uncertain, although it has been featured in Iran’s official export catalogue.

Iran has, however, deployed a shorter-range missile that is also on offer to export customers, one that has been explicitly mentioned in recent reporting on a forthcoming/realized transfers to Russia. The 368 mm diameter Fath (BM-120) is advertised as having a maximum range of 120 km while equipped with a 150 kg warhead. The Fath has other designations in Iranian service including the Fath-360, with the numbers in Iran’s domestic designation seemingly referring to the first two digits of the missile’s diameter in millimeters and not the maximum range as is the case with the export designation of BM-120.

The aforementioned Iranian designs are complemented by an even smaller and shorter-range missile which was originally designated the Ababil but has since been offered to export customers including Russia under the designation Arman. Ababil and Arman are respectively also designations for a propeller-driven strike drone and an air defence system, thereby indicating how confusing Iranian designations for military systems can be.

The Ababil/Arman is advertised as having a maximum range of 86 km while equipped with a 45 kg warhead in its baseline configuration. Iran has curiously not disclosed the diameter of the Ababil/Arman, but it is likely in the region of 200-250 mm. Notably, the Ababil/Arman is offered in an Ababil-OP/Arman-OP version. This is equipped with a lighter warhead but augments the onboard inertial navigation system (INS) and global navigation satellite system (GNSS) guidance system with an electro-optical seeker. Iran is the most enthusiastic adopter of electro-optical seekers on guided artillery rockets and ballistic missiles. Such seekers are primarily used to target surface ships and missiles equipped with electro-optical seekers have been transferred to and employed by Ansarallah in Yemen against maritime shipping. The Ababil-OP/Arman-OP appears to be also capable of attacking land-based targets, but the performance of a visible band electro-optical seeker will necessarily be affected by the time of day and atmospheric conditions including cloud cover (which is less of a concern in much of the arid Middle East).

It bears emphasis that while the Fath (BM-120) and Ababil/Arman are emblematic of a grouping of missiles primarily intended to support ground combat operations (these can, of course, also be employed for other purposes inclusive of comparatively shorter-range strikes against stationary targets), Iran does not appear to have a missile design that closely approximates the specifications of the well-known American M31 series of 227 mm guided artillery rocket (employed from the tracked M270 MLRS and wheeled M142 HIMARS launchers), which would fall between the Iranian Fath (BM-120) and Ababil/Arman in terms of performance. These Iranian missiles are nevertheless functional analogues to the better-known American design.

How Many Iranian Ballistic Missiles Will Be/Have Already Been Transferred To Russia?

As previously explained, there is uncertainty as to the specific ballistic missile designs that Iran is set to/has already transferred to Russia. Because the performance and characteristics of candidate Iranian missile designs vary so greatly, it is difficult to assess the implications of such a transfer. This is compounded by variance in reporting on the quantity of missiles that Russia is reportedly set to receive from Iran, at least as part of a first batch. In February 2024, Reuters reported that Iran was set to transfer a total of around 400 ballistic missiles to Russia, with Reuters explicitly mentioning the Fateh-110 (BM-300) and the Zolfaghar. Reports from August 2024, however, explicitly mention the much smaller and shorter-range Fath (BM-120) and Ababil/Arman. Reports from early September 2024 meanwhile suggest that Iran has already transferred 200 Fath (BM-120) missiles, which leaves uncertain what the other 200 or so missiles previously reported may refer to.

The implications of a combined total of 400 Fateh-110 (BM-300) and Zolfaghar on the Russia-Ukraine War are very different than the transfer of a combined total of 400 Fath (BM-120) and Ababil/Arman (a combined total of 400 of these four distinct missile designs is, of course, a distinct possibility). Not only do the Fath (BM-120) and Ababil/Arman have much shorter range and smaller warheads, which naturally carries the implication that these are intended for very different roles than the longer-range Fateh-110 (BM-300) and Zolfaghar, but different quantities of missiles can be carried on each launch vehicle. It bears emphasis that Iran’s launch vehicles cannot accept multiple types of missiles in the manner of the American M270 and M142 launch vehicles, which can be used to launch both the M31 series of guided artillery rockets and the much longer-range ATACMS ballistic missile.

Iran has displayed launch vehicles that can respectively carry up to two Fateh-110 (BM-300) or Zolfaghar ballistic missiles. In contrast, Iran has displayed launch vehicles that can respectively carry six Fath (BM-120) and eight Ababil/Armanmissiles. Missile launchers are generally deployed in multi-vehicle company-sized units (i.e., a battery) if not in battalion-sized units composed of multiple company-sized units (batteries). There are many reasons for this, including the fact that there is a lot of organizational overhead and logistical support that needs to be in place for the launchers to operate as intended. Hence, while individual launch vehicles may operate more independently for several days, the vehicles are ultimately tied to a company-sized if not a battalion-sized parent unit. It is worth noting that a company-sized (or smaller) unit equipped with four missile launchers may be designated as a battalion – one rank higher as military organizations go – but a missile “battalion” equipped with four launchers is nothing like an infantry or tank battalion or even a (tube) artillery battalion (generally equipped with 18 to 24 guns or howitzers) to which several hundred personnel are assigned. Similarly, a battalion-sized missile unit equipped with twelve launch vehicles may be designated a “brigade” while an artillery brigade is generally equipped with 54 to 72 guns or howitzers.

Supposing that Russia deploys the Fath (BM-120) and the Ababil/Arman missiles in company-sized units (“batteries”) each equipped with four launchers, each company-sized unit will respectively require 24 Fath (BM-120) missiles or 32 Ababil/Arman missiles. Supposing that each launch vehicle will be complemented by one or more trucks equipped with a single set of reloads, each company-sized unit will require a minimum of 48 Fath (BM-120) or 64 Ababil/Arman missiles. The Fath (BM-120) has an advertised maximum range of 120 km and Ababil/Arman has an advertised maximum range of 86 km.

Prior to the start of Russia’s Vovchansk Offensive and Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive in the summer of 2024, the active terrestrial frontage of the Russia-Ukraine War – from the border of Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Luhansk provinces to the Dnieper, amounted to some 600 kilometers. In addition, there existed some 400 kilometers or so of active riverine frontage along the Dnieper as well as another 500 or so kilometers of mostly inactive terrestrial frontage along the international border (until the Vovchansk and Kursk offensives were initiated in the summer of 2024). Leaving aside the riverine frontage and the hitherto inactive frontage along the international border, Russia will require no fewer than five company-sized Fath (BM-120) units and seven company-sized Ababil/Arman units to consistently cover the 600 or so kilometers of actively contested frontage from the Kharkiv-Luhansk provincial border to the Dnieper River. If each company-sized unit requires 48 Fath (BM-120) missiles or 64 Ababil/Arman missiles, then Russia will require 240 Fath (BM-120) and 448 Ababil/Arman missiles. These figures would be adequate for just four launchers per company-sized unit and one set of reloads per launcher. This supply of missiles per launcher will likely be expended in no more than a few weeks unless the missiles are strictly rationed, in which case a scarcity-induced low launch tempo would strongly shape the implications of the potential transfer of these missiles on the course of the Russia-Ukraine War.

The purpose of the above analytical exercise is to simply illustrate how little the reported transfer of 400 Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia may amount to if this figure either exclusively or primarily encompasses shorter-range missiles like the Fath (BM-120) and Ababil/Arman. If Russia is set to receive/has already received these shorter-range missile designs, then these are unlikely to be used across the entirety of actively contested frontage that has only expanded with Ukraine’s ongoing Kursk Offensive. If, however, Russia is set to receive 400 (comparatively) longer-range ballistic missiles, then the effects of forthcoming/realized transfers from Iran will likely be experienced not just further in Ukraine’s rear areas far removed from the frontlines but also across more of the actively contested frontline.

It bears mentioning that the latest reporting available as of this writing suggests that Iran may have already transferred 200 Fath (BM-120) missiles to Iran. A total of 200 Fath (BM-120) missiles can be used to equip four company-sized units (batteries) each equipped with four launchers and a total of twenty-four ready-to-fire 120 km range missiles as well as one set of twenty-four missiles as reloads. Alternatively, 200 Fath missiles can be used to equip two company-sized units (batteries) each equipped with four launchers and a total of twenty-four ready-to-fire 120 km range missiles as well as seventy-two missiles – three sets – as reloads. If the total number of missiles being transferred remains capped at around 400 as mentioned in previous reporting, then Russia may be set to receive/have already received 200 missiles of other types, with the types being unknown. With each Ababil/Arman launcher carrying eight of these missiles and a company-sized unit (battery) being equipped with thirty-two missiles, the transfer of just eight Ababil/Arman launch vehicles – enough for two company-sized units  – each accompanied by a single set of reloads will require the transfer of 128 of these missiles, leaving open the possibility that Russia may also receive up to 72 missiles of another type(s) from Iran.

These numbers are undoubtedly large in absolute terms, and it goes without saying that Russia will likely benefit from a significant, if unsustainable and therefore short-term, increase in its fielded military capabilities whatever the quantity of missiles that it may receive/has received from Iran. Two hundred – let alone four hundred – is a much larger number than zero and Russia desperately needs to plug glaring capability gaps across the spectrum of its strike capabilities. It also bears emphasis that the reported transfer of 400 ballistic missiles may only reflect the first of several batches set for transfer by Iran. Even so, there is less to these numbers than meets the eye, particularly if the most recent reports, which claim that Iran has already transferred around 200 of the 120-kilometer range Fath (BM-120) missiles to Iran, are accurate. Ukraine has likely received on a regular basis, and will likely continue to receive on a regular basis, comparable if not significantly larger quantities of guided artillery rockets for the American M270 and M142 rocket launchers, which are functionally analogous to the Iranian Fath (BM-120) and Ababil/Arman notwithstandig variance in the specifications.

Each M270 tracked launch vehicle can carry two modular pods loaded with six missiles each, while each M142 wheeled launch vehicle can carry one pod. Ukraine likely operates a combined total of 50 to 60 of these launch vehicles, meaning that fully loading the launchers without the provisioning of any reloads requires the transfer of around 500 227 mm artillery rockets by the United States. Although this observation is unlikely to offer any comfort to Ukraine, it does highlight the fact that the reported transfer of around 200 Fath (BM-120) missiles with a maximum range of 120 kilometers only offers Russia a means of attacking against targets located relatively close to the frontlines rather than deep in Ukraine’s rear areas, which would be the case if Russia was receiving up to 400 longer-range ballistic missiles such as the Zolfaghar, Zoheir/Raad-500, Fateh-313, Fateh-110 (BM-300), or even the BM-250, let alone any of Iran’s (comparatively) longer-range ballistic missile designs.